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Names of Arrested Activists Publicized

46050015b Paris HARATCH in Armenian
27 Dec 88 pp 1, 4

[Excerpt] The International Federation of Human Rights has established the following list of people arrested [in Soviet Armenia] as of 23 December:

Movses Korkisyan: Arrested on 27 November; member of the Self-Determination Association.

Sergei Grigoryantz: Arrested on 28 November; editor in chief of the journal GLASNOST.

Aleksei Shilkov: Arrested on 28 November; editor of GLASNOST.

Samvel Gevorgyan: Arrested on 10 December; member of Karabakh Committee.

Vazgen Manukyan: Arrested on 10 December; member of Karabakh Committee.

Levon Ter Petrosyan: Arrested on 10 December; member of Karabakh Committee.

Babgen Araktyan: Arrested on 10 December; member of Karabakh Committee.

Igor Muratyan: Arrested on 15 December.

Arshak Satoyan: Arrested on 12 December.

Stepan Garakeupekyan: [no entry]

Vache Petrosyan: Arrested on 10 December in the House of the Writers' Union.

Sembat Akobyan: Arrested on 11 December at his residence.

Tonara Arutyunyan: Arrested on 11 December.

Hrayr Ulubabyan: Arrested on 14 December at his residence.

Khachik Stampoltzyan: Arrested on 14 December at the headquarters of the "Benevolence" Association.

Aleksandr Arzumanyan: Arrested on 15 December.

Mekhak Gabrielyan: Arrested on 13 December. [passage omitted]

Article Defends Use of Force in 'Liberation Movement'

46050016a Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 29 Dec 88 p 4

[Article by A. K.: "The Imperative of the National Liberation Struggle"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The popular (nonspecialized) press plays a major role in the work to shape the political opinion of people. The Armenian press has not been able to play this role properly in its presentation of the Armenian question and our national liberation movement.

The Armenian intelligentsia did not subject these issues to serious and deep analysis to an extent and in a form that was essential. Even so, it is our impression that a significant segment of our intellectuals support the Armenian national liberation movement.

All Armenian intellectuals and the entire Armenian nation agree that the rights of the Armenian people must be restored. It could not be otherwise. However, there are also

a small number of Armenian intellectuals who agree in principle with the need for the restoration of our rights but who believe that that goal is beyond our means. They advise that the goal of a "unified Armenia" and "unified Armenian nation" be renounced believing that that goal cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. These intellectuals state that they would be satisfied if the genocide committed against the Armenians wins international recognition and try to persuade the Armenian people that they, too, should be satisfied with that. The said intellectuals try to persuade the Armenians of the Diaspora that they should accept their circumstances and the inevitability of assimilation and that they should be satisfied with cultural and social activities and with scoring personal successes in the countries they live in. Viewing issues from a purely humanitarian perspective, these intellectuals of ours condemn the assassination of Turkish government officials by Armenian fighters. While these intellectuals vilify and condemn terrorism, they remain silent about our national liberation movement; they sidestep that movement and they silently try to equate the concept of terrorism with that of national liberation movement. It is evident that the purpose of this equivalence is to vilify the national liberation movement. It must be asserted that unfortunately this approach largely conforms with the policies and propaganda of superpowers which have begun waging a ruthless battle against national liberation movements. [passage omitted]

We are opposed to killing and wars, but we are not opposed to struggles waged by oppressed peoples for national or social liberation. Although we oppose killing, we believe that killings are inevitable in the struggles of the oppressed. [passage omitted]

The biggest hurdle before our liberation struggle is the dispersed state of our people, the fact that it is deprived of a homeland and, finally, our Diaspora realities. However, from a standpoint of our liberation struggle, it must be said that this situation has certain advantages despite all its disadvantages.

We are a people which is dispersed across all continents and several dozen countries. While that situation prevents us from becoming a united national force, it has the advantage of not letting our enemies to oppress and to strangle us once and for all.

Our dispersion makes us and our liberation movement practically unassailable.

The countries in which our people have established residence include countries friendly to Turkey and countries that are hostile to Turkey. There are also countries which have neither hostile nor friendly relations with Turkey. Therefore, the Armenian people is not surrounded with enemies alone.

This situation gives our liberation movement a broad field of activity, ample opportunities to choose areas of activity and the possibility of waging joint battle against Turkey together with forces hostile to Turkey. [passage omitted]

People who are negatively disposed with regard to the liberation movement propose to us that we try to resolve our problems without resorting to force and using so-called purely political and cultural means. [passage omitted]

These views and proposals of the negatively disposed elements often appear to be correct and reasonable because they use as the basis of their arguments the Diaspora's powerless situation whose logical fate is death. While that is true, it is also true that the Armenian people—in this case the Diaspora—has vast possibilities and the means to support a liberation movement which can be used to escape the natural and inevitable path leading to death and to lead the Armenian nation to the restoration of its rights.

The national liberation movement is beneficial and essential not only in terms of its final goal and the likelihood of reaching that goal, but also by virtue of its existence.

The liberation movement can further unite and enhance the political maturity of the Armenians of Soviet Armenia, the Soviet Union and the Diaspora outside the Soviet Union by instilling in their dispersed masses the idea of being a single nation and by making the issue of

the restoration of our rights tangible, achievable and visible. [passage omitted]

Liberation Movement and Armenia

Let us first state that the Diaspora gains meaning and value with Soviet Armenia and the concept of "unified Armenia" and "unified Armenian nation."

Soviet Armenia, our present-day homeland, which acquired its own state as a consequence of revolutionary action and subsequently changed its form of government, is the foundation and anchor point of the Armenian national liberation movement which was born and lives in the Diaspora, and as such Armenia has a vital and decisive role to play in the work of our liberation movement simply by virtue of its existence.

Soviet Armenia is part of the Soviet Union. As a result, its foreign policy must conform with the general foreign policy of the Soviet Union which may sanction or oppose our liberation movement depending on its interests. Nevertheless, as the homeland of the Armenian people Soviet Armenia must at least be able provide moral support and backing for our liberation movement through the moral solidarity of Armenians living in our homeland.

If the Armenian national liberation movement can become an all-Armenian movement, it can play a decisive and determining role in the restoration of the rights of the Armenian people and in the constructive shaping of the fate of the Diaspora and, in general, the future of the Armenian nation.

REGIONAL

Recommendations Made To Bolster GCC Trade Cooperation

44040190 Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 2 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Talib bin Hilal al-'Mu'ammari]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] 'UMAN covered the symposium [on developing Gulf exports] because of its importance to bolstering and supporting exports among Gulf states. The 2-day symposium held four sessions and discussed six working papers.

The first paper, prepared by the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] Secretariat, dealt with the Uniform Economic Agreement and trade cooperation among GCC states.

The second paper, submitted by the Arab Monetary Fund, discussed the role of financing in developing exports. The third, by the Arab Organization for Investment Credit, was on the role of investment credit in developing trade cooperation.

The impact of standards on promoting exports was discussed in a fourth paper prepared by the GCC Standards Organization. The fifth, submitted by the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, discussed Gulf policies conducive to promotion and development of industrial exports. The sixth and final paper was submitted by the Federation of Arab Gulf Chambers [Baghdad Chambers of Commerce and Industry] and discussed the role of Arab and Gulf chambers in export promotion.

After extensive discussions of the working papers submitted to it, the symposium held its final session under the chairmanship of HE Habib Ahmad Qasim, Bahraini minister of commerce and agriculture. [passage omitted]

The following working papers were discussed at working sessions of the symposium:

- The Uniform Economic Agreement and Trade Among GCC States (prepared by the GCC Secretariat);
- The Role of Financing in Export Promotion (prepared by the Arab Monetary Fund);
- Developing Trade Through Credit (submitted by the Arab Organization for Investment Credit);
- The Role of Standards in Promoting Exports (prepared by the GCC Standards Organization);
- Gulf Policies Conducive to the Promotion and Development of Gulf Industrial Exports (prepared by the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting);
- The Role of Arab Gulf Chambers in Export Promotion, submitted by the Federation of Arab Gulf Chambers—the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Symposium discussions and constructive scrutiny of the working papers highlighted the need for sustained efforts by competent governmental authorities and by Arab Gulf Chambers of Commerce and Industry and their member companies and economic concerns with export capability. Their efforts are needed to remove handicaps to the flow of exports and improve product quality to increase competitive ability and efficiency in export markets. Discussions underlined the need for better use of suitable climates, positive developments, and GCC integration tendencies to free regional trade that enabled established industries to expand their markets.

Symposium participants arrived at the unshakable conclusion that the cessation of hostilities between Iraq and Iran and the return of stability to the Gulf region will help invigorate the entire spectrum of economic activity and stimulate demand for all kinds of services and industrial and farm products.

The symposium appreciates the GCC Secretariat's sincere efforts towards better coordination among member states in creating joint productive projects and removing obstacles to the free flow of regional trade and of exports to external markets. Also lauded were Secretariat efforts with such positive manifestations as specialized conferences and symposiums to develop and focus Gulf private sector awareness and enable it to overcome obstacles and challenges to export promotion and to form specialized and professional organizations oriented towards such goals. Examples of the latter are the Saudi Center for Export Promotion, the Gulf Marketing Association, and the projected Arab Marketing Company.

Attendees also lauded the fine efforts and positive role in export support and promotion of such of Gulf, Arab, and regional organizations as the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab Organization for Investment Credit, and the Islamic Development Bank.

The symposium made the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Continue the GCC Secretariat's fine efforts to promote and remove obstacles to the development of regional trade; to increase the negotiating power of GCC states and bolster their bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation agreements with various countries and economic blocks; and to cooperate with specialized world organizations in order to benefit from their expertise.
2. Make wider utilization of the advantages offered by the GCC Uniform Economic Agreement, expedite the implementation of all its provisions, and seek suitable and effective means to overcome whatever implementation problems the agreement might encounter because of the novelty of the experiment.

3. Expand Gulf markets, create new export outlets for Gulf products, develop more coordination and industrial integration, spread various industries in accordance with relative advantage, and support the important role of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting in the field of coordination and industrial consulting.

4. Coordinate and standardize support to and incentives for industries in GCC states so as to ensure complementary competition and coordination in licensing industry. This would help avoid future overcapacity of Gulf productivity especially in capital-intensive high output industries.

5. Concentrate GCC Secretariat studies on the feasibility of added incentives and facilities to bolster Gulf exports as well as introducing uniform export regulations, streamlining procedures, reducing or eliminating customs duties on exports, and introducing countermeasures to protect Gulf products against dumping.

6. Recommend that a portion of the aid and grants to developing countries extended by Gulf governments and funds be in the form of Gulf products.

7. Encourage exports with the use of barter, especially to developing nations that lack foreign exchange for imports, and develop uniform import policies to take advantage of collective bargaining.

8. Generalize the Saudi experiment of establishing export promotion centers in Arab Gulf states to develop policies suitable for export support and promotion, offer various consulting services in the field of external trade, and introduce and promote exportable products. Viable policies must be introduced to coordinate such centers once they are created.

9. Commend the export promotion efforts of Gulf chambers and call upon them to focus efforts on multiplying the export capability of the private sector, proposing support incentives, helping formulate export rules and regulations, and cooperating with appropriate authorities, such as departments of statistics, in supplying adequate information on exportable goods and market demand for them and in urging private sector participation in national, regional, and international exhibitions and specialized symposiums.

10. Exhort competent authorities to define a clear concept of, and specific policies towards, free zones and the economic role they are to have in export promotion.

11. Create national sources of export credit and expand the experiment of the Arab Organization for Export Credit in providing credit for regional Arab trade either directly or through national Arab credit facilities and banks.

12. Study the feasibility of creating specialized national facilities for export credit to be partly owned by commercial and other banks. Such facilities could play an important role in enhancing the competitiveness of Gulf exports. Use should also be made of the longer-range trade financing program developed by the Islamic Development Bank. The implementation of the Arab Monetary Fund's program to finance regional Arab trade should be expedited.

13. Urge private sector responsiveness to and interaction with the GCC Secretariat—especially in efforts and programs to promote Gulf exports—by continuing to develop channels of communication between Gulf chambers and appropriate Secretariat departments.

14. Call for effective participation by Gulf private sector companies and institutions in promoting Gulf exports by attention to and emphasis on product quality, by developing marketing skills, by giving preference to joint ventures, by employing high technology, and by cooperating in research and studies of marketing and the elements of production.

15. Emphasize programs to develop marketing skills by creating specialized agencies, organizing training symposiums, and urging educational institutions to offer courses in export marketing and to make use of training programs.

16. Assure a future role for the GCC Standards Organization in promoting export activities in the period to come in order to improve the quality and reduce costs of Gulf products through increased cooperation between that agency and concerned national authorities in GCC states in order to develop and establish Gulf standards up to the demands of various markets; implement a uniform system of export licenses, make a concerted effort to raise awareness of standards, promote product quality as a basic goal of productivity, and seek producer compliance with these standards.

17. Support the trend for more Gulf marketing organizations and establish institutions specialized in market studies and consultation. There should be emphasis on expediting the formation of the Arab marketing company—a project sponsored by the Arab Investment Company.

18. Urge maritime and overland shipping companies to coordinate and cooperate with Gulf exporters to increase shipping efficiency, reduce costs, and assure regularity of routes to targeted export markets.

19. Expand the trend for commercial sections at Gulf embassies overseas with duties to include the promotion of exportable Gulf products.

20. Form a committee of symposium organizers to follow up on the implementation of symposium recommendations. The committee, at its discretion, may admit to its membership other individuals or specialized agencies.

21. Call for a regularly scheduled symposium on Gulf export promotion to meet at least once every 2 years.

The statement [listing the above resolutions] was unanimously passed.

An attendee had proposed that joint exhibitions of Gulf cooperation states be held in non-GCC countries to help familiarize them with GCC products and manufactured goods. HE Habib Ahmad Qasim, Bahraini minister of commerce and agriculture and chairman of the session, responded that it was a fine suggestion but that many GCC citizens are also unaware of goods and products manufactured domestically or in other GCC states, and exhibitions are therefore needed in the GCC states to promote such industrial and agricultural products.

The symposium was organized by the GCC, the Federation of Arab Gulf Chambers, and the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. [passage omitted]

Participant Describes Libyan-Sudanese Discussions

45040137 Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic
8 Nov 88 pp 4-6

[Article: "Khalfallah al-Rashid and the Story of Unity With Libya"; "verbatim account" narrated by Muhammad al-Shaykh]

[Text] The questions newspaper readers had on their minds every morning, repeating them to themselves and raising them with each other, are justified because there are no longer fixed criteria and rules in light of which they can analyze the ticklish and complex political issues they are experiencing.

Nonetheless, AL-ASHIQQA' tried to put together parts of the story even though its chapters are not yet complete. It met with Mr Khalfallah al-Rashid al-Muhami, former chief justice, member of the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] politburo, and a participant in the unity negotiations.

The first impression we had of Mr Khalfallah was that of ease, great composure, and a youthful appearance.

As for Mr Khalfallah's accounts of what occurred in Tripoli, we are merely the narrators: Published reports about me are not true. I did not say that I signed by mistake or I signed something I did not understand. I just signed minutes of meetings that are not binding on anyone.

As a Sudanese delegation, we went to Libya to hold a dialogue, the outcome of which has to be submitted to the concerned sides for a decision.

What we signed, as brother Aldo Ajo said in the press, was not an agreement but rather the outcome of the dialogue. We attested to the fact that that was the outcome of the discussion.

It seems that understanding issues in a political climate takes on a different nature. Putting it plainly, this delegation went without written official authorization or mandate defining the committee's bounds or powers to sign or not to sign. Likewise, the delegation went without working papers or a shared notion, or even powers to sign on behalf of the parties.

Given these facts, everything that was raised in the political arena was an interpretation of meanings based on specific ends. These words were affirmed by the prime minister when he said that what occurred between Sudan and Libya was not an agreement but rather a plan subject to debate, modification, and so forth.

The truth of the matter is that, because of Libyan measures, we went into a debate without checking some of its hidden aspects. This may be attributed to my more than 30-year legal background that makes me take things at face value without digging deep into matters in a way not supported by the evidence.

When we went into the first meeting between the Sudanese and Libyan delegations, our idea was to define the base on which our dialogue was to proceed, but the Libyans began accusing the DUP of sending its delegates to obstruct the meeting.

During the debate we concluded that they were dealing with the DUP delegates as though they were attending the meeting with a preconceived idea against reaching any kind of understanding with Libya.

We tried in the first meeting to explain that the DUP did not harbor such ideas, that it was a unionist party, and one of the first Arab parties to call for Arab unity, and that we went there to debate and talk with an open mind.

We went one step further toward reassuring them that we went there to communicate and exchange ideas, had no desire to disrupt the meeting, and intended to submit whatever results we accomplished to the concerned authorities in the two countries.

Thereafter, the inability of the Sudanese delegation, and that of the Libyans as well, to prepare a working paper became manifest. The Libyans only presented the constitution of the union between Libya and Algeria. It is known that the foregoing union formula is a "confederate" one, a phase we have not yet reached.

Thereupon, we suggested to the Sudanese delegation that the Libyans wanted to drag us into or involve us in the Libyan-Algerian union plan. The delegation believed that that was not the case and that a Sudanese paper had to be prepared.

In the joint meeting, we explained to the Libyans that we had not developed a concept and that even the course of the debate was not clear to us.

We did, however, develop a Sudanese concept comprised of general matters put together from the fraternal pact with Egypt, from our personal memoranda and, from the Libyan-Algerian union plan.

Our concept dealt with general trends and with unity as a strategic objective: that universal Arab unity was our ultimate direction. We saw no harm in any of this.

Matters developed in subsequent meetings following the presentation of the Sudanese concept. I think the only criticism of what had been achieved was directed not at the general trends but rather at the framework.

We went into this framework after talking about a ministerial council. The Libyans, however, said that a ministerial council did not fit the bill and asked for the creation of a presidential or command council.

These proposals were put forth by more than one Sudanese delegate. Frankly speaking, it seems that we failed to realize that and we were moving with the current. When it was time to sign, however, the final draft came as a surprise to us, for it was affixed with the signature of Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi.

The origin of the story is that I participated in drafting the preamble and two members of the Sudanese delegation took part in preparing the framework, but I was not one of them. We noticed that but did not object because we had agreed prior to the signing that we would sign the outcome of the dialogue that went on between us.

The prevailing opinion was that the heads of the delegations should sign, but a Sudanese delegate suggested that all delegates sign, and we did not object to that because, when we signed, we clearly signed the minutes of the dialogue and not a unity plan, or an agreement, or anything else by any other name.

As for the work sessions, they were divided between plenary sessions and smaller meetings to reconcile points of view.

As for the spirit of the debate, it was clear that the Libyans were determined that this meeting produce a unionist action at the very least or people should not meet in the first place. The Sudanese delegation did not have this kind of understanding.

There was some contradiction and conflict in the formation of the Sudanese delegation for it was blatantly a government delegation created by a cabinet decision and, at the same time, a partisan political one, in addition to the failure to prepare working papers or a common concept among the delegates. Therefore, we were torn between a variety of whimsical differences and how to avoid them in order to present the Sudanese delegation in a favorable light.

This contradiction created a kind of confusion in interpretation and I say this in all honesty.

Finally, we decided that this matter was not final and it seemed that purely legal interpretations in political matters were futile with respect to public opinion.

I looked at it from a purely legal point of view. All interpretations of the outcome of the dialogue are not true because this dialogue cannot be carried out without amending the constitutions in both countries.

And even if we were empowered to sign, this would not be binding on anyone because amending the constitution calls for numerous measures.

I am not an expert in politics and I got involved in it only recently. My many student activities notwithstanding, I have not dedicated my full time to politics.

But it seems that in the world of politics, some things elude inexperienced politicians. I wished brother Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdallah Yasin was with us. Although he is not too much older than I am, I have great confidence in this political experience and I thought he would have been more astute than we were. The same thing goes for brother 'Abd-al-Malik al-Ja'li who is a former judge but of limited political experience, just like me. My political experience is very limited.

As for the secret behind my selection as a member of the Sudanese delegation, I do not know why I was selected. I did not want to travel for personal reasons, the death of my aunt. After insistence, however, I accompanied the delegation, but I did not prepare myself adequately. Add to that the fact that the Sudanese delegation did not meet in Khartoum before leaving.

On a personal level, I do not believe that everything in the world goes according to people's wishes, for if God wants things to happen, they will.

On Thursday, last October 27, I was asked to attend a meeting at the ministerial council at 1 pm. When I went there, I discovered that the meeting had been postponed until 9 am, Saturday 29 October. Our departure for Tripoli was scheduled for 1 pm the same day.

Lack of Sudanese preparation and Libyan insistence on unity did not turn the dialogue between us into a "dialogue of the deaf." As a Sudanese delegation, we had

prepared a Sudanese concept comprised of general goals and certain bilateral matters, but going into the structural aspects was a surprise to us.

There we met with Col Qadhdhafi as representatives of the DUP. We explained to him the unionists' concept of Arab unity: that we were the first party in the Middle East to call for unity as a universal strategic objective, but that the unionists believe that unity must first be achieved with Egypt.

Qadhdhafi did not object to this notion and asked that it be established first.

Based on my personal perception, it seems to me that the uproar over the outcome of the dialogue will not have any more impact and the whole matter will not go any further as evidenced by the fact that no executive action has been taken in the unity between Algeria and Libya.

As for talk that Libya is all set for unity, this is not true. Libya is facing domestic problems and has priorities that might hinder the implementation of any unity, but they do not make this public!

It is clear that all they want to do is announce unity or the lack thereof.

I believe that the uproar over this agreement is primarily a political issue because implementation of the agreement requires the amendment of the constitution. The phased circumstances are not conducive to such an amendment because the most important thing now is to draft a permanent constitution. This requires that the Constituent Assembly be fully formed which in turn requires that the problem in the south be settled.

What is happening is that we are facing difficult domestic problems totally impeding any talk about unity. This is what the DUP meant when it rejected the establishment of this kind of unity.

My conviction is that the agreement we reached triggered political reactions that differ from side to the next. Some may say that there is more to it than meets the eye. Our perception, however, was totally different from the outset, in addition to the fact that the final result of the agreement is totally non-binding.

The upshot of it all is that what occurred in Tripoli was a mere dialogue between two parties about a specific subject which may or may not produce results. I wish the uproar would quiet down a little.

Power Grid Project To Link GCC States
44000275 Manama GULF NEWS in English
20 Dec 88 p 5

[Text] Power savings of more than \$2 billion (BD754 million) a year are expected to be made by a GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] power grid, according to a leading expert.

Dr Nabil al-Musqati, Chief of Electricity Projects Planning, said that the overall cost of the project, to link all the GCC states through a power network, would cost in the region of \$1.62 billion to \$1.77 billion.

But Dr. al-Musqati, speaking to the Bahrain Society of Engineers, said that the savings to be gleaned from the ambitious scheme were immense.

Subsidised

He said that ultimately the project would mean reduced power costs for customers.

"Power charges in the GCC states are very low by international standards, because the power sector is heavily subsidised by governments," said Dr al-Musqati.

"But we have to know that the ultimate objective of the project would be the reduction of power costs for the consumers," he said.

The idea of a GCC power grid was first mooted in 1984.

Following a feasibility study, a working party consisting of electricity ministers and organisations from the six GCC states was formed to examine the option.

Dr al-Musqati said that the aim was for the power network in each of the GCC states to be completed by 1990.

He said that the working party found that not only could benefits be gained by linking the Gulf region through a power grid, but it would lead to the reduction of reserve power and allow for emergencies.

The main advantage would be the reduction of reserves by 3,600 megawatts by the year 2005, which would save about \$2 billion of power costs every year.

Huge savings would also be made on operation costs and maintaining power generation stations.

Dr al-Musqati said that the working team had recommended that the linking process should be carried out in stages.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Arab Children Talk About School, Military, Homeland

44230044 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Dec 88 p 16

[Article by Ya'el Fishbein: "We Want To Go to School and Are Not Afraid of the Army"]

[Text] On a pleasant December day, the IDF [Israel Defense Force] spokesman having been persuaded that a visit by education reporters to schools in the territories poses no security threat to the state, we were permitted to call at several schools in Tulkarm on condition that one officer accompany us at all times and that we talk only about education.

The Khalid Ibn-Sa'id Elementary School for boys was a representative example: Paratroopers were posted on the roof of the high school, which has been turned into a military barracks to ensure order in the school yard. Elementary schools reopened in the territories at the beginning of September. If peace was ensured, the IDF planned to open the middle schools and high schools, too. It became clear to us that the IDF's deterrent force does not "work" well on children. Despite the military presence in the schoolyard, they talked about "Palestine for the Palestinians," drew PLO flags, and voted for the partition of the country between the two nations.

I went into the sixth grade, accompanied by an officer of the civilian administration. It was a small, crowded room. The children sat close together in groups of three. They all stood up, disciplined and respectful, as we came in. Later, as the discussion grew more heated, they abandoned their obedient behavior, stood up from their seats, shouted, became disorderly, and waved their exercise books about. The principal apologized: "We have great disciplinary difficulties with them. They have been out of school a whole year and the street has done its work." I asked what they thought about peace between the two nations—after getting the officer's authorization to ask the question. One of the children tried to clarify: "What does she mean? If she means peace between two states in this country, then we are willing to talk, if not, there is nothing to talk about." The principal asks questions and translates: "She means peace between two nations." The children decide that they are prepared to talk. They talk fearlessly. They are not deterred by either the military man in the classroom or the soldiers on the roof.

I suggested a vote between those in favor of a Palestinian state at the side of the State of Israel, and those in favor of one state for both nations, along the lines of Greater Palestine. Out of 35 children, only four were in favor of one state, the others voted for two states for the two nations.

"We want peace, but we must be treated all right, without force," opined one student. "There must be peace so that blood will not be shed," said another. "When peace comes, all the prisoners will be released," added his neighbor. "We want peace, but on the basis of our self-determination, not yours," said another student. "Peace on the basis of 1947," somebody cried. "Peace in exchange for territories. Palestine for the Palestinians," explained another. "Just like Israel has had a state for 40 years, we want a state, too," shouted one boy. "If you agree to a Palestinian state, then there will be peace. It has to be mutual. You must recognize our state and we must recognize yours," added another boy.

They gradually became noisier and sharper. "We want peace, but you must leave the area, all of you." "I want the Army to leave the school. I want to study. I do not want to run around in the streets, I want us to be an educated people."

And then, when they had all had their say, a short boy with straight brown hair and burning eyes stood up and said: "I want you to get out of my classroom. I want you to get out of my school, I want you to get out of my town, and out of my country. And then there will be peace." A tense silence descended upon the classroom. Another student got up and said: "Why is it OK for Shamir to be your leader, but not for 'Arafat to be ours? Why?"

The officer decided that I had talked to them enough. Out. Outside, the principal apologized humbly: "They did not learn that in school. We do not deal with politics in the school. It all comes from the outside. They have been out of school about 1 year, and they learned plenty out there. They have changed. They are more alert to politics than they used to be. They are more mature. We have disciplinary problems. It is difficult to restrain them. They very much want to study, but they feel that it was not right to close down the school at the time. They felt that it was directed personally against them."

I asked him what he hoped would happen in the near future. He said they all waited for the Army to leave the school and for classes to resume in the high schools. During the months that he sat at home doing nothing, he hoped for "his" school to reopen. Sitting home was difficult. What is more, in the last few months his salary was halved. He bitterly pulled out of his pocket the pay slip for December: NIS 468.72. "We all have economic problems. Some teachers can hardly survive, especially those with families. That is not right. Why punish the teachers, they were not responsible for the schools closing," he said.

During the 1 year of the intifadah [uprising], parents used to call him up and ask him to do something about reopening the school. They complained that the children were running around in the streets and were being exposed to violence. Now that the school was open, he

did not know how long it would take before the students settled down. While we were talking students went by us carrying sheets of paper with the Palestinian flag drawn on them.

My visit to the Khalid Ibn-Sa'id school was preceded by a talk with the head of the Tulkarm regional education office, Abu-Husayn al-Shaykh. A handsome man, dressed in an elegant suit, he has for 9 years served as intermediary between the Israeli authorities in the territories and the local educational system.

The discussion in the cold room, painted the same pale yellow as that of the civilian government officer, was monitored by Major Dajar Faris, deputy commanding officer of the Tulkarm subdistrict. Faris, an exceedingly handsome Druze, treated our talk on education with bored nonchalance. Husayn is an English teacher by profession and speaks English fluently. Maj Faris had trouble following the English conversation, and the talk at times wandered into Arabic. The dialogue was heavy and stilted. Every time a sensitive question arose, such as, how many schools in the area were turned into barracks, the room was plunged into tense silence and Husayn said in an alarmed voice: "I do not want to talk about that. I am afraid." His hands began to sweat and shake. It was only when the officer prompted him: "Say what you want to say," that Husayn began counting: "The Morbiton School, the girls school in Qalqilyah, the Khalid Ibn-Sa'id in Tulkarm, and the high school in Anbata. High schools were also seized in al'Baqah al-Sharqiyah and Bidya. In Qalqilyah the Army has been coming and going at the school in the past 3 months." All of a sudden he stops counting. "I am scared. I do not want to talk. That has nothing to do with education; it is Army affairs."

There is no choice but to talk exclusively about education matters. City classrooms in the territories are not particularly crowded: approximately 40 students in a class. In villages they sometimes push 60 in a class. Two or three classes are joined and taught together. How does one teach 60 kids in 1 classroom? Simple: Some are given independent work to do while others are given a lesson. Half way into the hour, they change.

Although religion is gaining ground in the territories, there are many mixed boys and girls schools in the Tulkarm area. The residents of the territories insist on educating their children, but they do not want them far from home, so they have to put up with mixed schools. Not only are matters of morality swept aside when it comes to education, but money ceases to be a problem, too. The world of the territories is not a stable and secure world, and education is the best investment. Husayn himself has a boy at a university in Jordan. It costs him 30,000 dinars a year. He is spending all his savings on his son, and that is what they all do: spend their last dinar on education. Some 75 percent of the 2,000 students who took the final high school exams in Tulkarm, passed, the highest percentage in the West Bank.

Everybody waited impatiently for the beginning of the school year. Thousands of young people are bitter that the universities remain closed. Of 8,000 Tulkarm high school graduates, 500 went abroad to study. The rest are waiting for the West Bank universities to reopen. Very few are admitted to the University of Amman.

I asked whether the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict was taught in school. The answer was a shrug. That chapter is not in the books, and that is that. I asked how politically involved the teachers were; he pointed out in reply that only four teachers were arrested in all of the Tulkarm area in the course of the intifadah. More than that he was not willing to say. He did not want to talk about that kind of thing. He also refused to answer whether teachers taught in private homes while the schools were closed. He is, however, willing to talk about salaries: The teachers are embittered about the fact that they did not receive full pay in the past few months. The majority have families, are young, qualified, university graduates, but their economic situation is not good. Still, they are dedicated to their profession and have a sense of mission, Husayn said and added: "They know that teaching is their responsibility and that they must give their all to the students, because that is where the future lies." According to him, the Tulkarm educational system is particularly ambitious. "I do everything I can to put the right teacher in the right position. The teacher must feel that he belongs to the school and be proud of it. He is happy if the students pass high school finals." Everybody wants to succeed. No time is wasted on homeroom classes. Religion is taught three times a week.

Later, at the girls school, when he felt more secure, Husayn lectured at length on the importance of religion in the territories:

"You ask why religion is gaining ground in the West Bank? Because people in trouble need God. When you are in dire straits, it is only natural to turn to God. God is One to everyone, Jews and Arabs. The bad things come from Satan. Those who work against people's good are Satan's children. I have hope. All those who believe have hope. I do not know what is happening with us now. Everybody has gone mad. Not normal. But in the future, we will learn to live in peace. The Koran says that only the nonbelievers despair of God's mercy. The day will come when we will all gain God's mercy and will live in peace. What kind of peace? Peace between humans. You are a human being, and I am a human being. So let us live in peace. We all want to live in a peace based on justice, on being able to be independent, and on being able to express one's national identity. Let us express our national identity." This speech, coming from a frightened administration man like Husayn, is amazingly direct. Under the protective wing of religion he allowed himself to express his true feelings. Basically, what he said was no different from what the school children had said.

Ablah 'Awwad is the principal of the girls high school in 'Adawiyah. 'Awwad is a very strict Muslim. She wears the traditional robe and head cover, and her high-heeled shoes echo on the tile floor of the empty school. The school is a marvelously beautiful stone building with a tidy, blossoming garden, fish pond, and trees. The school has laboratories and computers. While in the biology laboratory, I asked the principal how she reconciles her religiousness with Darwin's theory. "I cannot," she answered, "but as an educator I have to teach Darwin's theory, too, and to present various views to my students, both religious and scientific. They will themselves decide which to believe."

'Awwad worked hard on the eve of the school opening. She was worried because the students had missed material. She does not know whether teachers taught in private homes during the intifadah. It was forbidden, and she did not know, and did not care. Now that the school is about to reopen she is planning how to make up for lost material. The teachers will give the girls additional hours, 1-2 a day, at their own expense. Volunteer work.

There is a hospital near the school. One can see the ambulances from the schoolyard when there are riots and wounded. "It is difficult, the situation is so difficult," she sighs and adds: "It is difficult to watch the girls. Willy nilly, they have become involved in the situation. I hope God will help Shamir and 'Arafat to come to some solution."

'Awwad is organizing a discussion with the teachers. A professional discussion, at which they will express their apprehensions about the school opening, the missed material, and the effects of the intifadah on the girls. Later, an Israeli source familiar with the area told us that the calm that impressed us in our talks with the teachers was feigned. The husband of one of them had been detained. The brother of another one of the teachers has already been in jail for a few months, and the father of a third was in the hospital with a rubber bullet wound.

Our IDF-appointed escort was glad to be rid of us. School release hour is a difficult time. The same day there had been several stone throwing incidents. We came out with the absolute conviction that, 10 minutes away from Netanya, a new generation of Palestinians is being reared. During the year of the intifadah they absorbed massive doses of practical political education. They are very familiar with the problems, are not afraid to state their views sharply, are determined, and seek an education. Whoever thinks that it will be possible to continue ruling this generation at ease is making a grievous mistake. They have lived in the streets, they have seen IDF soldiers lose control, they have seen the Army enter their closed schools, they participated in throwing stones, were hit by plastic bullets or gas bombs, and accompanied their friends and relatives to hospitals or detention camps.

Their teachers are intifadah teachers. This is a different brand of teacher. These teachers have a sense of mission; they believe in education and are willing to donate their free time to fulfill the responsibility they took upon themselves: To prepare the future generation of the Palestinian state, the advent of which no one doubts.

West Bank Youths Interviewed

44040198 Kuwait *AL-WATAN* in Arabic 25 Dec 88 p 14

[By John Hatzfeld; translation of article from French newspaper *LIBERATION*, date unknown]

[Text] West Bank—The village of Bani Na'im overlooks the city of Hebron in the south of the West Bank. The village is made up of houses of hard white stone surrounded by vineyards and olive trees on dry clay soil. The residents of the village, numbering 7,600 persons, belong to four clans. One of them, the al-Manasirah clan, settled the town before the Romans came to Palestine. The intifadah [uprising] entered Bani Na'im through its high school, which was closed at the end of December 1987 and still remains without its students.

The intifadah soon spread to the entire village. The people have spent more than 50 days under curfew. Two people have been lost as martyrs. Seven houses have been destroyed. Forty-five people have been wounded and 65 arrested, not to mention a total of 300 people interrogated, most of them "shabab" (young boys and girls of the intifadah). I met eight of these young people in Bani Na'im: Nadiya, Suhaylah, Zinah, Khalil, Ahmad, 'Abdu, Yusuf, and Nazim. These people have always lived in their village. Their ages range between 15 and 30. Their occupations include student, worker, peddler, automobile driver, housewife, and farmer. All have participated physically and spiritually in the intifadah in one way or another. Each has his view of the fundamental subjects connected with "the revolution of stones." Discussion of the subject took the following form:

Arab Governments

[Abdu] When young people took to the streets of Algiers, our hearts were with Algeria, which was always the Arab state most sincere in its support for us. We hoped that it would happen in other Arab states, such as Egypt or others.

[Khalil] The problem is that in the Arab world there is no democracy that allows young people to express their views. Our people working in Arab states suffer a great deal in some of them. There is a danger that one Arab state or another may swallow up the Palestinian state.

[Yusuf] The important thing is that the young people of the Arab states should espouse the path of the young people of the intifadah. In Lebanon, we saw what would happen to the Palestinians when the Arabs take charge of their affairs. They herd our people to the slaughter. It made us think for a long time here. The young people

will not commit their affairs to stupid leaders. We are the ones who pushed the Palestinian National Council to recognize Israel, because this is the right way. No decision is made in the village without approval of the young people. There are enough stones in our villages to throw until the Day of Resurrection!

Overseas Palestinians

[Suhaylah] When the Palestinian state is established, housing and employment priority must go to people from the camps, whether from the West Bank, Gaza, the East Bank, or Lebanon. They are the heart of the intifadah. The condition of the camps in Gaza is shameful.

[Nadiya] The West Bank and Gaza are a small area. If everybody returns, there will be an unemployment problem for the people here. I don't think all the Palestinians will return from abroad, because that would leave a vacuum in the Gulf States. Look at the Jews: Did all the Jews come to Israel?

[Nazim] Many of the Palestinians are wealthy in America. They will invest their money here. That is not too much for them. The Jews do the same.

[Ahmad] In Bani Na'im, as in other villages, every household has relatives abroad. The overseas Palestinians will help the Palestinian state.

Problem of Democracy

[Nadiya] I want a socialist Palestinian state, because the socialist countries never abandoned us. If the capitalist systems in America, Holland, and Britain were examples to be followed, they would never have supported the brutality of the Israeli army against us.

[Nazim] Who refused to grant Yasir 'Arafat an entry visa to go to New York to speak before the UN General Assembly? Who funds the Israeli army? Where does the Jewish lobby flourish? If I were French, I would like the American life; but I was born in occupied Palestine.

[Khalil] A liberal government is undoubtedly better for rich societies. In Palestine, we are poor people. In 1988, you are still without drinking water in our villages. There is no movie house in Hebron.

[Abdu] We don't care whether young people in socialist countries can get jeans or not. Their governments provide them with everything. All political attitudes are represented in the PLO and in the intifadah. In Bani Na'im there are Palestinian communists, others from the Islamic movement, liberals, and members of Fatah. The initiatives of the other parties are always respected. The Palestinian state will never be a one-party state. In some

Arab states that claim to be progressive there are political parties, yet no one dares to say what he feels. The important thing is not to proclaim a capitalist or socialist state; the important thing is to avoid autocratic governments.

[Suhaylah] The Palestinians are the most educated Arab people. This is their one weapon abroad. The socialist system of education is more democratic than the American system of education.

[Ahmad] We must not drown in these details, lest a split develop in the intifadah. What use is all this curiosity about the future? What is important now is that we push the Israelis out with one accord.

Settler Problem

The settlers in the settlement of (Bani Hefer), 3 km from here, have good drinking water and irrigation water for their crops, too, while we go to get drinking water from wells. I don't think the settlers will accept the restrictions that we will impose on their privileges when our state becomes a reality.

[Suhaylah] The settlers are always looking for ways to expel us from here, as if we were a herd of goats. I would not exchange a single word with them, even if it were the end of the world!

[Nadiya] The settlers are the dregs of the Jewish people. They are a sign of advancing fascism. Many Israelis will be thankful to us, if we rid them of these fascist groups.

[Yusuf] When the Israeli authorities cut off our electricity, the settlers hurry to turn on all the lights they have, to exasperate us. They do the same thing when soldiers enter the village. They all have to leave, even if they announce their acceptance of the laws of the Palestinian state.

Israeli Education

[Ahmad] It is hard to say what traces of Israeli culture will remain with us, considering that we were born under the occupation. We never came into much contact with that culture, because all we saw of the Jews was the face of repression—unlike what the Romans did in France and the Arabs in Spain long ago. They fear us like the plague and see us only as unskilled labor. They treat us as if we were animals. That is what I will retain from Jewish culture!

[Khalil] We were under a backward government; then Shamir's brutal government came to us. Even if I lived in the most dictatorial Arab state, I would never regret the loss of this Jewish culture.

[Yusuf] We have to pay attention to the freedom of opinion that exists among them. They form governments democratically and embark upon real election campaigns. Israeli agricultural technology is advanced, but the Israeli technicians do not allow us to learn about their technology. Now we need village agriculture to confront their blockade of us. After the Palestinian state becomes a reality, I would like to learn Israeli technology.

Intifadah and Hope

[Zinah] I hope my daughter will throw stones at the Israelis. I won't be afraid if she does it, even if they blow up my house. I know that the intifadah will never retreat.

[Ahmad] Whenever the Israelis blow up a house, the family receives 1,000 dinars the next day to support itself. If a wife loses her husband, she never pays anything to buy what she needs. That's the intifadah!

[Suhaylah] When the high school was closed at the end of December 1987, we thought it would reopen its doors shortly, but since that time the town has witnessed some incident every day.

[Abdu] Before the intifadah, I used to work from dawn to dusk. Now I work until noon because of the strike. Then I return home, where I find time to discuss everything. The intifadah has politicized everyone. The intifadah gives every person a special task. When we become independent, electricity and water will reach every house from the very first day of independence.

[Nazim] I did not imagine that the intifadah would achieve so much success.

[Nadiya] Before the intifadah, people were afraid of the Israelis. Many Palestinians used to cooperate with them. Only students and freedom fighters dared to resist them. Today, middle-aged men, young boys, and mothers share in the confrontation. Life in the village has changed. When the army comes, we are not afraid of it.

ALGERIA

Minister Discusses Agricultural Development Priorities

45190027 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
11 Dec 88 p 4

[Report on interview with Minister of Agriculture Nourredine Kadra; date and place not given]

[Text] In an interview granted to APS, Minister of Agriculture Nourredine Kadra introduced and commented upon the main lines of the program recently drawn up by the government to revive the agricultural sector.

That sector has just undergone a series of adjustments following the reorganization and redistribution of land belonging to the public agricultural sector. Farmers now expect these reforms to rid them of a series of restrictions and technical or bureaucratic difficulties without whose resolution, it must be noted, there can be no talk of reviving a vital and eminently strategic economic sector.

Claiming to be totally realistic and pragmatic, Kadra, who is well-acquainted with the sector he now heads, having worked in it since 1966, does not conceal the fact that the problems faced in agriculture are serious. "One must know how to listen in order to try to solve them, without philosophizing too much."

Responding to an initial question about the program drawn up by the government for the agricultural sector, Kadra said that the prerequisite for any revival of agriculture depends upon continuing reforms. "This means reorganization of national land. That operation is practically complete. By 6 September 1988, some 23,997 farms had emerged from the reforms, including 20,975 collective operations and 3,022 individual farms. The several thousand hectares still remaining to be distributed are marginal land. The process will be speeded up in order to be completed by the end of December 1988.

"The second phase of the agricultural reorganization will include the establishment of service cooperatives," Kadra said. In accordance with orders signed in September 1988, farmers are free to set up their service cooperatives, either on the basis of existing Wilaya Agricultural Cooperatives (COPAWI) or through the formation of new support structures.

"Concerning UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants] and the wilayas, we planned to begin setting up such cooperatives during the last quarter and following a widespread education campaign.

"A gap occurred following the events of October. Working with UNPA and the local authorities, a new schedule was agreed upon for the establishment of these support structures."

For the minister, the other major aspect that might have a positive influence on national agricultural production is the strengthening and revitalization of the activities of pilot seed farms. "We now have 180 pilot farms whose essential mission remains the production of grain, forage, and vegetable seed. That potential will be able to produce and supply seed for agriculture. In addition, the farms will play a leading role in disseminating and promoting new growing techniques. They will also engage in experimental testing."

Revitalization of Pilot Farms

The farms operate in accordance with 1982 statutes that practically make them state farms. "New statutes are now being drafted aimed at giving them greater autonomy within the framework of the reform introduced into the agricultural sector."

Commenting on the main guidelines drawn up by the government to increase farm production, Kadra said they were aimed in several directions.

"First of all, we shall move in the direction of broadening agricultural potential by stepping up development action in southern regions and the steppe, but in the mountains as well." Major development projects carried out in various parts of the national territory have sometimes been obstructed by inherent inadequacies, generally the absence of infrastructure (roads, trails, electrification), but also a lack of farm machinery and implements, means of transport, credits, and so on.

"In the future, we shall have to set up more reliable mechanisms to revive development activities. In this connection, we shall work with local authorities and water departments to draft a master plan of development for every wilaya, the only way to have consistent follow-up in the field. For example, the wilaya of Ouargla has a program of 3,000 hectares to carry out. For all participants in this operation, it will therefore be a matter of planning what means must be used to ensure success. It will not be our task to staff development operations, but rather, to plan them and respond to needs through optimum use of technical support structures existing in the country."

For example, the Saharan Commissionership for Agronomy in Ouargla will support wilayas in the southern areas and the Commissionership for Development of the Steppe, headquartered in Djelfa, will deal with wilayas located in the steppe region.

Regarding mountain agriculture, a development program was set up a year ago. For the 12 wilayas included this program of the development of arboriculture and the raising of smaller farmyard animals (apiculture, poultry, and rabbitbreeding), development offices exist that do not have overall plans, and they must be strengthened within the framework of mountain agriculture programs.

"Here also, in relation with other sectors outside of agriculture, a number of actions must be carried out aimed at opening up roads, bringing electrification to settlements, starting schools and building housing. The goal is to promote and develop these regions so as to stabilize the population by helping to procure more income and creating optimum living conditions."

In connection with regional agricultural development programs, Kadra announced that priority would be given to rural housing. "It is the farmers who make improvement in and development of areas difficult. They must therefore be helped. We must coordinate means and objectives. Priority must therefore be given to rural housing for these people."

Turning to agricultural production, the minister of agriculture announced that the program set up by the government grants priority to products on which development of production depends, namely seed.

Plant Production: Priority to Grain and Dried Vegetables

"Priority will also go to the production of grain and dried vegetables. The project presented by the previous government tended to encourage such production by increasing prices on production. We hope to approach it by working out a number of incentives.

"In order to develop market garden products, we have drawn up lists of basic products, including potatoes, onions, garlic and tomatoes. Sustained efforts will be made for the industrial production of tomatoes, which we continue to import at great cost.

"Regarding livestock raising, we propose to adjust and continue the program drawn up and presented by the Ministry of Agriculture 3 years ago. Current efforts tend to protect sheep from the drought. As soon as climatic conditions are more favorable, we shall resume the livestock production program, which obviously includes other types of animal production such as aviculture and rabbitbreeding, which have not suffered from the drought."

In describing other action taken to aid the agricultural sector, Kadra mentioned efforts to be made in the area of equipment.

"While we do not have major problems with the production of seed, the same is unfortunately not true regarding farm machinery and implements. The fire at the tractor manufacturing plant in Constantine considerably disrupted the rate of production and only 30 percent of the demand for tractors was met in August 1988."

To remedy the shortage in national production, Kadra announced the imminent acquisition of 6,000 tractors on the foreign market. "The call for bids was issued in December. The machinery will be received in March or April of 1989 and immediately delivered to beneficiaries." The minister also announced the reception in the near future of large amounts of tires for certain types of farm machinery. "In December 1988, we shall begin to distribute 3,000 utility vehicles mainly to be used by farmers."

Despite considerable current or future efforts to equip the agricultural sector, the minister of agriculture admitted that difficulties would remain, particularly insofar as tires and spare parts are concerned.

Following this broad picture of the main outline of the program to revive the agricultural sector, Kadra answered a question about the employment of young people in agriculture. "More intensive mechanization of

this sector will not prevent us from developing jobs," he said. "For the 1988-1989 season, we plan to create over 18,000 jobs in our sector. Livestock production, which comprises a large share of the gross domestic product, has interesting possibilities in this domain. We also hope to create new jobs through the development of small animal breeding projects. There are also great possibilities for creating jobs in the market garden sector. This is a national problem to whose resolution the agricultural sector wishes to make its contribution," Kadra added.

Allocation of Land: Investigative Commission

In response to a question raised in the APN [National People's Assembly] concerning the granting of land to persons outside the agricultural sector as part of the agricultural reform, the minister of agriculture said:

"In order to answer that question once and for all, we have decided to set up a commission responsible for the investigation, working with the different wilayas. We shall consider all controversial cases in order to verify them. Some confusion seems to exist. Let me explain. It is said, for example, that some agricultural officials have been granted land under the reform. That is true. These officials include deputy directors and engineers. In accordance with the law, their salaries have been suspended. With few exceptions, they have left the agricultural sector. These exceptions concern agricultural officials from the wilayas who received land but who were commandeered by the walis [governors] to manage the wilayas' agricultural administration. Obviously, one has the case of recipients who, lacking agricultural equipment, prefer to entrust the working of their land to third parties.

"Some 1,171 persons granted land under the reform waived their claim, either because they know nothing about farming or because they did not have the proper equipment or resources. Land thus abandoned will be redistributed to unemployed young people whom we must obviously help."

In keeping with the reform introduced on behalf of the national land patrimony, Kadra announced the drafting of a number of orders soon to be published, permitting persons who do not work their land in accordance with the law to give it up.

Returning to the topic of farm production, the minister of agriculture announced that it will be oriented toward supplying the national market, although a small export sector will continue to exist.

"We must also work in the direction of better adaptation of the farm equipment that we manufacture in Algeria to the real needs expressed by our farmers."

The minister of agriculture, who claims to reject any excessive intervention in the sector he is responsible for heading, announced that the government would draw up

a number of incentives (prices to production, credits, equipment to increase farm production). "In granting loans and equipment purchases, we shall give preference to farmers who grow priority crops.

"Because the farmer receives profitable prices from his production, he must not be content with low yields. He must participate in the national production effort.

"The matter of increasing farm production is everyone's business, from top to bottom. It is therefore up to every individual to make his contribution."

Railroads, Water Resources Given Priority in 1989 Plan

*45190037b Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
in French 20 Jan 89 p 18*

[Article by Z. Gadoum; first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE introduction]

[Text] Because of their impact on development, water resources and railroads are benefiting from increased support.

Were the projects included in the final year of the 1985-1989 5-year plan going to feel the effect of the financial constraints weighing on the national economy? Although the annual plan for 1989 did revise the order of priorities to some extent, certain strategic sectors such as water resources and the communications infrastructure were not affected by those measures. This is all the more remarkable in that those sectors involve major construction projects requiring studies and construction schedules that are generally spread over long periods of time. In other words, since major state projects are particularly subject to delays by their very nature, making it difficult to stick to schedules, it was to be feared that their progress would be slowed even more by a possible lack of funds.

Water resources and railroads were included among the big priorities in the 1989 plan because it was considered essential to strengthen those veritable "lungs" of the economy. The mobilization of water resources will enable agriculture to progress even further on the road to self-sufficiency, thereby reducing the food bill as well. It must be noted, however, that what this involves is a particularly arduous and long-term task, the reason being that it is not enough to have water resources available in nature: they must also be tamed and made available for the advancement of man and the economy in general. This is also an area in which we must resort to foreign financial and technical resources. Reducing our dependence therefore requires that we strengthen our national capabilities, and we are gradually gaining in experience.

The priority assigned to railroads as part of the program to develop communications infrastructures is explained by the deterioration in the rail system and the small share of traffic it carries in comparison with other means of transportation.

Large sums are being allocated to the two sectors in question. In the case of water resources, an envelope of 6 billion dinars is being set aside for outright grants to be allocated as follows:

1. For major hydraulic projects: 4.2 billion dinars.
2. For small- and medium-scale hydraulic projects: 1.8 billion dinars. These projects will benefit from an additional subsidy totaling 100 million dinars in the form of partially subsidized reimbursable loans (70 million dinars).

The above credits will make it possible to carry out a sizable irrigation program. The new program for the sector as a whole (including small- and large-scale hydraulic projects) has 1.05 billion dinars at its disposal, thus providing more maneuvering room for local action (decentralized programs). As far as actual construction projects are concerned, 1989 will see the start of work on five new dams, including three that were postponed in 1988, as well as the completion of three major water supply systems, continuation of the drilling program, irrigated development, and sanitation services that are a local responsibility. Payment credits for those activities are up by 78 percent over 1988.

In the case of the railroad infrastructure, the credits for 1989 total 2.7 billion dinars, including 100 million dinars in reimbursable loans (in 1988, the credits included in the finance law totaled 2.5 billion dinars, including 150 million dinars in reimbursable loans).

Because of the railroad system's particularly serious state of deterioration and disrepair, efforts in recent years have been devoted to the replacement of track. Track replacement was accelerated thanks chiefly to the newly established INFRAFER [expansion unknown] enterprise and the help provided by members of the National Service. Activities in 1987 were concerned mainly with modernization of the eastern mining line, the replacement of nearly 160 kms of track, and continuation by members of the National Service of their work on the Ain Touta-M'Sila section of track.

It is currently estimated that mobilizable capacity exists for replacing 360 kms of track per year. The main objectives for 1989 are to improve safety and traffic flow on the northern belt line, continue minimum service on the existing narrow-gauge lines (the Relizane-Tiaret and Blida-Djelfa lines), and continue implementation of the railroad master plan for the Algiers region.

Mobilizable capacity exists for laying between 100-140 kms of new track per year. It is obvious that these resources are inadequate for truly reviving railroad traffic. Activities on behalf of the railroads are to continue under the next medium-term plan.

In view of the scarcity of funds, the administrators will naturally be mobilized to reduce costs and stick to schedules. In the case of both railroads and water resources, a regular supply of material will be vital in order to achieve the best results. As a result, enterprises situated upstream from the process in question will have to give the builders unfailing support.

Youth Unemployment: Seminar Outlines Need for Solutions

45190037a Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 20 Jan 89 pp 45-47

[Article by A. Tareb; first paragraph is *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE* introduction]

[Text] There is profound uneasiness. No one today feels comfortable with the deterioration in the economic situation and an austerity policy that is increasingly characterized by the need for sacrifices—often at the expense of the most disadvantaged sectors of society.

How did the citizen, from whom more and more is being asked, wind up in such a situation? And think of the young people! That kind of remark is often heard, and it sums up completely a difficult situation that citizens and young people in particular are finding it more and more difficult to control. It is true that the country is worried about its young people today. Muted anxiety is gripping young people and particularly young people with nothing to do. "A job for my child!" was the cry of distress shouted by an old lady recently in front of a manpower office in the Algiers region. That cry of distress was the cry of a mother greatly tormented by worry over a future that apparently holds no prospects for her son.

The seminar on youth employment that was sponsored recently by the Ministry of Labor and Social [MTAS] amply reflected that concern. And in any case, it revealed all that remains to be done in that field.

Admittedly, the summary report presented by the MTAS' Labor Directorate and the reports by certain governorate delegates in charge of youth employment revealed some degree of effort by the state to help young people who are currently totally unemployed and therefore without resources. But the projects adopted have rarely been welcomed by young people, hence their almost systematic rejection (the work is hard and the pay is poor, with pay scales ranging 800-1,100 dinars per month—yes, you read correctly: 800 dinars for hard labor!). And credits to finance the projects adopted under the Youth Employment Program (PEJ-88) were not made available until long after the program's adoption. The financial limits, combined with the lack of

consistency in the projects, meant that only a minute fraction of young people were reached, and those constraints were mentioned frequently as seriously handicapping the progress of PEJ-88.

PEJ-88 consists of a few figures, judging from the document presented by the Labor Directorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

The PEJ, which was adopted in principle by the Council of Ministers on 23 December 1987, was supposed to involve a little over 95,000 young people through the creation of a little over 58,000 jobs and to place a little over 36,000 young people in training programs. The fragmentary results reaching the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs indicate that overall, only 11,961 permanent jobs were created. The training sector reported the registration of 22,601 young people.

It should be pointed out that of the 1.2 million people currently unemployed, 868,000 are young people. The planned creation of 90,000 jobs and the results achieved by PEJ-88—although that program has not been completed—tend to make one think that despite everything, the efforts made to date are nothing in comparison with what remains to be done.

Through the reports presented by the governorate delegates and other representatives of the public sector or of professional organizations and unions, one could sense the anxiety mentioned at the beginning of this article. It was made very obvious by the representative of the Governorate of Tizi-Ouzou when, in his report, he stirred the emotions of the participants by emphasizing that his department was being invaded by an increasingly large mass of young people looking for work and that more and more of them were turning out to be people with degrees. The same representative emphasized that on the very day before the seminar on youth employment opened, several hundred direct descendants of war martyrs had besieged the governorate's offices to demonstrate their anxiety and feeling of helplessness in the face of the difficulties they are currently experiencing not only in the field of employment but also in connection with housing, training, and so on.

That leads us to a digression concerning the problems related to our educational system, which so far has been one tremendous mess. There was a time in the past when the highest political bodies stressed the need to evaluate the system and apply correctives. The debate at the time was particularly harsh. Today, our educational system has great weaknesses and is even totally unadapted to reality. In any case, there is still the question of how a system that is profoundly democratic at the start—since it provides schooling for the entire childhood population—ends up equipping only a minute fraction of its young people to really "cope."

The principle, extremely noble in itself, of democratizing education by giving everyone equal access to the springs of knowledge turns out to have been corrupted, twisted, and demolished. The result of that situation is that an entire group of young people now has no prospect of normal integration with society, and we are seeing the distressing spectacle of hundreds of young people jostling each other—without much hope, incidentally—outside vocational training schools or apprenticeship centers or facing a great deal of indifference in front of the manpower offices.

The Youth Employment Program (PEJ-88) was devised as an emergency program for dealing with an urgent situation. The analysis presented at the seminar concerning the effort made within the context of that program shows that the means made available to those in charge of carrying it out (basically the governorates) often bore no relation to the problems facing them. How can the demand be met when unemployed young people number in the thousands, funds are clearly inadequate, government officials are in many cases incapable of meeting their obligations even in terms of infrastructure, and the job openings offered are so unattractive? And how has it been met? More or less clumsily so far, we must admit. The best proof of this is the way in which lists of projects of very questionable impact were drawn up without bringing the young people themselves into the process.

And the result was quickly seen, since a good many proposals for bringing young people into the projects were bluntly rejected by the latter.

Generally speaking, and as one delegate pointed out, young people refuse to take any job that does not have a promising future.

The result of that situation was that many projects were not really seriously implemented. Instead of the jobs offered them, young people preferred the parallel labor market, which pays better and involves less tiring work in any case. That situation was reported by several delegates, incidentally.

Moreover, when projects were carried out, they suffered from many inadequacies: poor training (with local communities and especially the communes completely uninvolved in the problems of providing guidance for young people) and inadequate equipment (the Ministry of Commerce's representative at the seminar on youth employment revealed that sizable financial resources would be needed to solve that problem). He said that the national hardware enterprise would need at least twice its current AGI [adjusted gross income] just to provide young people with the small tools they need. Transportation was also a serious problem. Traveling distance to their work and the absence of means of transportation led many young people to give up and caused many others to be fired for repeated tardiness. On this subject,

it should be pointed out that transportation was the responsibility of the young people, who had to pay for it out of their meager wage of 800 dinars.

The establishment of service cooperatives for young people was a hugely popular formula in the employment program, but it ran into many difficulties. The young people frequently had no place to meet—a problem that often put a damper on all initiative. And the secretary general of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs admitted that it was a thorny problem. It seems that because the problem is so acute, a think tank has been set up within the Ministry of Interior.

Another problem and another difficulty was information. It is an understatement to say that information has been neglected in the youth employment program. The statements on that subject were bitter: a lack of information concerning regulations and particularly labor regulations, a lack of information concerning the establishment of service cooperatives, a lack of familiarity with the law on handicrafts, and so on. On this subject, the representative of the National Chamber of Commerce emphasized that his organization was being visited by groups of young people wanting to establish service cooperatives but lacking everything they needed, mainly information. As a result, the National Chamber of Commerce has been able to do nothing but admit its powerlessness. That situation brings us to the role played by the special representatives (a position created under the PEJ) and poses the question of its usefulness. Was it really necessary to overburden the governorates even further when they already had labor directorates and there are employment departments that should have been alerted to the problem and motivated to deal with it?

That being said, however, and despite great inadequacies, PEJ-88 was not completely negative.

Considering the current state of the labor market, which presents great difficulties when it comes to finding jobs for young people, some governorates—admittedly better off than others—showed initiative in implementing the PEJ.

As an example, we can mention the Governorate of Bel-Abbes, where the National Enterprise for the Production of Farm Equipment (ENPMA) set up service units to provide service, an operation that was expanded to include a number of other governorates. Those units consist entirely of young people. The operation is coordinated by "leaders" from the enterprise. In 1989, it should be possible to expand that operation to include machining and maintenance.

And the Governorate of Algiers was able, with the help of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers], to reach 2,200 enterprises scattered all over its territory. As a result, it was able to come up with a number of vacant jobs for 1989.

According to the representative of the Governorate of Algiers, an operation was recently started with the cooperation of the manpower offices. The result: 5,836 vacant jobs were counted as part of that operation, while 4,500 positions were counted in connection with the training and apprenticeship program.

All the same, initiatives like those are limited in number.

If we were to sum up this experience briefly, we would have to say that while the PEJ at least exists—and that is in its favor—it must be revised in terms of its basic components.

That means a revision in terms of inadequate and unrewarding wages, the consistency of the projects involved, a better dissemination of information, and a better grip on training problems—in short, in terms of providing assistance to young people wanting to go to work for themselves as members of cooperatives. While the banking sector is showing its willingness to help—as was advantageously pointed out by the representative of the CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank]—it draws attention to the inescapable question of guarantees and therefore of how the risks will in fact be covered. Everything remains to be done in this area, the exception being the agricultural sector, which is already covered. This was made very obvious, and the difficulties are not minor ones.

The program for 1989 will have to deal with all the inadequacies noted to date and the questions that have still not been answered.

According to the forecasts in PEJ-89, it should be possible to create 90,000 jobs, including 25,000 permanent ones and over 10,000 solely in the sector of services, handicrafts, and so on.

Considering that more and more young graduates are showing up in search of jobs, many projects will have to be reoriented.

While PEJ-89 sets more ambitious goals than those in PEJ-88, we repeat that account must also be taken of everything that did not function properly when the first program was being implemented.

Without prejudging what might happen in 1989—since the representative of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs did not announce how or by what means he intended to combat the inadequacies that showed up during the first program—certain steps are being taken in view of the sluggishness encountered to date. Certain measures for reorienting the work of the current manpower offices are in the planning stage. The BMO's [manpower offices] are destined to become offices providing assistance and advice on the startup of new activities. The first step will be to change their name: the BMO's will become public employment offices. This new activity will require many new skills, and that in

itself constitutes a whole program. Another step will be to reactivate a special fund which was established in 1988 for the employment of young people but which never functioned. According to the representative of the Ministry of Finance, that fund is intended to help finance PEJ-89 at an amount equal to 1 billion dinars.

We can also mention the introduction of a vehicle license fee, the revenue from which will be used to finance the 1989 program, and a 3-year exemption from taxes and additional levies in exchange for the creation of jobs for young people.

The conclusion is obvious. Until 1985, the problem was not a problem of employment but of training. Today, the restrictions are such that in the coming decade, our country is in danger of experiencing a large-scale problem which is that of unemployment, hence the need to do a great deal of thinking to try to come up with solutions, not just stopgap measures. The stakes are important.

Meanwhile, the facts are stubborn. Out of 1.2 million unemployed, 868,000 are young people. That being the case, is the PEJ with its forecast of 90,000 jobs the right solution?

EGYPT

Daily Assails U.S. Veto on Condemnation of Israel

NC1802220689 Cairo MENA in Arabic
2126 GMT 18 Feb 89

[Text] AL-AKHBAR newspaper doubts whether the United States truly desires to settle the Middle East issue on the basis of justice and international legality. The paper questions the meaning of the strange position by the U.S. Administration in using its veto to prevent the UN Security Council from condemning Israel for its arbitrary actions against the Palestinian people.

In an editorial in its Sunday edition, the paper expresses its amazement at the U.S. Administration's use of the veto just a few days after the U.S. State Department issued an official condemnation, accusing Israel openly and unequivocally of violating human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory and of carrying out inhuman practices in its attempts to quell the Palestinian uprising.

AL-AKHBAR points to the attempts by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to prevent the European Community from proposing initiatives to convene an international peace conference and his requests that they defer these attempts until after he has held talks with the parties concerned. The paper says that this stand is increasing the vagueness and fog surrounding the policy of the new U.S. Administration. Concluding, AL-AKHBAR declares that the friends of the United States hope that their doubts about the U.S. Administration are

not true and that the Bush administration will rearrange its cards and define its policy in a manner that is more committed to logic and fairness.

Mustafa Amin Urges More U.S. Aid

JN1502183189 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
14 Feb 89 p 12

[“An Idea” column by Mustafa Amin]

[Text] It is in the interests of the United States for stability to continue in Egypt and for peace and security to prevail in the Middle East. This is an indisputable fact. This, as far as we know, is also one of the bases of U.S. foreign policy. All of this is threatened if the economic situation in the country does not become stable. The attempts by the Zionist mafia in the U.S. Congress to reduce aid to Egypt will not only harm Egypt but will primarily harm U.S. interests.

In the U.S. Constitution, there is an amendment called “Senator Brooke’s Amendment” [as published], which states that any country that stops repaying its accruals—whether in interest or installments—for more than 1 year will be banned from receiving all kinds of U.S. aid. Egypt has to pay late debt interest, and in July, a year will have passed without our repaying interest or installments. So does this constitutional amendment apply to us? And can the United States stop sending us wheat?

We know that the United States is facing certain difficult economic conditions. We also know that the new President, Bush, had to cut back the state budget by \$80 billion, and that he had to reduce the Armed Forces’ budget. But, we also know that Egypt’s economic suffocation threatens peace in the Middle East region.

For its part, Egypt is doing the impossible to reduce state expenditures and is dropping all unnecessary expenses from its budget. However, Egypt cannot immediately implement the demands of the IMF and the World Bank. Otherwise, an explosion will occur that will not be in the interests of the United States, Egypt, or the world, if it happens at the time when Egypt is exerting intensive efforts so that peace and stability will prevail in the region.

The Egyptian people are ready to sacrifice, stand fast, and resist. But, we must make it clear to the United States and the world that we cannot tighten our belts or tolerate price increases any more than we have. Also, we must pursue projects to raise standards of living, encourage investment, increase the area of arable land, and repay our debts. We must also make it clear that we need the support of the United States, the European countries, and Greece. We believe that it is in the interests of all of these states for Egypt to remain strong, stable, and able to play its important role in achieving peace and stability.

For our part, we will continue to fight extravagance and luxury and to reduce the government's expenditure, encourage exports, remove obstacles to investment, and double tourism and production until we reach the day when we can rely on ourselves.

Political Advisor Al-Baz Expresses Optimism Over Future

45040139 Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 7 Dec 88 p 13

[Article: "Dr Usamah al-Baz Offers Vision of Nineties: Egypt Stronger Militarily, Politically and Economically; Our Relations With America Within Boundaries That Serve Our Interests"]

[Text] The lecture given by Dr Usamah al-Baz, chief of the President's Office for Political Affairs, was of great significance given the fact that it was an attempt to explore the shape foreign policy is expected to take in the next phase, the nineties in particular. The lecture's importance was not confined to the content of Dr al-Baz's dissertation, especially since his vision of Egypt's future situation was totally optimistic: that it will be strong politically, economically and militarily. Furthermore, this optimistic outlook included the Arab situation, perceived weaknesses, and the non-aligned situation as well.

Of equal importance were the discussions held immediately after the symposium which may have dealt with the same topics raised in Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid's symposium, most important of which perhaps was the nature of Egypt's relations with Washington and Tel-Aviv, especially since the vision he offered of Egypt in the nineties did not include relations with these two capitals. He affirmed that Egypt's policy transcended the question of Israel. "At one point in time, Tel-Aviv represented our entire thinking: its attitude toward us and our attitude toward it, be it militant or peaceful. It is necessary that this matter take its natural dimension. What I want to say is that I do not think that the idea of Israel ought to be central to Egypt's policy." About relations with America, he said that "they will be confined to the sphere of relations that are not special relations. They are relations of cooperation, broad in terms of cooperation, but they undergo [phases of] attraction and tension. They do not have that personal quality that exists with other countries to which I am bound by a common interest such as future unity or specific strategies. Relations with Arab countries such as the Sudan, and the Palestinian cause are more important than relations with Washington."

To go back to the symposium, Dr Usamah al-Baz alluded to the need to be aware of a number of things before defining the future of the nineties. Entity in particular, or Egypt's vision of itself, must be known and Egypt's role must be sketched in our minds. This means a basic vision of this state in a scientific rather than a subjective

framework based on certain laws such as the laws of movement in history. It is also essential that the vision be flawed and not an absolute, for the only absolute is the divine truth.

Dr Baz said that, in all honesty, Egypt in the nineties will be stronger politically, militarily and culturally, notwithstanding everything that has been said, for several objective reasons, as he put it.

"In the last 40 years Egypt has passed through several phases. They may not have been phases in the accepted sense of the word, but they were phases of growth and development that required change. There was rapid runaway revolutionary change, some of which was developmental. Egypt, however, was always racing in numerous somewhat contiguous phases.

"Egypt has completed the stage of consolidating elements of strength throughout the previous phase, notwithstanding the battles it wages with varying success. It is a historic fact that a strong Egypt is one capable of bringing about balance and stability to the region. We say that it will be stronger politically because we have made significant progress in the matter of democracy." Dr al-Baz emphasized that, in spite of certain persistent problems such as the population explosion and economic problems—regarding which we have not yet agreed on an integral vision among ourselves on how to resolve them, and sometimes disagreement is a blessing—we must arrive at a minimal agreement to formulate a national plan. There is an attempt to commit ourselves to the planning and development of Egypt's own resources. We have, for example, passed the stage of favoring the agricultural and industrial sectors one over the other and are now in the balancing phase.

Dr al-Baz outlines the spheres and the framework that could be linked to the Arab framework and the non-aligned sphere. "We must think within an Arab framework politically, militarily, and in terms of security." About the Arab sphere, he said that "there are vulnerabilities that do not bode well and the picture may be even worse than that. Comparing the Arab World since World War II, there were many Arab countries, some of which were colonialized and some did not exist. The idea of national identity is emerging. Even the existence of the Islamic tendency was linked to the emergence of the idea of turning to the outside in search of a civilizational and cultural identity. Even the concept of unity put forth in the fifties has undergone major changes. Today, there is the idea of regional groupings. There is the Gulf Cooperation Council, the unity or movement within GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries. There is a third wing which is the Nile Valley." He said that he perceived the regional groupings as step on the road to cooperation.

Dr al-Baz said that the Iran-Iraq war has intensified the feeling of division and separation in the Arab world. He said, that in order to dominate, two objectives must be

realized: keeping Egypt preoccupied with its own problems and self-reliant, and not achieving unity among the active forces in the Arab nation. Dr al-Baz emphasized that there was no disagreement between the Islamic international framework or concept and the Arab national framework. He also emphasized that the non-aligned movement has an opportunity to become stronger and more effective due to the existence of a new basis for cooperation among the superpowers; its distinguished role among the countries of the world; and the fact that the cold war is no longer an issue. It must, however, shed its period of weakness, uncertainty, and indecisiveness internally and externally. The movement is undertaking certain demonstrative actions. Dr al-Baz reaffirmed his optimism in the nineties because a strong Egypt will be in a strong Arab nation in the non-aligned movement or in an international framework.

Discussions began after Dr al-Baz concluded his lecture. About what Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim had said concerning its strength amid the faltering non-aligned concept, the question of what we want and where we want to go in the nineties was raised. Dr Sa'd pointed out that Dr al-Baz did not deal with Israel and America in his presentation, particularly in view of Tel-Aviv's technological capabilities. Dr al-Baz replied that it was important that we not be obsessed with Israel. Concerning America, he said that there was a phase that was coming to an end and different major forces [will come into existence-?] He recalled, for instance, that at one time our policy was linked to France and Britain while the subject of America was brought up only occasionally. This means that major forces change and the picture shifts. By and large, we must be confident about our independence and confident about the freedom of our movement. This means that Egypt will be strong. Some forces in the region have been curtailed. Dr al-Baz pointed out that "it was not right to devote special attention to defining my vision of America, for I define my relationship with it on the basis of what serves my national interests. In the future, Egypt will be more capable in the next stage to define the relationship." A participant raised the matter of Islamic thought and the phenomenon of Islamic expansion. He said that this may be a healthy phenomenon, but the Islamic tendency must be convinced that it ought not to impose its concepts and perceptions because imposition and expansion of the scope of the absolute revealed by God to his creatures means denial of Islam. The mistake of the proponents of the Islamic tendency is that he who disagrees with them is considered an enemy to be resisted. Expansion of the scope of thought may compel some of them to turn to violence and our ability to take advantage of this Islamic tributary depends on the ability of the other Arab and Islamic people to realize that it is a question of interaction rather than imposition of opinion.

Commenting on criticism of his optimism, Dr al-Baz said that that was not pessimism but a difference of opinion. He said: "We have an opportunity to achieve progress under its objective and subjective conditions. If

we take advantage of this opportunity, we will achieve knowledge." In reply to the question of technological change coming into Egypt in the nineties, he said that the people are certainly more aware of the subject of technological advances.

Shukri Reacts to Government Communique, States Party Views

45040189A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 Dec 88 p 4

[By Fayiz Zayid]

[Excerpt] In an unprepared statement, which took him over 45 minutes to make, Ibrahim Shukri said, "Let me first of all wish you many happy returns. Let's consider the report prepared by the committee which was entrusted with the task of responding to the government's communique, and let's do so with objectivity and understanding. After all, the report contains many new ideas. Let me thank the committee and its chairman for this report, and let me make a few observations about it.

"The committee started its report by talking about democracy. The government had done the same thing in its communique. That was a good move. To us, democracy is the fruit which people have waited for a long time. Changes have to be made in the elections law, especially in the law which regulates people's political rights. I have called repeatedly for such changes, and I submitted a bill which would provide guarantees for the elections law. All the people are calling for these guarantees. The first conference on justice called for these changes and for an independent judicial authority to oversee all the elections. My bill calls for voters' fingerprints to be on file in the register of voters. This practice is followed in backward, developing, and advanced countries. We saw it being used recently in the United States' presidential elections to ensure the integrity of the elections. We also asked that people use their identity or family cards in the voting process and that voters place an imprint of their thumb in front of their names. We asked that voters' lists correspond to the the civil register in the electoral precinct. We indicated that using absolute lists in electing candidates to the Advisory Council and to local people's councils was not appropriate for the people. We said that the system of voting for a single candidate or for a proportional list was much better than that of voting for an absolute list." Mr Shukri called for the repeal of the emergency law because everyone who wants real stability for Egypt and economic prosperity for our country is calling for the repeal of this law.

"This is what all the opposition parties are asking for when they talk with the National Democratic Party. We know that having an emergency law in effect means that all other laws are suspended. The emergency law has been abused, and because of that, people are crying out and calling for help. This emergency law has been used to discipline villages and to detain and hurt people. Innocent people were arrested in the name of the emergency law, and mosques were desecrated. How can you talk

about a good investment climate when an emergency law is in effect? No Arab or foreigner would come to a country where an emergency law is in effect. No Arab or foreigner would invest his money in such an unstable climate. And yet, we are people who do not support extremism or attacks on policemen. But we also reject, and with equal vigor, extremist practices by the police. I know that many people in villages and residential areas have suffered from the disciplinary campaigns that were launched by policemen. I know that the courts did release all those from the village of al-Kawm al-Ahmar in al-Jizah who had been arrested even though they were guilty of no crime. These people were arrested because a policeman had been attacked. That is something we do not approve of. We can never approve of the humiliation of the Egyptian people, nor can we approve of them being ruled forever by an emergency law."

Ibrahim Shukri wondered, "Is it our destiny to be ruled by the emergency law? This law has caused terrorism and corruption to become widespread and to flourish. Investment companies also became widespread under the emergency law. It was the government's television services that helped these investment companies become widespread and gain the absolute confidence of the people. When the simple and plain people see advertisements for these companies on television, it is impossible for them to believe that these firms would swindle them. The government is partly responsible here, even though the primary culprit in this case is Safwat al-Sharif, minister of information. Television is a dangerous instrument that influences the simple and plain people. Government has to do something about the mistakes made by these investment companies, and it must compensate small investors who were victimized by these companies. Government must take all that into account. People deposited their life savings in these companies so they could receive a steady monthly income to help them meet the harsh demands of life. Now, however, they find themselves unable to find enough to meet their families' expenses.

"Television is destroying Egypt's economy. Last Friday television continued to broadcast programs until 3:15 am, and people, of course, were watching. How can that set proper guidelines for spending? How can workers and farmers work when this television [is keeping them awake]? Television is a blow to attempts which are being made to increase productivity. Such actions, Mr Prime Minister, are destroying the Egyptian economy. They are also destroying the tastes of Egyptian consumers and creating modes of consumption which are incompatible with the nature of the Egyptian people and with their religious traditions."

Ibrahim Shukri went on to say, "The creation of a Supreme Committee to review the laws so that contradictions can be eliminated and consistency with the canonical laws of Islam achieved is commendable. However, the People's Assembly has to do its duty: it must apply the canonical laws of Islam. When Dr Sufi Abu

Talib was speaker of the Assembly, a committee was organized to review the laws and make them consistent with the canonical laws of Islam. This committee has completed its task. Now, however, we find that the work done by the committee has disappeared and vanished without a trace in a manner that is quite astonishing and perplexing." [passage omitted]

Manpower Ministry Shortcomings Detailed *45040157a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 20 Dec 88 p 10*

[By Rida al-'Iraqi]

[Text] The Ministry of Manpower and Education's annual report for 1987 has been issued. The report includes work force planning to appoint graduates, migration, foreign employment, research into the labor structure, wage studies, and the information and statistics center.

The ministry's activity in the area of work force planning constitutes a basic focal point in its pursuit of its areas of specialization, proceeding from a clear, specific notion which considers that the firmer and more accurate this planning is, the greater will be the benefit derived from Egyptian human resources. These constitute the basic element in a production process which assumes the desired form in terms of self-exertion and production.

The tasks assigned to the ministry include the appointment of graduates matriculating in higher and university education and on the level of people possessing intermediate technical credentials. People from the class of 1982 possessing university and higher institute credentials have recently been appointed to real job opportunities after definition of actual needs (6 years after graduating), along with the people possessing intermediate and technical accreditation and above from the class of 1981. The number of people appointed from these classes came to 147,461.

It is worth pointing out that the preceding class of people possessing higher credentials, that of 1981, was appointed 2 years ago (1986). From this class, 30,219 students applied for appointments. The number of people who had passed was 64,128; that is, half the people in the 1981 class who passed applied to the Manpower [Ministry]. If the classes of 1981 and 1982 are compared with the class that had preceded them, we will find that 60,206 passed and 25,511 applied to the Manpower [Ministry]. As for the class of 1982, 27,236 graduates with higher credentials were appointed. It is clear from the comparison that there is a discrepancy between the number of people appointed to government positions and the number of people applying for positions in spite of the increase in the number of graduates and the government's delay in responding to their appointment. The class of 1982 was appointed 6 years after its graduation. This is a policy of the utmost seriousness.

With respect to the graduates of institutes and intermediate certificate holders from the 1981 class, there was a total of 120,225 appointments. With respect to the class of 1980 in terms of intermediate accreditation, 82,011 graduates out of the 154,914 who passed were given appointments. If a comparison is made between the classes of 1980 and 1981, it is clear from the comparison that there was an increase in the number of people presenting requests for positions as a result of the increase in the number of graduates with intermediate credentials, the lack of availability of opportunities outside the governmental framework, and the decline in opportunities to travel abroad, especially following the decline in oil prices.

A Historic Beginning

In 1975, the number of graduates came to 57,000 and within 10 years, that is, in 1985, the number increased to 115,000. It is expected that the number of 1988 graduates for whom job opportunities will be needed will come to 430,000.

It is well known that the volume of manpower in Egypt now is 13,799,000, of whom the government and the public sector provide job opportunities for 5 million.

As for the private sector, it absorbs 8 million employees.

The Central Agency of Mobilization and Statistics has determined that the magnitude of unemployment is 14.8 percent of the volume of the work force (13 million employees), that is, that there are 2.8 million people currently unemployed, and their number is increasing annually. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Haqq, the minister of manpower, has found it necessary to change the pyramid, which has now been turned upside down, and revealed that vocational and occupational training centers do not bring in students; they are empty. Their capacity can accommodate 150,000 and they bring in only about 70,000 a year. There are vocational training centers which give incentives to trainees that are greater than the salary of a graduate with intermediate credentials, and in spite of that, young people abandon this for higher education. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Haqq asserted that there is no solution except in the form of a commitment on the part of private and public education to a specific ratio, where 70 percent of the students will go into vocational and technical education and just 30 to higher and intermediate education.

Eliminating Education in Commerce

In another area, 400,000 students annually apply for work in the labor market, 100,000 of whom have university (higher) credentials and 200,000 intermediate credentials, while about 100,000 are without credentials or are called experts. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Haqq stated "From these figures, a great problem is apparent; of the intermediate credentials, that is, approximately half the work force, 100,000, that is half, have obtained a diploma in

commerce. It is not logical that the job market should absorb 100,000 people who have obtained a diploma in commerce every year. Therefore I request the elimination of education in commerce in Egypt or at least a freeze on it for 10 years."

Forty Percent of the Population Does Not Get an Education

If we subdivide the Egyptian people into the share of the work force which has not reached the working age, we will find that 40 percent of Egyptian society is below the working age, which means that the numbers which will enter the labor market will perceptibly increase. That is, 26 percent of the total population consists of people who are just studying now, and this is to be considered a dangerous reflection of the magnitude of the population problem in Egypt and is the concept which hides the effects of the population explosion.

From the foregoing it is clear that there has been a grievous disruption in the system for appointing graduates. For example, there is a complaint basically about the absence of job opportunities [for women], while their optimum occupation, which is nursing, is facing a growing deficit.

The annual report points out that the ministry is playing a vital, prominent role in the development of job opportunities abroad, and the labor offices belonging to the ministry abroad managed to provide 18,349 job opportunities abroad during the period 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1987: 13,154 workers were nominated to these, and the remaining nominations are being completed for 5,195 job opportunities for the next pilgrimage season. The ministry also reviewed 13,885 labor contracts for people working in the government and the public sector, and 1,472 labor contracts were submitted by the employment offices that have been granted permits in accordance with Law 119 for 1982.

From the table attached to the chapter in the report, it is apparent that the job opportunities the ministry provided involved no more than three [as published] Arab countries: Saudi Arabia (17,939, which I believe are job opportunities in the pilgrimage season); Kuwait, 266 job opportunities; Jordan, 93 job opportunities; Qatar, 36 opportunities; the Emirates, 13 opportunities; and Yemen, two. The remaining Arab countries lack job opportunities. The figures the ministry cited in its report are ludicrous and not in keeping with the role the ministry has been assigned to perform to reduce the burdens of the government and provide job opportunities for the growing unemployment, which exceeded 2.8 percent in 1986.

Since the ministry reviewed the labor contracts, an incident occurred, published in AL-AKHBAR on 27 August under the title "Buy Illusions in the Desert of

Kuwait." The gist of the incident is that an announcement was published in the newspapers requesting specialized engineers and technicians with expertise for Kuwait. The announcement was published with the agreement of the Ministry of Manpower and Training. It was pointed out in the announcement that contracts would be made through the ministry. The engineers were selected in the presence of a delegate from the ministry in the course of tests and the contracts were written up and approved by the Ministry of Manpower. Its delegate approved the signatures on them and kept a copy of each contract. After the chosen group had gone off, they were surprised to find that they had fallen into the hands of contractors in human beings who were supplying engineers and workers to a Kuwaiti company for amounts it received per capita which were greater than 50 percent of the wages it paid to the workers with whom those contractors had concluded agreements in their own countries. Of course these engineers' rights were eliminated. Where was the ministry's role of reviewing the contracts while the incident of theft took place under its documentation of the contract? The incident makes it appear that the ministry's role is marginal and is only bureaucratic procedure and nothing else—if it had any real role!

In addition the ministry has not yet played its part in enumerating the number of Egyptians working abroad!

Research Into Work Force Structures

The annual report states that careful work force planning requires the study of phenomena and indices which are connected to the labor market and considerations of both supply and demand for the work force and its vocational, skilled, and educational areas of specialization in various economic activities. The ministry has carried out a group of studies and research works. These studies have produced important conclusions, the most important of which we will present, namely, the problems of work force supply in commercial activity. The goal of the study is to ascertain the various aspects of the disruption in the work force in commercial activities and the most important areas of contradictions and imbalance in labor structures. The study concluded with the following recommendation: Although commercial activity is to be considered a major, important activity, the power to absorb labor in this activity is still limited compared with other major economic activities. That may perhaps be attributed to the obstacles and problems this sector is suffering from. The volume of the work force in this activity came to about 1.4 million in 1985, and this figure represents about 10.6 percent of the total work force throughout the nation.

The rate of participation of [women] in the commercial work force is considered very limited, since it is no greater than 7 percent of the total work force in this activity. Retail activity is still the dominant trade activity, since it by itself absorbs about 81.9 percent of the total work force, while the share of wholesale trade,

restaurants, and hotels does not exceed 18.1 percent of the total work force, and the private sector alone has taken up about 93 percent of the work force in this activity. This ratio reflects the difficulties the work force planning process can confront in this activity. The rate of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy remains high in this activity, approaching 62 percent of the total work force. The important phenomena related to the work force in this activity include the discrepancy in distribution among various governorates.

Cairo Governorate alone accommodates about 25 percent of the work force. The Governorate of Alexandria comes in second with a 10.5 percent share, Giza with a 8.9 percent share, and finally al-Daqahliyah with a 6.5 percent share. This means that these four governorates absorb close to 50 percent of the work force in this activity.

Egypt Agrees to \$500 Million Construction Deal With Iraq

45040160 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
8 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] The Joint Egyptian-Iraqi Higher Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi and Revolutionary Command Council member and Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, began its eighth session in Cairo yesterday evening.

Dr Sidqi announced that an agreement was reached to increase the joint contract between the two countries from \$250 million for 1989 to \$500 million, requiring a visible effort to raise each party's share of the contract from \$125 million to \$250 million. Dr Sidqi expressed confidence that this ambitious goal would be reached. It was also decided that an agreement would be reached to establish a joint construction company with a capital of \$40 million.

On the agenda of the eighth session of the Joint Egyptian-Iraqi Higher Committee is the building of several large iron, steel, aluminum, and cement factories, as well as the establishment of land reclamation companies and an exchange of expertise on military production. The committee will also discuss signing an agreement to prepare Egyptian labor to help with reconstruction in Iraq, granting the Egyptians special priority and a better position than other nationalities because of the outstanding role they have played in Iraq's development. Problems concerning Egyptians' rights, financial remittances and insurance will be discussed.

Also on the agenda is following up establishment of the Arab Bridge Transport Company and founding another company for ship repair.

Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi, the ministers of social insurance and social affairs, transport and communication, electricity, military production, industry, cabinet affairs, scientific research, economy and finance, justice,

and emigration, the governor of Cairo, the representatives of the major armed forces' commands, the staff of the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo, and Mr 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq, minister of manpower and head of the honor delegation accompanying the Iraqi guest during his visit to Egypt, led those receiving Taha Yasin Ramadan when he arrived in Cairo yesterday.

In his statements to the press, Dr 'Atif Sidqi announced that the preparatory committee began working several days earlier in Cairo at the technician level and that the Egyptian minister of economy and the Iraqi minister of trade, as co-chairmen of the preparatory committee, met Thursday. The committee's work is attaining good results. Dr Sidqi expressed hope that, during its 2-day eighth session, the Higher Committee can crystallize the subjects prepared by the preparatory committee to serve the joint interests of the two countries and support their progress toward joint Arab cooperation in general.

Dr Sidqi added, "If the first meeting of the Higher Committee in Baghdad in July was the beginning of bilateral cooperation, we hope that this meeting will strengthen and deepen this cooperation."

Assessing past cooperation, Dr Sidqi said, "The first meeting of the committee in Baghdad, held after the meeting between Presidents Husni Mubarak and Saddam Husayn, was followed by an exchange of official visits between Iraqi and Egyptian officials in various spheres to establish lasting bridges between the two countries in various economic, commercial, educational, scientific, and transportation activities, which have witnessed tremendous growth in the link between the two countries."

Taha Yasin Ramadan also said that the current session affords an opportunity for increased dialogue and joint research on the issues of bilateral cooperation and for the growth of joint Arab activity in general and on the regional level. He also said that the two sides had initiated a work schedule through a general framework agreed upon during their July meetings in Baghdad. The results will be evaluated and new prospects for cooperation will be discussed. The two parties agree that their steps in this regard will be tied to their ability to carry them out, no matter how small the step, emphasizing the importance of creating a balance between making decisions and implementing these decisions.

Columnist Mocks Tabah Negotiations
JN1702145489 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic
14 Feb 89 p 20

[“Stands” column by Anis Mansur]

[Text] Some of the discussions between Egypt and Israel over Tabah (250 feddans) were ludicrous, really a joke. Let us assume that a 10-year-old child wants to enter Tabah. The passport he carries has his father's and mother's pictures, both of whom are in America. Does he

enter or doesn't he? If he does enter, wants to buy some ice cream, and has only Israeli shekels on him, will you refuse to give a child what he asks for?

Let us assume that two Israeli citizens quarrel and their blood is shed, which law will apply to them? Let us assume one of them is Egyptian, which law will apply to them? Let us assume that a drunk Israeli attacks a store and destroys it, which law would be applied to him?

There are scores of examples that the Egyptians consider pranks and laugh at, whereas the Israelis are very serious about them and demand a reply. If they get an answer, they ask to refer it to their government for consultations—that is, postpone negotiations for a few days.

Many Israeli citizens feel the absurdity of their government and the stubbornness of the negotiators. They say: We ought to win the confidence of the Egyptians. We should not waste time on these trivial negotiations. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship should set an example to encourage the rest of the Arabs.

However, in Israel, they do not have one opinion, political party, or religious sect. Opinions vary between those who say the Sonesta Hotel should be burned down and those who say that it should be weighed against gold.

Realistic people say: Our need for Egypt and Egypt's need for us should not end. The dreamers in Israel believe that the trinity of Tabah, al-'Aqabah, and Eilat is the cornerstone of future tourism and economy—the trinity of progress after the year 2000 when the Egyptians will number 70 million and the Israelis 6 million, when the faces and names in the Arab world change, and when people are more forgiving and concerned about peace and prosperity.

Eilat Mayor Muki Milzer [name as published] told me that linking al-'Aqabah and Tabah by sea is considered a revolution in world communications. Now, for the first time any European can drive his car to Asia or Africa, which is a world historic event.

Columnist Urges Brotherhood To Condemn Terrorism
JN1402071289 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
10 Feb 89 p 5

[From “A Word of Love” column by Muhammad al-Hayawan]

[Text] We are still awaiting a statement by the Muslim Brotherhood condemning terrorism, especially since the Muslim brothers themselves are being subjected to terrorism. We hear that terrorist groups hold them at mosques and beat them with chains. What else are the Muslim Brotherhood leaders awaiting before issuing such a statement?

Editorial Scores 'Rudeness' of Israeli Leaders
JN1802182089 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
16 Feb 89 p 5

[Editorial: "Bizarre Ways in International Relations"]

[Text] Uninhibited by established rules of conduct, Israel follows a unique principle in its foreign policy dealings, assuming that the whole world has taken the side of its adversaries and that it is absolutely free to castigate any country or leader who speaks out against its intransigence on the Palestinian question or hold a conference with PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat.

No personality that has come down on the side of the aggrieved Palestinian people has been spared the rudeness of Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and his foreign minister, Moshe Arens. No matter that such Israeli behavior marks a departure from diplomatic protocol and presumes to deny the right of foreign heads of government and other officials to air their views and convictions.

The British Foreign Office did a good job snubbing the Israeli foreign minister's attempt to play down William Waldegrave's assertion that no power on earth can put down the intifadah [uprising] that has demonstrated that the Palestinian people have legitimate political aspirations that need to be addressed. Israel's defense minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, claimed that the British minister only speaks for himself. Waldegrave had visited the occupied territory and seen for himself Israeli violations of the most basic human rights.

Perhaps we remember Israel's extremely tactless reaction to the reported possibility of French President Francois Mitterrand receiving Yasir 'Arafat at the Elysee Palace. Whenever a European country invites the PLO leader to visit, Israel reacts in similar fashion. Indeed, the United States itself, the only remaining prop for the Tel Aviv government, has not been spared the presumption of Yitzhaq Rabin, who is presiding over the bestiality against the people of the occupied territories and who has had the nerve to denounce U.S. criticism of his handling of the intifadah.

IRAQ

France Reportedly To Build Aircraft Plant in Baghdad
44000272 Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 11 Dec 88 p 8

[Text] Tehran, Dec. 10 (Kayhan Int'l)—According to an Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) report from Paris, a group of French military industrialists have recently met Iraqi officials for studying a feasibility plan of a project to establish a military aircraft factory for producing Mirage-2000 and Alfa Jet warplanes in Iraq.

Based on the report, the LE MONDE newspaper disclosing the ongoing talks also revealed that Iraq has announced its intention to manufacture the entire or at least some parts of the aircraft in the country.

The newspaper emphasized that the project will be implemented through a credit granted to Iraq by France in exchange for oil.

Observers believe that the project could beset France with difficulties, since France has been endeavoring to improve and stabilize its relations with Iran, and does not want to lose Iranian market for its civilian sector, the report added.

LE MONDE added that the French businessmen's delegation has left Baghdad for Kuwait, and has held talks with Kuwait officials on a deal for selling 20 Mirages to the sheikhdom.

JORDAN

Devaluation Deemed Necessary To Change Consumption Patterns

44040201 al-Dammam AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL
Dec 88 pp 53-54

[Interview with Dr Mahir Shukri, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan. Date and place not given]

[Text]

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] How do you evaluate the impact of recent Central Bank measures? What results may be anticipated in the near future and in the medium term?

[Shukri] We anticipated that the exchange market would exhibit temporary imbalances as the fiscal measures are implemented then the market would stabilize and the dinar settle at a certain level. The Central Bank, as it embarked towards monetary flexibility, set a realistic price for the dinar which, despite certain fluctuations, has remained in the range of 420 to 430 fils per dollar.

The exchange market has now returned to normal. Profit margins have noticeably narrowed down from their instability-driven speculative high of around 20 fils per single dollar—quite high at least by Jordan market standards. That wide gap between buy and sell prices has now narrowed to between 5 and 10 fils; closer to 5 fils actually. This would indicate that supply is equal to or slightly higher than demand because price indicators tend to head lower.

We expect prices to go lower still because most dollar holders, regardless of the price they paid, will realize that dollar prices are heading lower, both domestically and abroad. World markets tend towards further corrective reductions in dollar prices in pace with American economy requirements. Jordanian markets will naturally

reflect this tendency as long as they are not isolated from world markets. Dollar holders, especially nonspecialists, would lose by continuing to hold. They had reasons for their buying decisions and their selling decisions will certainly be based on such objective factors as future market trends and the degree of confidence in the national economy.

In the medium term, we believe the dollar will continue to decline vis-a-vis the dinar, perhaps to 400 fils or even 390 fils.

The best measure for savings maintenance is the ruling on stocks and bonds purchases and any other investment within Jordan. We expect the dollar to hover around the price set by the Central Bank and continually edge closer to the official rate. It might remain slightly higher because of the nature of the exchange market. A differential of 10 to 20 fils is reasonable and would hopefully disappear altogether over time.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] How responsive was the banking system to these measures?

[Shukri] Quite responsive, in all honesty. Banks even helped each other with foreign exchange shortages and discouraged patrons from moves that might have been damaging to them, to the measures, or to monetary soundness. It is true as published that one bank pumped dollars into the market in coordination with the Central Bank. Rumors that some banks interrupted certain merchant credit were exaggerated. As it happened, the banks reevaluated certain customers and found they may be unable to support the requested credit lines which were consequently declined or reduced. Credit relationships between banks and their customers are determined by the banks themselves. It is untrue that the Central Bank asked the banks to interrupt certain credit lines.

It must be pointed out, however, that some merchants reacted to the measures by requesting year-long credit coverage. Requests for coverage totaling \$200 million were received by the banks all at once, which exceeds the capability of this country or any other country capable of covering imports for several months but not for a year. This is why the banks declined certain large credit requests.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] Would you explain your procedure for setting foreign currency prices?

[Shukri] The procedure, in short, is to scrutinize such bank receivables as expatriate remittances, export revenues, and any other foreign currency income. This is then balanced against bank foreign exchange payables and current obligations; not future obligations such as credit.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] Will any new measures be introduced? Are there plans to restrict Arab and foreign worker remittances?

[Shukri] No new measures. We believe that what the economy needs now is time to absorb the measures now in place. No restrictions will be imposed on incoming workers even though we believe there may be fewer of them as a result of current measures.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] You had frequently reiterated a commitment to a fixed dinar rate of exchange then you suddenly devalued it. What happened?

[Shukri] In order to avoid exaggerations in the dinar's rate of exchange, the Central Bank has priced it since 1986 on the basis of the foreign trade basket. It was in fact policy up till then to use the rate of exchange as a neutral element and tool of the Central Bank rather than as an active tool of monetary policy [as published]. It was a requirement of that neutrality that the dinar's rate be protected from exaggeration.

That policy, maintained until the adoption of recent measures, required the banks to provide for the country's foreign exchange needs. We found ourselves covering payables but the market did not sell us its surplus. In effect, this turned into official support of currency smuggling, especially as the differential widened between the [official and free market] exchange rate and the price set by the Central Bank. Foreign assets turned into a feeding mechanism for the cambio market. We issued a black list of those individuals who bought foreign currency at the banks and sold it to cambio dealers at the time when the private sector should have had more than enough for its needs. Because of this, we of the Central Bank found that we suffered all the exaggerations of the kingdom's current system. We also concluded that the country could not maintain such levels of spending and consumption. We maintained constant coordination with the government's fiscal and economic policies in order to arrive at the present monetary measures whose objective is to restructure the Jordanian economy to correct imbalances and narrow discrepancies between incomes and revenues and consumption and investment.

We adopted the aforementioned measures to avoid reaching that point and in order to correct for imbalances and discrepancies. We did not notify the Monetary Fund because these measures entailed a change in the pricing mechanism that required devaluing the dinar and not merely reducing its rate of exchange. At present, the dinar is not tied either to special drawing rights or to the foreign trade basket. It was necessary to let it decline on par with supply and demand in order to round the bundle of fiscal and economic measures needed to end the discrepancies.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] What is the purpose of mandatory reserves for foreign currency deposits?

[Shukri] The Central Bank Act empowers us to impose a mandatory deposits reserve ranging from 5 to 35 percent for the purpose of providing bank liquidity and protecting depositors. The Bank has historically required operating banks to post mandatory reserves, which explains why there has never been a single bankruptcy in the history of Jordan banking.

[Early on], we did not require mandatory postings against foreign currency deposits because the amounts were insignificant and largely invested abroad anyway. Foreign currency deposits have been increasing of late, because of circumstances, and it became necessary to extend to foreign currency depositors the same protection accorded dinar depositors. We ask the banks, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to post with the Central Bank a percentage—determined at their discretion—of foreign currency deposits in return for interest rates higher than those of world markets. We had to take such a step because it would not have been proper to release a huge amount of money invested abroad, valued at 500 million dinars, without doing something to regain it by conciliatory means.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] How much are the kingdom's current reserves of gold and foreign exchange?

[Shukri] It is Central Bank policy to reveal only published figures. Foreign assets (Central Bank reserves in foreign currencies) rose to 305 million dinars by the end of last August from 294 million dinars at the end of July, or an increase of some 10 million dinars. Banking system assets at the end of August maintained their July 32 level of about 870 million dinars. The reserves are satisfactory. The recent measures were coincidentally adopted at a time when we believed we had adequate reserves to meet any market upheaval.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] These reserves cover imports for how long a period?

[Shukri] Imports are estimated at a total of 900 million dinars per year. Our reserves cover four months of imports. Many economic observers do not take all assets into accounting. They consider only cash assets and mistakenly overlook gold, receivables from Iraq, and special drawing rights.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] What are the latest figures on Jordanian expatriate remittances? How will they be impacted by recent monetary measures?

[Shukri] Expatriate remittances increased in the first quarter of the year by some 33 percent over the same period a year earlier but declined in the second quarter, for a net increase of 22 percent in the first half of the year. Figures for July show that the increase has slowed to about 14 percent over the same period in 1987. This would indicate a reluctance to remit.

[AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL] What is the size of Jordan's external debt and how much is the monthly outlay for debt service?

[Shukri] Foreign debt payables are in the range of \$5 billion. Monthly debt service is \$150 million.

KUWAIT

Development Fund's Foreign Loans Reported

44040204 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 25 Dec 88 p 9

[Excerpt] Economic developments of the utmost significance took place in 1988 in the domestic, Gulf, Arab, and international arenas and in all sectors. The Kuwaiti news agency KUNA reported yesterday on significant domestic economic developments and said that loans were made by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) to finance development projects in a number of Arab and friendly nations.

The report also discussed visits between Kuwaiti officials and their Arab counterparts in order to bolster economic, commercial, and technical bilateral relations.

The following KUNA economic report said that KFAED loans were made to Arab and other friendly nations to finance development projects in agriculture, shipping, transportation, shipping, manufacturing, water, etc. The fund, on 6 Jan 88, loaned the Arab Republic of Egypt 10 million dinars to help finance pharmaceutical development. The Syrian Arab Republic received a supplementary loan of 2.35 million dinars to expand the Majradah generating station. The fund had previously helped finance the project in 1985 with a 7 million dinar loan.

On 16 Feb 88 Djibouti was granted a 2.6 million dinar loan to finance the Djibouti harbor project. On 17 Feb 88 the Republic of Cyprus contracted for a 4.3 million dinar loan to finance water resource development. On 18 Feb 88 the Republic of Equatorial Guinea received a 1.1 million dinar loan to finance the Bata airport project. On 20 Feb 88 the fund gave Ghana a 3.5 million dinar loan to help finance country electrification in the north.

On 20 Feb 88 KFAED signed a loan agreement for 2.5 million dinars to help Niger finance a project to bring water to villages and the countryside. The Republic of Mali obtained a loan for 2.5 million dinars under the program for the economic bloc of West Africa. Mauritania also received a 2.5 million dinar loan on 23 Feb 88 under the same program. On 25 Feb 88 the Kingdom of Morocco obtained an 8 million dinar loan to help finance the Awluz dam project. On 28 Feb 88 the Republic of the Sudan signed an agreement for a 5.25 million dinar loan for a water project in al-Fashir, the capital of Darfur.

The People's Republic of China was granted a 5 million dinar loan to finance the Jiangsu Harbor project. The Republic of Senegal obtained a loan for 3.25 million dinars to finance water projects. A 3.5 million dinar-loan to the Republic of Botswana will help finance the Nata-Mawn highway project.

In the same year, Niger signed for a second loan, valued at 4 million Kuwaiti dinars, to finance the Tagadoah-Takitah highway project. On 2 Nov 88 the People's Republic of Benin obtained a fund loan for 2.5 million dinars to finance a water project in the countryside. The Republic of Cyprus received a supplemental loan of 2.5 million dinars to help finance the Larnaca-Nicosia expressway and the Larnaca-Cufino highway projects.

On 9 Dec 88 the Republic of Indonesia secured a 5.5 million dinar loan to help finance road improvements. On 13 Dec 88 the People's Republic of China obtained a 3 million dinar loan to finance the Jinan-Yaoshan highway project.

In the area of bolstering economic relations with other nations, Minister of Finance Jasim al-Khuraifi visited the Arab Republic of Egypt on 4 Jan 88 to discuss ways of economic cooperation. On 12 Jan 88 al-Khuraifi made a tour of Southeast Asian and Pacific countries that took him to Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and Japan where he met with senior officials and discussed avenues of cementing economic and commercial relations and increasing investment opportunities. He concluded an agreement with Malaysia on investment guarantees to help encourage future Kuwaiti investment.

On 6 Jun 88, Minister of Commerce and Industry Faysal 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Khalid made a tour of Switzerland, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Bulgaria where he explored ways of increasing cooperation and trade.

On 27 Aug, the minister of commerce, along with his aides, returned from Turkey where he chaired the first session of Turkish-Kuwaiti Joint Commission for Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. Al-Khalid headed an official economic delegation to Cairo on 9 Oct 88 to help inaugurate the Islamic Exhibition. [passage omitted]

OMAN

Agricultural Sector Accomplishments Reported 44040143 al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 17 Nov 88 p 12

[Article by 'Asim Rashwan]

[Excerpt] In recent years the Sultanate of Oman has seen an overall resurgence in all economic sectors, however the agricultural sector has enjoyed special attention within the framework of efforts to achieve high degrees

of self-sufficiency in foods. This attention was crowned by Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id's proclamation of 1988 as the Year of Agriculture in the sultanate.

Shaykh Muhammad Ibn-'Abdallah Ibn-Zahir al-Hina'i, the Omani minister of agriculture and fisheries, spoke to AL-KHALIJ about the achievements that have been made in the agricultural sector in the sultanate. He said that the Year of Agriculture in the sultanate "is not the end of the matter, rather it marks the beginning of our increased devotion to the development of our agricultural potential, with an emphasis on the capabilities of the Omani people in this field, since we draw these capabilities from the roots of an agricultural renaissance hidden in the Omani soil."

The Omani minister announced that his ministry has implemented many projects aimed at protecting the underground water reserves, and enhancing them at the same time. He mentioned that the implementation of three dams with a total cost of 5.1 million Omani riyals had begun this year. It is expected that they will increase available water resources in the sultanate by 6.1 million cubic meters a year.

He said that an exploratory study of the al-Jabal al-Akhdar region is being prepared now. Its purpose is to find out what water resources and potential for agricultural development exist in the region. Another project for aerial survey, photography, and data collection is being done in stages, its purpose being to establish detailed maps of various regions of the sultanate so that it will be possible to determine the geographical locations of the canals and their embankments and the type and state of each one. Its purpose is also to determine the geographic distribution of wells and to reveal their various types. He also expects that the anticipated maps will show the diffusion and branching of the river valleys behind the existing dams and the locations of the proposed dams, in addition to clearly defining existing agricultural lands.

2,500 Farms

Shaykh al-Hina'i spoke about the agricultural extension program in the sultanate, in answer to a question from AL-KHALIJ about the goals of this program and its chances for success. He said that 2,500 farms had been selected to implement the program; it will be done in the form of farm groupings at more than one village for each agricultural center at the sultanate level. The goal is to increase agricultural productivity, which would help to decrease the food gap as a first step towards closing it completely, and achieving self-reliance in providing food.

The extension program also aims to train and teach Omani farmers to apply the agricultural procedures recommended by extension at the proper times for

achieving the highest crop yield, and to encourage citizens to work in the agricultural field in order to stem migration from the countryside to the cities, or from the agricultural profession to other professional activities.

Al-Hina'i said that it is also possible, by implementing this program, to achieve capital development of the existing agricultural lands by growing crops that are in keeping with the results of water and soil analyses made to determine the ideal crop composition which would achieve the highest yield, as well as by selecting crops that have a productive return which would provide a suitable income for agriculture, and by reviving the growing of traditional crops which characterize the sultanate, such as fruits and vegetables.

As for horizontal development, the program helps to achieve it by way of making use of uncultivated areas in the places containing farm groupings, cultivating them with fruit tree saplings that are adapted to the region.

He confirmed that mango and lemon saplings have already been distributed to the farmers of the farm groupings.

Sprinkling, Drip Irrigation, and Fountains

What about the traditional system of canals and the experiments with modern irrigation systems in the Sultanate of Oman? Minister al-Hina'i said that the activities of the Year of Agriculture had included expanded extension symposia for the farmers to make them aware of the importance of introducing these systems on their farms and the advantages of these systems.

He confirmed that modern irrigation systems had been introduced into most of the 307 farms affiliated with the project to develop and increase the local goat. These systems are currently being introduced on the rest of the farms and the farms of the farm groupings project.

He explained that the use of modern irrigation systems varies according to the crops planted. In vegetable cultivation, drip irrigation is used, whereas sprinkler irrigation is used for fodder and field crops. As for fruit trees, the fountain irrigation system is used.

Goats, and Reducing Imports

Regarding the project to develop the local goat and the goals thereof, Minister al-Hina'i said that the concept of the project is formulated on the basis of small livestock production units operating in the northern regions of the sultanate. The state supports and encourages them, and it gives stockmen an incentive to participate in the livestock production projects. He said that the ministry is giving 10 head of local goats to every farmer; moreover it is undertaking the construction of sanitary, goat-raising pens that hold 40 head, in addition to overseeing the health of these animals, and teaching the stockmen the best way to feed them. He stressed that his ministry

offers these facilities and services free of charge, in exchange for the farmers' introduction of modern systems of irrigation on their farms in order to provide green fodder and barley, and for the judicious consumption of water. He said that the farmers can meet these obligations through easy loans via the Oman Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries.

He added that the purpose of this project is to disseminate the local goat and increase its population in order to increase the production of its meat and milk, and to support the farmers and encourage them to invest in the field of livestock production. Moreover, the effect of increased production of this kind would be reflected in an increased supply of meat, and the subsequent lowering of its price and a decrease in its imports.

As to whether there were specific conditions that must be met for farmers to get local goats free of charge, Minister al-Hina'i said that there are a number of rules on the basis of which the farmers benefitting from the project are selected. Among the most important conditions, are that the farmer should be free for agricultural work, and that he provide water from a well belonging to his farm, so that he may grow the two feddans of fodder crops needed to feed the animals.

What about combatting the epidemic and infectious diseases that form an obstacle to the livestock resource development program? Are there specific plans to combat them? The Omani minister said: "We have an integrative program for national immunization, which is scheduled to be implemented over a period of 3 years. We started it last year, and it is being carried out by one of the international firms specializing in this field."

He said that the immunization is slated to include 550,000 head against foot-and-mouth disease, cattle plague [rinderpest], pest of small ruminants, sheep pox, and goat pox. This is in addition to immunization doses against "muscular enlargement" in cattle in the southern region.

He added that so far two phases of the national immunization project have been carried out. "In the first phase we innoculated 400,000 head, and in the second innoculation, covered more than 750,000 head of cattle, goats, and sheep.

50 Percent Subsidization

On the facilities that the ministry offers to Omani farmers, al-Hina'i said: "We are offering production requirements of vegetable seeds, seed potato, chemical and organic fertilizers, agricultural pesticides, and sprayers. All those are subsidized at a rate that varies between 25 and 50 percent."

He added that this year, for the first time vegetable seeds, seed potato, and pesticides were distributed directly to the farmers from the supplying companies and establishments under the ministry's oversight, with the goal of meeting the farmers needs for them at the appropriate times.

He explained that the ministry had undertaken to provide 23,088 kg of vegetable seeds such that they would be sold to the farmers through 21 distribution centers at the level of the regions of the sultanate. In addition, 185 tons of seed of various varieties of potato were made available, which will be distributed to the farmers at a subsidized rate of 50 percent.

He added that 3,000 tons of compound chemical fertilizer, and 1,000 more tons of ammonium sulphate were made available. In addition, 177,800 sacks of organic fertilizer were distributed, and all of them are sold to the farmer, subsidized by 25 percent.

He also said that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries had undertaken to provide 1,200 high pressure sprayers at a cost subsidized by 50 percent to the farmers in various regions of the sultanate in order to combat harmful pests in the field and garden crops. It has also signed an agreement with a company specializing in the field to carry out aerial spraying over an area of about 300,000 feddans in order to protect the date trees against attack from the "dubas" insect ["date leafhopper", *Ommatissus binotatus* var. *lybicus*]. The aerial spraying will be done without the farmers bearing any of the financial costs.

Woodlands and the Phenomenon of 'Desertification'

How is the phenomenon of desertification and the movements of sands which encroach upon agricultural and inhabited lands dealt with? The minister of agriculture and fisheries responded by saying that his ministry had projects for expanding the woodlands, in addition to preserving the natural woodlands that currently exist.

He said that an area of land of 178.7 feddans have been set aside for the woodlands project in the administrative division of Suhar in the north of the al-Batinah region.

He confirmed that the cost of planting 100 feddans of this area as a first phase had already been estimated to be about 21,500 Omani riyals, and that a certain company was now fencing in the allocated area according to the agreement signed in this regard, and that the planting of trees would be intensified as soon as the fencing is completed.

He added that in another project to increase woodlands in the eastern region the ministry uses local species of tree, such as Christ's-thorn [*Zizyphus*] and *Prosopis*

spicigera. He said that there is a third project in the al-Zahirah region, where the area in one of its locations is up to 96 feddans with an estimated cost of 22,350 Omani riyals.

Omani Soil Classification

What about the soil classification studies in the Sultanate of Oman to find out how well they fit the ambitious projects? Minister al-Hina'i said that his ministry had already conducted a study of the soil and water in the regions of Oman proper and north and south al-Batinah, where 83 farms were selected from which soil and water samples were taken for analysis, and a detailed report was prepared for each farm that included the characteristics of the soil and the best methods for managing it and selecting the crops that are right for the soil and have the highest productivity.

On the other hand, Minister al-Hina'i said that his ministry was doing soil surveys at various levels within the project with the goal of finding out what kinds of soil make up the lands of the sultanate with the goal of increasing the arable area and improving management in the farms currently existing in order to increase agricultural production in the sultanate.

He said that that is being done in cooperation with the International Food and Agriculture Organization and the office of the United Nations Development Program in Muscat.

He mentioned that the project would prepare an atlas showing the kinds of soil along with a chart gathered through an exploratory survey covering all the lands in the sultanate of Oman. He affirmed that in light of these operations it would be possible to plan future agricultural development.

Minister al-Hina'i said that under the same project a detailed survey will be made of the soil of an area of 10,000 hectares of uncultivated land, the location of which was decided upon after the existence of appropriate potential for underground water was confirmed.

Development Programs in Dhofar?

About the agricultural development programs in the southern region—Dhofar—Minister al-Hina'i said that the farm groupings were among the most important of these programs, numbering 106 farms, to which the ministry is supplying production requirements and seedlings, and the mechanics of service operations, and intensifying extension services in them, and determining their ideal crop composition in light of the analysis of the soil and the water that flows there, and introducing modern irrigation systems.

He added that the center-pivot irrigation system project at the livestock resource research station in Salalah is being tested now. The project consists of three pivots for

sprinkler irrigation; the first one irrigates an area of 48 hectares, as does the second one; as for the third, it irrigates only 38 hectares. He said that the source of water for this system was three artesian wells, in addition to the supply from Jarziz Spring.

He mentioned that "rosa grass" will be planted as green fodder around the two big pivots in a 96 hectare area. The area of the small pivot—38 hectares—will be cultivated with barley and other crops. Initial plowing operations have already been completed, and plowing will be done once again to make the land ready for planting.

Shaykh al-Hina'i said that this project, in the southern region, aims at providing green fodder and other fodder crops for the animals of the livestock resource research station there, and the plant surplus will help to cover part of the demand during the dry season in this region.

5 Million for Fisheries

The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries spoke about efforts in the development and preservation of fish resources. He said that the establishment of the Omani Fishing Company and the announcement of its establishment, a few days ago, is a big step towards developing the fisher resources in the sultanate on the basis of the directives of Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id. He said that the goals of this company are embodied in the pursuit of all kinds of fishing activities in addition to other activities that it does, such as fishing operations, buying, equipping, processing, freezing, packaging, and marketing, and the practice and establishment of all the industries linked to fishing activities, as long as they does not conflict with the interests of the small fishermen.

He added that the government has decided to support the company by granting it the right to use, without remuneration, the refrigerated fish repositories that the ministry had set up in many of the coastal regions, as well as the centers for marketing fish. The government has also decided to give the company 5 million Omani riyals as an interest-free loan, the amount to be repaid over a period of 15 years, with a grace period of 5 years from the date that the amount of the entire loan is issued.

He confirmed that his ministry is determined to conduct a survey of the fish reserves in order to determine how plentiful all species are, taking into full consideration the importance of preserving the fish resources of the sultanate. It will also prepare a main plan for fishing ports along the coastline in order to expand the facilities of the infrastructure of the fishing sector.

He said that the ministry has prepared a plan to oversee the protection of fish resources, and it will be applied to the fishing boats through trained Omani cadres. [passage omitted]

SAUDI ARABIA

Indicators Show Economic Recovery

44040074 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
4 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Text] Riyadh—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—The Saudi Ministry of Finance and Economy emphasized that the financial sector showed considerable recovery this past year as indicated by higher stock prices, healthy demand for publicly offered shares of new companies, and a rise in corporate and commercial bank profits.

A report on the new state budget issued by the ministry yesterday said that monetary and banking instruments of payment increased by 5.1 percent and bank deposits rose by 9.5 percent in the first 9 months of the year. Bank capital and reserves also rose by 8.9 percent and the number of bank branches in the kingdom increased to 925 during the same period.

The statement added that growth of national economy was directly impacted during the past year by several external factors such as soft oil prices, continued exchange rate fluctuations, and the proliferation of protectionist measures in world markets.

Nevertheless, improvements and recovery were sustained in most national economic sectors. The gross domestic product for all sectors had a fixed asset growth rate of 3.2 percent. The industrial sector maintained a strong growth rate of 4.7 percent, based on a fixed price index. This compares to 1.9 percent a year earlier.

The farm sector also showed strong growth of 10.8 percent. The electricity and water sector had a growth rate of 5 percent.

Actual payouts by government credit funds totaled 33,145 loans in the fiscal year which just ended. This corresponds equally with figures for the previous year.

The Finance Ministry's statement pointed out that inflation rates and comparative indices were affected by higher import prices and fluctuations in the exchange rate of principal currencies. The ministry believes, however, that rates are low in world terms because the highest figure for the cost of living index was 1.1 percent and the general inflation rate did not exceed 1.3 percent.

Preliminary trade figures, according to the statement, show that Saudi exports last year increased by 10 percent to 95,675 million riyals. Imports of goods and commodities amounted to 80,553 million riyals for an increase of 7 percent over the previous year. The trade surplus, at 15,122 million riyals, is up 31 percent from a year earlier.

The statement reiterated that in order to support the general state budget and create sound investment opportunities for domestic capital, the government will issue treasury bonds, valued at no more than 25 billion riyals, to be gradually offered throughout the current year.

The Finance Ministry considers this a continuation of a policy the government began last year, primarily to provide stable domestic investment channels for local savings in addition to providing new finance resources for internal development.

Expenditures for the new fiscal year are budgeted at 141,000 million riyals. New budget allotments to certain service and development sectors are indicated below:

1. Development of human resources: 24,000 million riyals
2. Development of economic resources: 5,000 million riyals
3. Shipping and transport: 8,280 million riyals
4. Health and social development: 10,550 million riyals
5. Municipal services: 5,420 million riyals
6. Basic infrastructure: 2,570 million riyals
7. Specialized credit agencies for the new fiscal year: about 6,000 million riyals
8. Local subsidies: 5,325 million riyals

SUDAN

Minister Deng on Garang Movement, Peace

JN1502181389 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
13 Feb 89 p 8

[Interview with Aldo Ajo Deng, Sudanese deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture and natural resources, by Mahmud 'Abdin; date and place not given]

[Excerpt]

[AL-SIYASAH] Why has your government rejected the peace agreement reached recently with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army?

[Deng] First, I would like to point out that more than 500,000 persons were killed and 2 million left the South for the North as a result of this war. We believe that war is not the way to change the regime in Sudan, and the South has nothing to do with this. We would like to affirm that religion was not behind Garang's rebellion because it took place before September 1983.

The Garang movement is racist and separatist. It uses separatism for monopolization. We would like to ask the following: What is Garang doing? The answer is that he is using external enemies to destroy Sudan. His movement raises the slogan of socialism to draw support from socialist countries, while the stories about killing Christians in the South aim at drawing support from the West.

By the same token, they are saying that the Arabs are killing the Africans to take aid. Garang has used every method to undermine Sudan, divide it, and separate the South from the North.

[AL-SIYASAH] Does this mean that Garang himself is a separatist, not a liberation leader? And from whom does he want to liberate Sudan?

[Deng] The Sudanese must know who Garang is and what his identity is before speaking about peace. Garang harshly represses all who differ with him. If I had joined him, I would have disappeared like the others, or I would have been sent to one of his camps. There are more than 5,000 political prisoners in Garang's camps just because their views are different from his.

When we talk of peace, we must know with whom we seek peace.

[AL-SIYASAH] Why have you rejected the peace initiative?

[Deng] Peace cannot be achieved through an agreement that calls for an immediate abrogation of the state of emergency and military agreements with neighboring states. Peace cannot be achieved by imposing conditions. If I were John Garang, I would first call for a cease-fire and a national conference to discuss national issues. In this case, there will be no justification for the state of emergency.

If there is a seriousness, a cease-fire must be reached to transport food supplies and save the starving millions. No official can accept an agreement like the one reached because it is a trap. It is an agreement between the [Democratic] Unionist Party [DUP] and the [Sudanese People's] Liberation Movement. It does not include the government. It is a conspiracy, and at the same time, an agreement that lacks seriousness.

The Sudanese Government does not reject peace. There are many initiatives—the Al-Mahdi-Garang meeting, the Koka Dam agreement, and the agreement between the southern parties and Garang.

The government says now that the door is still open for all those who seek peace. We also agree with the cease-fire and believe that it is necessary to form a committee to prepare an agenda for the constitutional conference. We also believe that it is necessary to extend the period of the conference and to convene it inside or even outside Sudan, but without any conditions. The cease-fire is the first serious step to achieving peace.

[AL-SIYASAH] Is the government not earnest in efforts to achieve peace?

[Deng] No one in Sudan at the present time rejects peace. We did not reject the agreement, but we want a peace initiative underlining the cease-fire. However, Garang is setting a trap, and we must be aware of it.

[AL-SIYASAH] What is the future of peace in Sudan?

[Deng] The future is a peaceful and realistic solution. If the national conference for which we call convenes, its resolutions must be binding on all parties. With regard to the future of peace, the objectives of the parties should be clear, and the endeavor for peace must be unconditional.

With regard to the Islamic laws and the call for their abrogation, I reject the Islamic laws. I also say that these laws are not appropriate for Sudan. I bravely said this in Parliament, and I fear no one.

However, the DUP is afraid to declare this explicitly. It says that it supports the Islamic laws while working through other means to change them. We reject using the South as a method and cover to achieve political goals. The DUP must be clear in declaring that the Islamic laws are not appropriate for Sudan on the condition that they do not use the South as a cover. Why should the DUP and its leader, al-Mirghani, not be clear on its stand on the Islamic law? [passage omitted]

Finance Minister on Economic Situation
JN1402101089 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic
10 Feb 89 p 24

[Interview with Sudanese Finance Minister Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im by Ahmad Hanqah in Khartoum—date not given]

[Excerpts]

[AL-ANBA'] What is the situation in the Central Bank (Sudan Bank) in light of the new monetary guidelines?

[Nur al-Da'im] Sudan's debts are approximately \$13 million [as published]. Therefore, the Sudan Bank Treasury suffers from a terrible deficit in foreign currency. This is a fact. The reasons for this deficit can be attributed to times of draught, desertification, and the policies of the past era. During that time, Port Sudan became a port for imports only. Only after 1985 did this port begin to witness export activities, particularly during the past 3 years. The export process has become active, particularly in the fields of cattle, cereals such as sorghum and sesame, and other crops such as gum, cotton, leather, and others. Sudan actually needs \$1,500 million a year, while the returns of this year's exports are only \$600 million. This is the result of last fall's floods and rains which obstructed production due to the destruction of the infrastructure. This has also stabilized the general budget deficit at \$2 million [as published]. Moreover, the hot security issues have used up a great amount of currency to confront the civil war in the South

and the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur, Kordufan, and the contact areas with the South and the national capital. This has contributed to the improvement of the security situation in these areas. Back again to the reasons for the deficit, we can say that one of the reasons also was spending in important fields that can tolerate no postponement. We cannot claim that the Sudan Bank is healthy. However, new solutions were proposed by the citizens and adopted by the government to increase production. This is good news in that the budget deficit will be overcome in the future, the development process in the country will be promoted, and the economic crisis will be settled, God willing.[passage omitted]

[AL-ANBA'] Do you believe that if used correctly, local resources can overcome all obstacles preventing a positive input to the general treasury. In other words, is there any hope for Sudan's economies?

[Nur al-Da'im] Undoubtedly, Sudan has great resources and wealth unmatched by any other country, especially since its virgin land has many rivers and other water resources, in addition to its diverse climate. Theoretically, it is qualified to be the international bread basket. But, from a practical viewpoint, the lack of security, stability, and the incoherence among the infrastructures in a large country, which lacks transportation and telecommunications means [sentence incomplete as published]. If we manage to build reservoirs, roads, bridges, and telecommunication networks—that is to build the infrastructures—then our country will move forward on the path of development, especially since we have advanced and modern investment laws. What we lack is the infrastructure to attract investors.

The 4-year program gave priority to infrastructure issues. If we manage to attract external aid in addition to domestic revenues and mobilization, then we will cover a long distance on the path of development and progress. Also, we must not forget that we must add to the bases of development that already exist in Sudan the Sudanese citizen, who has broad experience and is highly qualified, and who has proved these abilities and qualifications both inside and outside his country. These will form the development base.

Sudan is promised prosperity and high production output. When the infrastructure is completed, Sudan will become the international bread basket.

[AL-ANBA'] The government is accused of failing to provide citizens with good or new services and life's basic needs. Where do taxes, loans, and aid go?

[Nur Al-Da'im] First, I assure you that is an incorrect accusation, especially since we are living in a democratic era, whether we like it or not, and masses are given the facts by the government itself, the opposition, the newspapers, or the parliament sessions, which all serve as forums. This contrasts with the previous dictatorship

era, which was characterized by secret dealings and declared and undeclared policies. Any one who follows the state-run media organs—radio and television—would have heard about the loans. During the broadcast and open parliament sessions, these loans and aid [agreements] are approved.

However, the real problem that prevents making full use of these loans is the shortcomings of the executive capabilities in the civil service which, at times fails in satisfactory implementation, especially since the civil service, which is entrusted with implementation, lacks experience. This is due to the low level of graduates resulting from the drop in the education level. Therefore, certain mistakes in adequately employing these loans do at times occur.

For example, heavy rains came this year, but this was not enough to render the agricultural season a success had it not been for our efforts to provide tractors, fuel, and spare parts. Consequently, 16 million feddan in the mechanized agricultural areas were planted. This was the biggest area planted in the history of Sudan. [passage omitted]

[AL-ANBA'] The sorghum yield for the current agricultural season far exceeds the country's needs. Can this be used to improve payments if freely and correctly marketed or if exchanged according to an equal deal system?

[Nur al-Da'im] Although the sorghum yield for this year is high, the government will not market it according to the equal deals system. The harvest will be collected by the Agricultural Bank and stored in silos. If the silos' capacity is not enough, it will be stored in the traditional manner, that is, if we failed to market it directly after storing the strategic reserve.

[AL-ANBA'] Minister, you in the government are accused of inability to attract the private sector to contribute toward solving the economic problems in view of the absence of plans for popular participation in laying economic plans and decisions. What is your comment?

[Nur al-Da'im] The Sudanese private sector has entered into economic projects. However, some of the practices from which the public sector suffers have been transferred to the private sector. After all, we are a single people. The same reasons that made Arab or foreign investors refrain [from investing in Sudan] have also prevented the Sudanese investor. These, as I said before, are represented in the absence of comprehensive infrastructure to facilitate investment.

For example, an investor from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia may come and find that there is no means of telecommunication—telephones and telex—and difficult transportation and that all circumstances are standing against

him, then would he dare invest in these circumstances? What applies for the Arab investor also applies for the Sudanese investor, who is better aware of the situation, particularly as the results of adventure in these circumstances are known in advance. [passage omitted]

[AL-ANBA'] During the December riots and demonstrations in Sudan in reaction to an increase in the sugar price and the imposition of new taxes, you pointed to the presence of foreign interference and said foreign parties were behind these demonstrations, without specifying them. Could you explain this?

[Nur al-Da'im] Foreign interference in the demonstrations was obvious because when the people rose they did so spontaneously and were not organized. They were entitled to express their viewpoint through these peaceful demonstrations. However, some shifted to sabotage and hurled stones at cars. Demonstrations also continued even after the government had revoked its decisions. Dr Ma'mun Muhammad Husayn and Amin Makki Madani [not further identified] addressed the demonstrators and they are aware of the subject and of interference. I hope they would speak up, especially since a car suddenly appeared and opened fire on the demonstrators, killing one citizen. They carried him to the university in order to start a rebellion in the hope of reviving the October incidents. However, they were disappointed as the killed person was a worker and not a student. Is it the ethics of the Sudanese people to exacerbate problems and open fire? [passage omitted]

[AL-ANBA'] Oil is the hope and dream cherished by the Sudanese. How much oil exists and is it true that some quarters do not want Sudan to exploit its wealth?

[Nur al-Da'im] Sudan is rich with its oil resources, whether in the contact areas between the North and South, in Bentiu in the South, or other areas. These were not exploited for security reasons. Oil is also present in Darfur, Kordofan, and the Central Region. However, the expelled companies did not want to extract it for political and other reasons. They do not now need this oil which can be a reserve waiting for them for hundreds of years. But we as a poor people suffering from debts and poor economy and as a country in which the wheel of economy has stopped look forward to a quick exploitation of this wealth. They also do not want us to enter the market as competitors. The picture will become clearer once you note that during the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran, the world market was trying to gain from the war. Oil also appeared in South and North Yemen but has not been exploited yet. The world politics wants to turn us and the two Yemens into a strategic stock. But we as a government are in a hurry to invest it in order to address the large number of economic problems facing us. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister Denies U.S. 'Economic Pressures'

JN1502165489 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic
13 Feb 89 p 16

[By 'Abd al-Fattah Darwish]

[Excerpt] In an interview with AL-QABAS, 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, Sudanese finance and planning minister, denied that the United States was exerting economic pressures on Sudan in an attempt to exploit Sudan's current economic difficulties. The Sudanese minister said that the United States does not oppose rescheduling Sudan's foreign debts. He affirmed that all industrial nations have started understanding Sudan's circumstances and are showing a readiness to help it.

He clarified that the dispute with the United States centered on the \$40 million annual loan given by the United States to Sudan to finance its imports of U.S. wheat, which Sudan refused to renew. Sudan explained to the United States that it wishes to be given development and not trade loans and that it wishes to develop its own food production. The United States expressed understanding over this point.

The minister of finance and planning is in Kuwait heading his country's delegation to the meeting held 12 February with eight finance institutions and Arab national and development funds. The aim of this meeting is to discuss projects which these institutions help to finance in Sudan. [passage omitted]

Nur al-Da'im on Economy, Southern Issue

JN1802212789 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic
16 Feb 89 p 14

[Interview with Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, Sudanese minister of finance and economic planning and member of the Al-Ummah parliamentary commission, by Fathi al-Daw—date and place not given]

[Excerpts]

[AL-WATAN] We will begin our conversation on the economic arena, namely the decision to dispense with U.S. aid and loans in the form of wheat. Is the decision a political or economic one?

[Nur al-Da'im] What has happened is that we used to receive U.S. loans to cover wheat prices. Sudan had to repay \$9 million. In accordance with U.S. laws, the sum had to be repayed on time. Following the Paris economic conference, the United States decided to exert pressure on Sudan. The pressure was very clear. The United States no longer supported Sudan. In my view, it linked the issue of aid to its policies, especially on the war in the southern part of the country, and to incorrect interpretations. Now we have managed to cover our need for wheat for 7 months, and have decided to dispense with U.S. wheat. [passage omitted]

[AL-WATAN] It is taken for granted that following the peace initiative, the popular movement gained another dimension and a greater momentum outside Sudan, because it is a party to the initiative while the role of the government diminished. Do you agree?

[Nur al-Da'im] Yes, because the manner in which the initiative was launched has led to a misunderstanding, although it contained positive aspects such as the convening of the constitutional conference. But the other issues, such as the lifting of the emergency law, the ending of the war, and the agreements with neighboring countries, are so important that they cannot be imposed by a rebel movement. The two sides should meet without preconditions. During debate in parliament, Muhammad Tawfiq said that the agreement should be either accepted or rejected as a whole. Parliament decided to reject it. No rebel movement can impose conditions on us or compel us to abrogate agreements with neighboring countries, even if such agreements exist, because it is no more than a rebel movement.

Agreement on two issues, namely the constitutional conference and the acceptance of the commission, should take place, and then a cease-fire and the emergency law [as published] because we cannot lift the emergency law if we are not reassured about the state of affairs in the country. The agreement showed that some support the war and others oppose it. This is not the question because the Sudanese people want peace. Even the Sudanese Army is in a state of defense. Our mistake is that we did not carry out a complete mobilization during the war, and we cannot negotiate from a weak position. Al-Nasir has fallen for the third time. In fact, it is a small village. We cannot say it is a city with highways. As I said, this is the third time it has fallen. The first time was during the transitional period as a result of Al-Jazuli Daf'allah's deceptive message. At the end of 1986, Al-Nasir was also occupied and was restored. Now, it can also be restored. The media made a mistake when they hinted that it was the first time.

[AL-WATAN] Al-Nasir is a strategic city. But we believe that 1 cm² is like 1 mile² in terms of sovereignty. Therefore, we should not belittle any part of the land.

[Nur al-Da'im] This is true. But there should be a determination to restore it. It is clear the war in the south was imposed and foreign parties, like Israel, Kenya and the churches, directly interfered in it. The rebel movement does not depend on its intrinsic power. We are exerting efforts to reach an agreement with Ethiopia on the issue, and the issue of the constitutional conference will be decided in a few weeks. In my view, Kenya is weak. It also has ambitions in the Elimi triangle because the British administration has allowed Kenya to administer it on behalf of Sudan, but now it wants to restore it. [sentence as published] There is a border problem. We should not make mistakes. Through good mobilization, we can restore the township. [passage omitted]

**AL-SIYASAH Publishes Al-Mahdi, Al-Mirghani
Letters on DUP**

45040192 Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
2 Jan 89 pp 6-7

[Text of letters exchanged by Prime Minister al-Mahdi
and DUP Chairman al-Mirghani]

[Text] AL-SIYASAH publishes here the two letters exchanged by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the prime minister and al-Ummah National Party chairman, and Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the guardian of al-Khatmiyah sect and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] chairman, in accordance with which the DUP withdrew from the national concord government and in the light of which al-Sadiq al-Mahdi decided to relieve the DUP cabinet ministers and representatives from their constitutional, executive, and legislative positions. By publishing these two documents, AL-SIYASAH is making a record for history and for future generations who will make their judgement on those who controlled the country's affairs in a decisive phase of determining Sudan's and the Sudanese nation's future and independence and of entrenching the mainstays of freedom and democracy.

By publishing these two documents, AL-SIYASAH also wishes to put all the facts before the Sudanese people at this juncture of our country's history. Men make history, and we are now undergoing the phase of historymaking. If we take the opportunity and underline our honorable patriotic stance, history will record this fact for us. If we fail to take the opportunity, history will also scribe for us a record of disgrace, shame, squander, and crime against this country's right and the right of its future generations to an honorable life, a bright and prosperous future and to security, stability and reassurance. Let all realize that history is merciless. Are we aware of this?

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,

The DUP,

The General Office,

Date_____

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,

Honorable brother al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the prime minister,

God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you:

By virtue of the difficult and deteriorating circumstances being experienced by our beloved country and in view of the dangers engulfing its safety, security, and stability, I convey to you the DUP opinion on how to develop a solution to end this deterioration. You are aware of the dimensions of this deterioration and of the need to confront it to safeguard the supreme national interest.

The country has been exposed to numerous hardships, some of them due to the legacy of economic, social, and political problems inherited from the defunct May regime. This is in addition to the destruction and devastation caused by the floods throughout the beloved country.

Despite the efforts made to contain these difficult problems, we have not succeeded in containing them.

The Sudanese peace initiative, received with great support by the Sudanese people's masses, was a step in the right direction. However, the failure to accept the initiative immediately has had a negative impact on its prompt implementation.

Moreover, urgent national efforts are needed to revive the economy and to tackle its problems, especially the problems of inflation, the scarcity of essential goods, and the high price of services. These problems have caused Sudanese citizen's living standards to decline.

Furthermore, the most recent approach, embodied in increasing sugar prices by 500 percent, introducing additional taxes, and raising the prices of other goods in accordance with the cabinet's latest decrees has also undermined the living standard and has led to an extremely tense political situation that poses a threat to democracy.

Perhaps you agree with us that the two issues of economy and of peace are closely connected and that they should be given top priority in the reform aimed at rebuilding Sudanese society. Moreover, it is necessary to accelerate the procedures to take serious steps to build democracy, to complete building the constitutional institutions, to establish local and regional government, and to prepare for holding the general elections, all within the space of one year.

This major task requires the following:

1. Rescinding immediately the price and tax increases announced by the cabinet on 26 December 1988;
2. Dissolving the current government immediately;
3. Forming a national reconciliation government with specific powers and with a program summed up in the following:

A. Working to establish peace by implementing the Sudanese peace initiative;

B. Tackling the living crisis and the masses' hardship;

C. Taking the measures necessary to completely hand over authority to the masses through establishing democratic institutions in the country and holding local and regional elections;

D. Preparing for the general elections;

E. Adopting a foreign policy compatible with the country's supreme interests.

In conclusion and on the basis of the abovementioned, we convey to you the DUP's resolution to withdraw from this government as of today, 28 December 1988. With this resolution, we are not shirking our responsibility but providing the opportunity for introduction of the desired change. If you agree with our abovementioned proposals, we are prepared to sit with you to discuss the matter of forming and participation in a national reconciliation government.

God is the giver of success, and from Him help is sought.

(Signed) Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, DUP chairman

Khartoum, 28 December 1988.

**Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's Response to al-Khatmiyah
Guardian and DUP Chairman:**

Date: 29 December 1988

Dear Brother Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, DUP chairman,

God's peace and mercy be upon you,

I have received your letter of 28 December 1988 in which you express specific reasons for proposing the formation of a national reconciliation government and in which you declare your withdrawal from the national concord government.

Discussions were held on the peace initiative issue, and they culminated with the statement I made on 17 December 1988. You then issued a statement supporting my statement, thus eliminating any disagreement on this issue.

As for the recent tax increases, they were dictated by objective circumstances, and your party participated fully in them. When the increases were opposed by our parliamentary (institutions), by the unionist forces, and by segments of the people, we deemed it fit to review them in the light of these positions. You are aware of the plan to reconsider the increases because it was discussed with your delegation which visited us on the evening of 27 December 1988. As for the talk about a national reconciliation government, you are aware that we proposed the formation of a government including all the political forces represented in the [Constituent] Assembly. This was impossible to do for reasons of which you are aware. The [current] government was then formed with the support of nearly 90 percent of the parliament's deputies. We pledged to extend bridges to the political forces outside the Assembly, and we have. We have been

eager, and we continue to be eager to see that any government is formed on the basis of the existing constitutional institutions. It is well known that discussing a broader government formula is supported by the Constituent Assembly as an indisputable objective, that is if a practical formula for the purpose can be found. You are aware of our customary preparedness for whatever is likely to broaden the country's governmental base and to enhance participation in running the country's affairs.

As for raising the idea of a national reconciliation government in the ambiguous manner contained in your letter, it is incomprehensible, especially since you use it as a reason for your withdrawal from the government under this circumstance. This withdrawal is tantamount to abandoning a responsibility to which you are a partner. It is also tantamount to exploiting inflammable political circumstances which pose a threat to Sudan and to its democratic system. Your party, with its influence and role, was expected to participate with the others in protecting Sudan and its democratic system from dangers, and to contribute to closing the doors in the face of the aspirants and the adventurers.

The hardships our people are experiencing as a result of [word indistinct], and living problems, and of the circumstances of the sudden flooding are facts which we have discussed extensively. We have mobilized every available capability to confront them, and we have achieved relative success. But the challenges continue to be great.

We have often complained that your party's cabinet ministers take part in making decisions and then abandon their collective responsibility before public opinion, and we have also complained that your party abandons at times the positions of its cabinet ministers. The responsibility is collective. Parliamentary responsibility is one of the most important mainstays of the democratic system that we practice. The abandonment of this responsibility, along with other negative acts, has greatly affected the regime's ability to make decisions and to lead.

In conclusion, we will face our responsibilities to avert dangers from the country with the required resolve and determination. I hope that you will not forget that the country's interest and its democratic system require that all, regardless of their positions, consolidate their efforts toward this end. We, following the national course, expect your position toward action on the various issues to be a national position that seeks to serve the national interest.

I consider your letter of 28 December 1988 to mean withdrawal of the DUP representatives from all the constitutional institutions in which they have participated, and I will act accordingly.

God is the giver of success.

(Signed) Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, prime minister

Oil Exploration Drilling To Commence Soon
EAI202165589 Khartoum National Unity Radio in Arabic 1300 GMT 12 Feb 89

[Text] In the next few days the Sun Oil Company will start petroleum exploration drilling operations. It will start drilling a second well in the Taftish Abu-Jinn area under the Jazirah plan. A responsible source in the government and Sun Oil Company revealed that the results of the geophysical survey indicated that the area is oil-bearing and thus encouraging for the drilling operations, particularly after the government closure of the first well when it was confirmed that its yield would not be commercially viable.

Editorial Calls for Finance Minister's Resignation
45040185B Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 1 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Idris Hasan: "In Words: Resignation Is Only Choice for Finance Minister"]

[Text] Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, the minister of finance and chief economic policy official, should have tendered his resignation from the cabinet after the government failed to implement his policy. He should not have reacted to the broad, organized movement in the country to reject the government's recent decisions to raise prices and impose new tax burdens on citizens by threatening people and warning them of misfortune, ruin, and dire consequences.

We would have liked Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im to do what extraordinary men, who really appreciate their responsibility, would have done when their policies and decisions are at odds with the masses' wishes. Extraordinary men resign in such situations, creating thereby an opportunity for others to offer other options they may have. This is because the [operative] principle in a democracy is that government serve the people, not act as their master. We would have liked Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, the minister of finance, to do what the late Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, who was Egypt's minister of finance and the economy, did. Dr al-Qaysuni, a knowledgeable economist whose competence is acknowledged worldwide, tendered his resignation from the cabinet in January 1978 when the Egyptian people rejected his decision to raise bread prices. Dr al-Qaysuni resigned even though the late President al-Sadat opposed the popular rejection movement which had been organized as an uprising that swept Egypt on 18 and 19 January. The late President al-Sadat had described the people's rejection of Dr al-Qaysuni's decisions as "the thieves' uprising." At that time he said the uprising was backed by forces who were setting it in motion for political purposes whose ultimate objective was to overthrow his regime. Now, the same thing is being said in Sudan.

Ultimately, however, none of this prevented President al-Sadat from retracting his position and changing his government's policy in the face of the people's rejection movement. When President al-Sadat rescinded the decisions which had raised bread prices, Dr al-Qaysuni saw the rescission as an action that reflected on him personally and on his policies, and that made it impossible for him to continue serving as minister in the cabinet. This means that when a government's policies are incompatible with the positions of any government official, that official should not remain in office. This is a genuine democratic principle which is employed and followed by all democratic regimes which follow the rules of democracy.

A recent story about the British minister of health may provide an ideal example of the behavior of those who respect themselves first and respect democracy second. There was a recent crisis in Britain because of something the minister had said about toxic materials in eggs, which is a principal food in the British diet. Egg producers in Britain sustained enormous losses as a result of the minister's statement, and the British economy was generally damaged. The government had no other choice but to ask the minister to retract her statement. The minister retracted her statement, and she followed that by tendering her resignation.

None of that, however, happened with our minister of finance, Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, who remained unconcerned about embarrassing the government and causing a political crisis which forced the democratic system into a dangerous situation whose implications are not yet clear.

Instead of tendering his resignation from the cabinet, as any official in a democracy who appreciates his responsibilities would do, Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im went on television and addressed people in a Fascist, intimidating manner that does not become a person who holds a position of responsibility because of circumstances. The irresponsible statements Dr al-Da'im made did untold damage to his party and his government and caused serious injury to an organization whose history has earned it the respect of the Sudanese people. Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im did serious injury to al-Ansar: He forced them into a battle they were not a party to when he called upon them to fight and asked for their assistance against citizens. He acted as though members of the al-Ansar organization were not citizens but rather people who were being reduced to defending their representatives, even if they were wrong. Those representatives were wrong, of course. Otherwise, they would not have rescinded their decisions. Usually, decisions are rescinded only when they are groundless or were made in error.

This is neither the first nor the last time in which Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im speaks so menacingly. His manner is completely incompatible with the democratic approach he talks about and appears to adhere to when

he says that the government he represents, represents 90 percent of all the people in Sudan. If what he says is true, why is he insisting on a confrontation? Why is he using force, and why is he flexing his muscles? Why is he hurting an organization like al-Ansar, which is a steadfast member of the national movement? Al-Ansar's contributions to the movement and the positions it assumed in its favor are undeniable. In fact, throughout the history of Sudan every Sudanese citizen has respected and cherished al-Ansar's contributions and positions. Talking about members of that organization in this manner is unbecoming and incompatible with their history and the national role they played in all stages of our history. They were the guardians of the country's independence and the advocates for its national unity. They never fought from any other position, but Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im claims that they fought against the people of Sudan and their wishes.

Honesty requires us to say that the first people who would have been hurt by Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im's recent decisions, the decisions he rescinded, would have been the members of al-Ansar. The minister of finance must not lead himself to believe that he can induce members of that organization to act against the concerns of ordinary citizens. Therefore, if Dr al-Da'im has not tendered his resignation because his decisions failed and were rescinded, he is being asked to tender his resignation because he wronged the al-Ansar organization, and he tried to portray its members as enemies of the Sudanese people. Such an accusation is one that no honest patriot who is loyal to this steadfast, patriotic entity will accept.

Writer Cites Failures of Civil Service Selection Panel

45040185A Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic
29 Dec 89 p 8

[By 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The selection of candidates for positions in all sectors of public service must be subject to open competition. Any other procedure for selecting those candidates would contradict the 1975 Public Service Code. The provision that a selection committee appoint university graduates to public service positions actually regulates the selection process and does not constitute an exemption from this rule which was ignored completely during the past years, especially when lower positions, like those of clerks, bookkeepers, warehouse custodians, and teachers were being filled. Ignoring the public service code creates opportunities for preferential treatment and for making poor choices. It is just not enough to form committees—if such committees are actually formed—to examine applicants who go to the Public Personnel Department or to the Accounting Office. Instead, vacant positions must be advertised in newspapers and on radio and television so that as many applications as possible can be received.

Until about the late sixties, university graduates were automatically appointed to public service positions. At that time, the number of university graduates was not much greater than the number of positions which were created every year to meet the expanding goals of public service. In addition, a number of positions became vacant because people retired, were dismissed, or resigned. But as the number of graduates grew, the number of public service positions to which they could be appointed declined. Eventually, new graduates will be hired only to replace those who leave their positions, since the number of graduates has doubled 5 times during the past 20 years.

Since only a very small percentage of graduates can be appointed to public service positions, competition should become the basis for selecting the best applicants. Competition should have been the basis for selecting applicants a long time ago. If the selection committee insists on using the same methods that were used when the graduates of Gordon University College were appointed to public service positions, it would be demonstrating its rigidity. And yet, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform must attend to an issue which concerns graduates. The ministry must attend to the problem of blatant partisan favoritism, which is practiced by unit representatives serving on the selection committees. These people are charged with the task of seeing to it that the ministers' wishes are met. It is being said that no announcements of any vacant positions in the new Security Agency were made before a large number of graduates were appointed to fill these positions. [passage omitted]

TUNISIA

PUP Leader Interviewed on Party Rift

45190030 Tunis REALITES in French
16-22 Dec 88 pp 14-15

[Interview with Mohamed Bel Hadj Amor, secretary general of the People's Unity Party, by correspondent Taieb Zahar; date and place of interview not given—first paragraph is REALITES introduction]

[Text] The recent convention of the People's Unity Party (PUP), which took place on the 10th and 11th of this month, provided some clarification of the situation. To learn more about it, we interviewed Mr Mohamed Bel Hadj Amor, the party's secretary general, who talked to us about the party's internal crisis, legislative elections, labor unions....

[REALITES] The People's Unity Party was recently rocked by an internal crisis that resulted in the expulsion of Mounir Kachouk and Jalel Azzouna by the close of its convention. What led to the dispute?

[Amor] The democratic orientation of our party and its contribution to building our country's democratic structure unmasked the negativistic thinking of certain elements in our midst who are incapable of playing a positive role in the consolidation of democracy and progress. The situation was closely watched by the public which quickly perceived our leadership's and membership's attachment to democratic practices and their rejection of repressive methods and fanaticism. We based our approach to the crisis on the principle that the party convention should have the final word in the matter. For this reason, we made a point of asking that all party members participate in the proceedings, with no exceptions, so that the decisions would be made fairly and in harmony with the interests of the party. The elements who had separated themselves from the party and found themselves isolated from the democratic framework they reject responded with what amounted to a series of insults to our legal structures, defamation of the party, and absention. Their reaction was considered a dangerous escalation in the destructive actions of this separatist minority.

Public opinion and the press quickly perceived the threat that such conduct represents to the establishment of a multiparty system and condemned these antidemocratic practices by excluding those responsible for them from the political scene. In the end, the party convention, having fully understood the situation, called on well-intentioned members who tried up to the last minute to convince the two dissidents to attend the convention, to no avail. The convention then decided simply to expel Mounir Kachoukh and Jallel Azzouna, who withdrew to the banner of former political figures, proving that it was not the party's internal workings they opposed, but that they had intended to take control of the PUP in order to hand it over to a political movement.

[REALITES] What is the particularity of the PUP in relation to the other existing parties?

[Amor] The PUP is a party that draws its inspiration from the people's aspirations for a just and progressive society. Its ideology and its primary stands are based on the effective participation of all citizens in the formulation, implementation, and follow-up of economic, social, and cultural policy choices. I am opposed—as are our members, by the way—to bureaucratic or collectivist socialism, which has failed everywhere.

[REALITES] What distinguishes you from Tunisia's former "Socialist" rulers?

[Amor] We are against the monopoly of power; in favor of democracy and participation.

[REALITES] Where does the PUP stand in Tunisia's political spectrum?

[Amor] It is among the left-wing movements that are working for the establishment of a democratic society.

[REALITES] What is your relationship to the government?

[Amor] We are solidifying democratic gains. We are vigilant and critical of the government, and we are opposed to actions that are not in favor of the common masses.

[REALITES] Are you a part of the parliamentary majority supporting the president?

[Amor] We were the first to promote the idea. The well-being of Tunisia lies with such a majority which is the product of consensus on an economic and social program that favors the majority of the population.

[REALITES] What distinguishes you from the Tunisian Communist Party?

[Amor] I do not identify with Karl Marx and I do not approve of the notion of class struggle. The national sector, private and public sectors side by side—they can coexist. The state should not have to do everything. But on the other hand, nothing could be worse than for the state to withdraw the country's building process. We need to define the best means of fostering the public sector.

[REALITES] Will you be a candidate in the next presidential election?

[Amor] No.

[REALITES] Why not?

[Amor] We support the president's parliamentary majority.

[REALITES] Do you plan to field a joint ticket with other political parties?

[Amor] We plan to participate in the elections. The various possibilities of alliance with other parties remain to be seen. It will also depend on platforms.

[REALITES] Will there be Islamists on your legislative ticket?

[Amor] The question has never come up.

[REALITES] What do you think of Colonel al-Qadhdhaffi's latest speech?

[Amor] He is outspoken. You have to take him the way he is. When I have the opportunity to meet with him, I will tell him what I think. But I am in favor of a complementary economic relationship between our two countries.

[REALITES] What is your approach to labor unionism?

[Amor] The workers' organization must be at the forefront of the struggle for the development of the country just as it was in the struggle for independence. We must mobilize all the forces of production against underdevelopment. The unions have a large role to play in worker training and in raising the awareness of workers. We cannot embark on development with a feeble, passive, and unrepresentative labor confederation. We need clear legislation granting everyone his rights.

Status of Jewish Population Examined
45040176 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
11-17 Jan 89 pp 34, 35

[Article by Nora Fakhuri and interview with Jewish Tunisian human rights activist; date and place not given]

[Text] Some 3,000 Jews live in Tunisia today, down from 140,000 at independence in 1956. Where did all they go? Where do the rest live? What are their organizations? What are their prospects?

A Jewish community leader in Tunisia said: "We are being treated well in our country, Tunisia. We are attached to our president and government and we live, enjoying complete respect, with our Muslim compatriots."

The Tunisian Jewish community consists of citizens of Tunisian nationality who organize themselves as follows:

The spiritual authority is led by Grand Rabbi Madar who comes from the town of Djerba. He is known to have written many pages of the Torah on parchment with reed pens, using ink made of gum. The civic authority is represented by the Jewish community's "father" Rene Shish. He is a man in his seventies, calm, cultured, clear-sighted, and attached to Tunisia. He cannot see himself in any other place. He is considered a pioneer of the textile industry in Tunisia. He owned one of the most important textile networks before he decided to retire and rest. For many years after the independence he provided clothing material for the army and the police. Up to this day he is considered to be an authority and an adviser in the textile field.

These two personalities share control of a community of elderly people, as only the relatively old-aged have remained in Tunisia while the rest have left the country by the thousands and tens of thousands. Why did they go and where did they go? Upon independence the Jews carried French citizenship in accordance with a French law that forced the Tunisian Jews and the European inhabitants, other than the French—Italians, Maltese, Greeks, Spanish, and British—to assume French citizenship.

The majority of Tunisian Jews disapproved of this, particularly since the Jews of Djerba, Qabis, Sfax, and Nabul were fully assimilated into the in the environment

in which they lived. They used to exchange visits with their Muslim neighbors and shared a common life, with the exception of marriage and worship.

Thus we find a Jew entering the first government formed upon independence by Habib Bourguiba in 1956. He was Andy Barush, a well-known industrialist and businessman.

However, independence also saw the beginning of large-scale Jewish immigration, particularly from the capital, on the basis that the Jews carried French citizenship. They found this an opportunity to take advantage of the aid given to the "returnees".

The second wave of immigration came in 1962 that marked the beginning of implementing the policy of cooperatives that was enforced and then implemented by former minister Ahmed Ben Saleh. The textile industry and trade were nationalized in one of the first measures to nationalize the trade and industry that were in the hands of Jews.

The third wave of immigration came after the June 1967 6-day war following anti-Jewish demonstrations in Tunisia. During this time, the largest number of Jews left Tunisia, especially the young people, and the effective forces in the Jewish community. Ever since, the Jewish community diminished. But where did all these people go?

A Jewish leader in Tunisia says:

"The majority of those have left Tunisia and settled in France. A small number left for the United States, Canada, and Italy."

This leader would rather say that a small number went to Israel. But a doctoral thesis discussed by a Tunisian Jew at Aix-en-Provence University in southern France confirms that the number of Tunisian Jews that went to Israel was very small.

The majority of north African Jews who immigrated from their countries of origin have settled in France. They specialized in the textile trade, food industry, commerce, services, and finances. Yet this does not deny the fact that a small number of them settled in Israel. A Jew of Tunisian origin named "Hilal" reached the position of minister of security [as published]. On the other hand, three leaders who are at the pinnacle of the religious and civic authorities for French Jews are of Tunisian origin. These are: the Grand Rabbi of France; Rabbi Madar, president of the Higher Jewish Court in France; and Misliyah, president of the French Jewish Association. These were among those who immigrated from Tunisia at earlier times.

Jews in Tunisia constitute 0.37 percent of the total population. Some 2,000 of them live in the capital Tunis. The remaining 1,000, according to Jewish sources, live in the towns of (Nabil), Sousa, Sfax, Tetouan, and the Isle of Djerba.

Several hundred of them live in towns like Sfax, Nabl, and Djerba while a few score live in other places.

According to the Torah scriptures, prayer can be held in the synagogue if a minimum of 10 people attended.

Tunisian Jews have several synagogues. There are seven synagogues in the capital and its suburbs. The principal synagogue is on a main street in the capital, al-Hurriyah street. They all come under the Jewish affairs administration.

Rabbi Madar is a government employee in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He receives a salary like any other employee. There are Jewish synagogues in Tunisia's most important towns, although synagogues in the towns of Bajah, al-Mahdiyyah, and Benzerte have become cultural centers after the number of Jews in these towns diminished or became completely nonexistent.

Al-Ghuraybah in Djerba is one of the most renowned synagogues in Tunisia and one of the most internationally renowned synagogues. Its original building dates back about 2,000 years. According to Jewish legend, it was built on a rock that was brought from Jerusalem from the synagogue that was destroyed when the Romans expelled the Jews from Palestine 2,000 years ago.

Tunisian Jews, even Jews from all over the world, come to this synagogue for pilgrimage in the month of May every year following Passover. But in the past few years this pilgrimage has waned.

Al-Ghuraybah is considered an architectural work of art. It is built in an oriental architectural style and is embellished with shiny stones and beautiful arches. Its floor is covered with oriental mats and is currently used for prayers by the Jews of Djerba.

It was in this synagogue that Rabbi Madar was elected Chief Rabbi of Tunisia after which he moved to the capital to become number one religious personality for the Jews of Tunisia. Yet al-Ghuraybah, though ancient, does not contain any significant historical objects or ancient Torah books.

[box, 1 p 35]

Tunisian Jew Voices Support of Palestinian Rights

Serge Addah is a cultured Tunisian who is equally fluent in Arabic and French like most other employees in Tunisian departments and institutions.

The significance about Serge is that he is a Jew and considered to be one of the strugglers for democracy and human rights. He is a member of the Tunisian Human Rights Defense League and an activist supporting the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

AL-MAJALLAH interviewed him and asked him how, being a Jew, did he come to hold this belief. He said: "I do not view this matter from the standpoint of a Jew or a Tunisian. There is a Palestinian people which has been expelled from its land since 1948 and after three wars still finds itself without a state and without a land. This people has a right to self-determination, to a land, and to a flag. Why not so when this people already had these constituent factors before 1948? Therefore, as far as I am concerned the matter is one of redressing an injustice and restoring a right. The world community must find a logical solution.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But what is the solution?

[Addah] I believe that the recent PNC resolutions in Algiers and the recent declaration in Stockholm lead to the conviction that a solution is possible with the establishment of a Palestinian state. A possible solution is that which leads to peace. Talk about peace leads to talk about negotiations. Those who today are objecting to dialogue with the Palestinians are the Israeli leaders.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do any Tunisian Jews share your views?

[Addah] I am talking about my personal position. I am a struggler and a descendant of a nationalist family. As for the Jewish community in Tunisia, I cannot speak for it, yet I must say that the tremendous Israeli propaganda machine has been able to tilt the balance of Jews and others.

We have seen people well known for their support of right stand against the Palestinians. The Arabs have not countered the Israeli propaganda with an equally strong propaganda. But I must say that many of Tunisian and Maghreb Jews have begun to understand that the Israeli leaders are pursuing a policy of injustice and persecution, especially since the beginning of the uprising. Therefore, it is not surprising that we see a change in the attitude of a considerable number of Jews toward a more rational and more objective stand.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Apparently you have a relationship with Palestinian leaders and especially with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat].

[Addah] My relationship with the PLO is not new. When I was a student in Paris some of my best friends were Muhammad al-Hamshari and 'Izz al-Din Qalaq [PLO representatives believed assassinated by Israeli agents]. I had relationships with a number of [PLO] leaders since that time and it is continuing up to this day. I first met with Yasir 'Arafat in Algiers in 1983 on the occasion of

the convening of the PNC session which I attended as one of the supporters of the Palestinian cause. This meeting was repeated several times.

Sources of Election Campaign Funding Analyzed
45190033 Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French
8 Jan 89 p 7

[Article by Brahim Oueslati and M.G.: "How Are the Tunisian Political Parties Financed?"]

[Excerpt] Tunisia currently has seven parties, all existing within the law. Two of them, the RCD [Democratic Constitutional Rally] (formerly the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party]) and the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT) were established well before independence was won. Two others, the Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) and the PUP [People's Unity Party], came into being at the end of the 1970' but did not win legal approval until 1981. The other three were recognized after 7 November.

Each of these seven groups is different from the others not only in terms of ideology, supporters, and real weight, but in terms of influence on the political life of the nation as well. In this connection, the RCD, as a party which waged the struggle for independence and a party in power, is by far the political group which has most definitely put its stamp on the sociopolitical life and history of the country. Often linked with state government, it has in the end become identified with it, obtaining subsidies from the administrative budget on which it relies heavily. The fact is that the PSD, to use its old designation, did not have a budget of its own. But this situation could not long endure, and after the 7 November change with its profound effect on the party in power (which became the RCD in February 1988), the Rally was to separate itself, due above all to the determination of its president, from the administration.

What the Law Provides

Organic Law No 88-32, dated 3 May 1988, on the Organization of Political Parties specifies how party budgets are obtained. In fact, Article 12 provides that "Any legally established political party may without any special authorization acquire for valuable consideration, possess, and administer:

"1) Its members' dues;

"2) The premises and equipment intended for party administration and the meetings of its members; and

"3) Its assets.

"To make matters clearer, the budget of a political party comes from the membership dues of its adherents, the solicitation of pledges and gifts from members and supporters. Article 12 sets forth the requirement that "Gifts and donations must be listed in a declaration

showing, among other things, each item, its value, and the giver or givers. This declaration will be submitted by the leaders of the party to the Ministry of Interior within 3 months of receipt of the gift or donation."

Also, according to Article 16 "No political party may receive any direct or indirect material assistance from abroad or from foreigners established in Tunisia in any capacity, or in any form whatsoever." Therefore any party leader who "receives funds obtained from a foreign party, directly or indirectly, in any form or in any capacity whatsoever, for his personal account or that of the party, will be subject to a prison sentence of a minimum of 5 years" (Article 25).

Aid From the State

The state also finances the political parties, but in an indirect manner. In fact, parties may recover expenditures incurred in the course of the electoral campaign and for ballots and posters, in accordance with the following conditions (as provided for in Article 45b of the Electoral Code):

- For presidential elections: If the candidate has won at least 5 percent of the votes reported on the national level.
- For legislative and municipal elections, if the slate of candidates has won at least 3 percent of the votes reported on the level of the voting district.

In addition, Law No 88-33 dated 3 March 1988 provides for tax benefits for political parties, as follows:

- Exemption from the transfer tax on the real property needed for their activities, when such is purchased, donated, or traded.
- Registration of contracts signed with third parties pertaining to the real property necessary for their activities, at a single fixed rate.
- Exemption from the real estate registry tax in the event of an appeal to the administrative court.

Finally, according to the provisions of Article 6 of the Party Law, each party "must maintain double-entry ledgers and an inventory record of its assets, including real and chattel property.

"It must submit its accounts annually to the accounting court, and must at all times be prepared to prove the source of its financial assets."

RSP Disapproves of State Subsidies

The Progressive Socialist Rally (RSP) obtained legal approval on 12 September 1988.

"Apart from political and ideological choices, the RSP rejects any form of subsidy coming either from the state or from any organized domestic or foreign party." For, according to the RSP spokesman, "It is a paradox to ask

the state to provide money to organize the opposition." To a question about whether the assistance provided by the state to the opposition newspapers in general and the newspaper EL MAWQEF in particular is not, in fact, a subsidy, the RSP spokesman said that EL MAWQEF "is not the organ of the RSP any more than it is an independent journal." With regard to the funds obtained for the current management of this newly legalized party, we were told by the RSP that "They come almost exclusively from gifts from members or supporters." Two sorts of fees have been established. Regular dues, ranging in amount from 5 to 30 dinars per month per member, are collected, and there are also supplementary fees collected at gatherings of a certain size, such as congresses, meetings, etc.

Moreover, the RSP has a charter permit which it can lease to a private party for the transportation of persons and the distribution of the newspaper EL MAWQEF.

In order to ensure regular income, the RSP plans to promote profit-making projects "which will bring in immediate funds." We have received reports that the RSP plans to invest in the catering business. In connection with the financing of electoral campaigns, the RSP hopes that "The principle of equality before the law, in connection with electoral campaign financing" will be respected. This is the best way of protecting the various political groups from the financial manipulations of hidden organizations.

UDU To Publish Accounts

"The Unionist Democratic Union (UDU) is barely past the organizational stage. It was just recently legalized. This is why it has not had time to draft a budget," we were told in answer to our questions.

"We have existed thus far on the basis of financial pledges from the individuals who support us. These individuals belong to all socioprofessional categories, and they have made more or less sizable gifts to us in cash and in kind. They are helping us thereby to ensure the financial autonomy to which we are committed, consistent with the law."

Where the financing of electoral campaigns is concerned, the UDU is committed "to clear accounting by the parties to avoid the intervention of concealed sources of financing." Moreover, the UDU promises "to publish its accounts after the campaign."

PSP Favors Higher National Commission

According to the spokesman of the PSP, "The state should take over the financing of the parties. There would also, of course, be the dues and the gifts obtained from the members and supporters, as provided by the law. This system would avoid the risk of allegiance to any foreign party.

"Moreover, this partial aid from the state should be prorated according to the importance of each party involved. We are committed to the principle of clear financial accounting by the political groups. In this connection, we believe that it would be wise to establish a higher national commission which would have the authority to verify the membership totals reported by this or that party."

MDS Rejects American-Style Campaign

The financing for the Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) is provided "thanks to the activity of the members, and based on the voluntary principle, as in the national liberation era. Even the rental of the headquarters and the costs of publishing our journals are paid for by the members themselves," the MDS spokesman said. "The fact is that this party refuses to be dependent on anyone," he added.

However, and because of the deficit situation being experienced by that party's publications, the state decided to grant a subsidy of about 60 percent on the price of paper. "The state also paid out an advance of about 50,000 dinars by way of reparations for the seizures which occurred prior to 7 November," the MDS spokesman admitted.

"The current expenditures have to do with the newspaper, the publication of texts, transportation, and rents. These expenditures are covered by the members themselves through their dues and their gifts to us," he said. And he added that "The members of the Political Bureau of the MDS pay 100 dinars each every month, and this goes to cover the general expenditures of the Tunis federation.

"Within the party, it is the militants and the cadres who cover the various costs."

On the other hand, pledge contributions are solicited whenever the MDS organizes an important gathering or decides to provide aid to the families of prisoners or the unemployed.

With regard to the profit-making development projects, the MDS currently has none. However, it hopes that the administration will take action so that the preliminary permits and authorization necessary for this kind of activity "can be delivered with less red tape" to all of the political groups. Moreover, the MDS is currently chartering two vehicles, and from time to time it organizes sales of craft products made by some of its members.

As to electoral campaign financing, the MDS defines its position as follows. "We are opposed to the principle of waging American-style campaigns in an underdeveloped and indebted country. This is why every cent spent counts. We propose that the media, and Tunisian Radio and Television (RTT) in particular, assume their role in

presenting the candidates to the public. This is an economical way of reducing the costs of the campaign and safeguarding public funds."

PUP Favors State Financial Assistance

"The political parties are veritable channels for the transmission of the aspirations of the various social classes and categories. As a result, they play a leading role in the organization of civil life and in the defense and development of the state institutions.

"This is why their role cannot be assumed fully and seriously in the absence of a substantial financial base.

"If the political party is seen as a popular institution for staffing and participating in the organization of public and political life and the defense of the republican system, it should be guaranteed financial aid dispensed exclusively by the state and by its own members.

"This aid would allow the party to avoid deviation from its choices and to avoid being entrapped in dark maneuvers which might pose a danger to society and the country."

On the subject of electoral campaign financing, the PUP believes that "Voting is an action which is necessary if we are to make the political and constitutional institutions effective, an action in which the participation of the people is expressly required." This is why the state, "which has the right and the duty to protect its institutions, is under obligation to finance all of the actions necessary for the proper operation of these institutions.

"It is clearly understood that the law can and should define the framework for and the limits of the financial aid which the state should provide to the political parties without prior conditions, so they can carry out their electoral campaigns."

RCD Plans Autonomous Budget

The RCD remains the best-structured party by far, and that most strongly represented in all regions of the country. In fact, there is no corner so remote that it does not have a cell, or failing that, a section. Having always been in the forefront of the political scene since it was established in February 1920, the Rally, which has been in power since Tunisia gained its independence, has undergone profound changes throughout its history. The last dates back to February 1988 when the decision to take a new name was made during a Central Committee meeting (27-28 February). The Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) became the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD). It was above all a matter of infusing new blood into this tottering party, which was profiting from its role in the administration. This was what was made clear by President Ben Ali, as president of the RCD,

during his closing address at the final congress. The RCD should cease to rely on the government administration. It should rely on its own resources and have an autonomous budget.

2 Million Dinars From Members

After 1 January 1989, the RCD will have its own budget, obtained basically from members' dues and gifts and the solicitation of pledge contributions. The Rally has 1.5 million members distributed among 5,200 cells. A membership costs 1.5 dinars, yielding a total of more than 2 million dinars. This sum is distributed equitably to the cells, the federation, the coordination committee and the central administration of the party. As for contribution pledges, they are 5 dinars each. Several thousand have been obtained, allowing an expansion of the RCD's budget.

With regard to gifts from members, they have never amounted to as much as this year. By way of example, some 20 businessmen belonging to the RCD have pledged substantial aid which will total about 50,000 dinars per year over a period of 5 years. There are also gifts in kind (vehicles, furniture).

A Special Commission

According to the provisions of Law No 88-32, dated 3 May 1988, on the organization of political parties, "Any legally established political party may, without any special authorization, purchase for valuable consideration, possess, and administer the dues of its members, the premises and the equipment used for the administration of the party and the meetings of its members, and its assets" (Article 12).

This is why, following the organizational congress, the RCD established a commission headed by Mr Abdallah Kallal, a member of the Political Bureau and treasurer of the Rally, for the purpose of making a rational study of the steps likely to make the RCD budget flourish, consistent with the provisions of the law. Investment in development projects and the management of real estate, as pursued by the coordination committee in Sfax, are among the proposals which have already been put forward and which are consistent with the regulations in effect.

PCT Mobilizes for Campaign Financing

What about the finances of the Tunisian Communist Party?

"Without going into details about the figures (in this connection, it should be noted that the party finances are fully accounted for and have been submitted to the fiscal controllers within the framework of the new law), our budget does not exceed 100,000 Tunisian dinars, of which almost half is reserved for the ETTARIK EL JADID subsidy. The balance goes for the salaries of a few

permanent employees, whom one can count on the fingers of one hand, and to pay the rent for 10 or so offices. And that is more or less how the money is used," the accountants responsible for the Communist Party budget say. As for the resources, they are obtained exclusively from the members' dues and subscriptions, and gifts from supporters. In this connection, our members are subject to a rather stiff party fee which has nothing to do with the 12 100-millim stamps paid for a full year! We charge a rate which comes to about 2 percent of income. As a result, the upper cadres, for example, pay 120 dinars per year by way of regular dues, apart from special contributions.

For example, at the time the party was legalized in 1981, the newspapers carried reports about communist women who were contributing their jewelry to finance the party and the electoral campaign at that time. Unfortunately, however, communist women do not have much jewelry, and despite this very touching symbolic gesture, the amounts obtained did not constitute any veritable treasury.

With regard to electoral campaigns, that in 1981 cost us 10,000 dinars, although we were not represented in more than a quarter of the districts.

If we participate in the election this time, and if we are represented in all the districts, bearing in mind that costs have at least doubled, we will have to expect that the

electoral campaign will cost at least 100,000 dinars. This is beyond our usual means, and to obtain this sum we will have to mobilize to obtain special contributions from those who sympathize with us.

Recovery of Sums Spent

Article 45b (especially created) allows the candidates or slates of candidates to recover the costs of ballots and posters in accordance with the following conditions:

- For presidential elections, if the candidate has won at least 5 percent of the votes reported on the national level.
- For legislative and municipal elections, the slates of candidates must have won at least 3 percent of the votes reported on the level of the electoral district.
- To recover the cost of printing these ballots and posters for the presidential elections.
- The candidate must have won 5 percent of the votes on the national level. He may thus recover the cost of printing ballots in a proportion equal to the number of persons shown on the voters' register, plus 10 percent, and also the cost of printing posters, with a ratio of one poster per 500 voters.
- Candidates in the legislative and municipal elections can recover the cost of printing ballots in a proportion equal to the number of individuals shown on the voters' register, plus 10 percent. [passage omitted]

INDIA

'Sources' Say Poll Reforms Unlikely Before December

46001225 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 9 Dec 88 p 1

[Article by M. K. Kaul]

[Text] Electoral reforms can, at the earliest, be put to effect by December next when the Lok Sabha polls are due, say the Election Commission sources.

The two major changes, they point out, that the electoral reforms envisage are: Lowering of voting age from the present 21 years to 18 and use of electronic voting machine.

To effect both the changes, Parliament will have to amend Article 327 of the Constitution and the Representation of Peoples Act of 1951 and 1958, the sources said.

Since in both cases, amendment of the Indian Statute is a must, it cannot be done unless both are voted for by a minimum of two-thirds of the members present at the time of voting in each of the two Houses of Parliament. Then the amendment has to be ratified by a minimum of 50 per cent of the State assemblies.

In spite of the Congress having more than half the states under its control, the sources say, the process is time consuming unless of course the amendments to the Constitution are "rushed through" without "much regard" to the basic rights of the legislative houses.

Even if "hypothetically," they say, it is assumed that the amendments are put through at a "break neck speed at the command of the ruling party," the revision of electoral rolls will not be easy.

Since it is for the first time that persons within the age of group of 18 and 21 will be given the franchise rights, the Election Commission will have to undertake a "massive revision" work of the electoral rolls.

It will be, they say, more or less a "mini" census carried on the "house-to-house basis." So the Election Commission will have to mobilise a huge task force to conduct the survey throughout the country.

As it is, it is being pointed out, the Election Commission depends on the Centre and State government agencies. Since the survey now has got to be much bigger than undertaken ever before it will have to seek services of school teachers and other such professionals.

Given the experience of the census operation, sources say, the lapses in the electoral rolls are going to be much bigger than what is the normal case. The Election Commission sources fear that time consumed for rectification of mistakes after inviting objections would be enormous, thus leading to delays.

Even at rough estimates, sources say, the lowering of voting age would mean induction of something like 50 million voters on the electoral rolls. All this would not take less than six months to achieve, say the Election Commission sources.

As the things stand today, the Government can at the most introduce a "comprehensive electoral reform bill" to Parliament during current session, which has now been extended.

Thus, the bill can be discussed and put to various parliamentary exercises only during the budget session, which normally begins around late February, if it is given "top priority."

The next step would be to "request" the Congress-ruled states to have the amendment passed through their legislative houses to meet the "minimum" constitutional requirements.

The Article 327 of the Indian Constitution, which governs the elections in the country, stipulates that election to the House of the people and the State legislative assemblies shall be on the basis of adult franchise, that is, any person who is a citizen of India and who is not less than 21 years of age on such a date as may be fixed by or under any law by the appropriate legislatures can be a registered voter.

To bring down the stipulation of 21 years, the Constitution will have to be changed and hence the all important amendment.

As far as use of voting machine is concerned, it too needs legislative approval since the Supreme Court banned its use without appropriate legislative steps. The use of electronic machines was challenged after it was put to use on selective basis in Delhi and elsewhere in the country in 1980 polls. The highest court in the country had disfavoured it, saying it could be done only bringing suitable changes in the concerned laws.

Tribal National Volunteers Now Political Party
46001230 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
11 Dec 88 p 4

[Text] Ramgamura (West District), 10 December—Within three months of resuming normal life, the Tribal National Volunteer [TNV] yesterday emerged as an overground political party.

The announcement was made on the third day of the organisation's state conference which ended here today with an open session in which the delegates took part in a "free and frank" discussion. The move to launch the TNV as a political party "in order to preserve its distinctive identity" was followed by the constitution of 43-member central committee and a 9-member central executive with Mr Bijay Hrankhawl as president, Mr Kartik Koloi as general secretary and Mr Ananta Debbarma as treasurer.

The former commanders of the TNV his (sic) squads, Kripasadhan Jamatiya, Kamini Debbarma and Benoy Debbarma have been accommodated in the executive body in various capacities to please the erstwhile armed wing and to ensure proportional representation of all the tribal communities in the committee.

The TNV leadership yesterday decided that the party would make all efforts to ensure the implementation of the accord till February when a central committee meeting of the party would decide upon the future action to be adopted by the TNV.

Despite being invited to participate in the conference, except the tribal students federation, the student wing of the TUJS [Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti], no other political party sent its representatives to the conference.

The TUJS had issued a strong circular among its workers warning that participation in the TNV conference would entail expulsion from the party. But the TSE [expansion unknown] president, Mr Amulya Reang, and the vice-president, Mr Sabda Kumar Jamatiya, who addressed the conference, said "TSF [expansion unknown] is a non-political students organisation and is cooperating with the TUJS only because it is working in the interest of tribals."

The Tripura chief minister, Mr Sudhir Ranjan Mazumder, too, had been invited to attend the open session but did not do so "presumably due to pressure from the TUJS."

Admiral Tells Newsmen of Navy Plans, Capabilities

46001226 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
11 Dec 88 p 8

[Text] Pune, 10 December—India will have to remain watchful in view of the considerable presence of superpowers in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Admiral J. G. Nadkarni, chief of the naval staff, said here today.

Speaking to newsmen after reviewing the passing out parade of the 75th course of the National Defence Academy (NDA), Admiral Nadkarni said, "Our stand was that the IOR should remain as a 'zone of peace' and there was no requirement of other powers in the region." Indian navy was capable of policing the region, he added.

The naval chief said India was not in a position to build up its navy to counter the superpowers. In fact, it was not India's aim to build up its navy on those lines, as it was interested in only safeguarding the interests of the country and other littoral states. India would resort to making diplomatic moves in this regard, he said.

When asked whether a Chinese submarine was operating in the IOR, Admiral Nadkarni said as per information available, China was not present in the IOR.

The naval chief said India would soon induct a very sophisticated anti-submarine helicopter, and also a few helicopters for commando operations. It would increase the strength of sea aircraft carrier, he said, adding the naval air arm was progressing gradually. There would be eight TU-142 for carrying out a reconnaissance and anti-submarine role, he said.

Admiral Nadkarni said the programme for modernisation and expansion of the Indian navy was in full swing. He mentioned the arrival of the nuclear submarine "Chakra," "Godavari," "Ganga" and "Gomati," and minor war vessels such as missile boats as part of the programme. He said a new ship, of the same size as "Godavari" but more updated in arms would be constructed at Calcutta. He said, "we should soon have a third naval base at Karwar."

Admiral Nadkarni revealed that a naval group insurance scheme for sailors and officers has been introduced. A sailor would be insured for Rs 1,50,000, while an officer for Rs 2,50,000. In addition, various measures were being taken for the welfare of the naval staff, he said. New plans were being drawn to attract talented youths in the navy.

UNI adds: Admiral Nadkarni said a collaboration agreement with a foreign firm for the design of a new aircraft carrier will be signed soon.

He said there were offers from at least three foreign firms, and an agreement would be signed with one of them. The construction of the third aircraft carrier to be built in India was expected to begin by 1991 and would be completed by 1997, he said.

The life of the aircraft carriers being around 40 to 48 years, the oldest carrier INS Vikrant and the recently-acquired INS Virat (which has completed 30 years service) will need replacement in the 1990s, the naval chief said.

On whether there was any plan to protect the islands within the jurisdiction of India, he said, "we have to take suitable measures to safeguard the safety of the islands belonging to India. It is a part of the planning."

Referring to the recent mercenaries attack on the Maldives Island and the Indian help offered, Admiral Nadkarni said plans were afoot to have helicopters for command operations.

On reports about Pakistan having acquired the capability to build submarines, he said, "according to our knowledge Pakistan is in a position to build small midget submarines of about 40 to 50 tonnes.

These submarines are nowhere near the class being built in India of 2,080 tonnes, he said.

He also said there was no information of Pakistan having acquired submarines from China.

Admiral Nadkarni said the navy is being equipped with different class of vehicles to provide more power and strength. Three Russian "877 EKM," were inducted this year while the fourth would be inducted next year.

He said the naval air arm was also being strengthened with the induction of eight "TU 142 M" anti-submarine warfare aircraft, which was recently used in operations on the Maldives Island.

India, South Yemen To Expand Trade, Cooperation

46001229 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
10 Dec 88 p 9

[Text] India and South Yemen agreed on Friday to constitute a joint economic committee to expand their trade and economic relations. They also signed two other agreements for greater interaction between their foreign offices and cultural exchange.

South Yemen Foreign Minister Abdul Aziz Al-Daly, who came to the Capital on Wednesday on a five-day visit met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, reviewed bilateral matters with External Affairs Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and had talks with Human Resources, and Information and Broadcasting Ministers.

Addressing newsmen on Friday, he said there was a vast scope for expansion of bilateral cooperation, particularly in the economic field, between the two countries. India, he said, could help his country in oil exploration.

Mr Al-Daly said that both the sides reviewed the situation in the South-West Asia, particularly of Palestine, and expressed his optimism about convening an international conference on the region.

He said that Reagan Government's denial of visa to PLO Chief Yasser Arafat had strengthened the Palestinian cause as the mass uprising of Palestinians in the occupied lands was evidence of their determination to achieve their right. The declaration of Palestinian State's independence was a positive step towards achieving durable peace in the region, he said.

Sharing India's concern over the presence of Super Powers' naval forces in the Indian Ocean, he demanded their immediate withdrawal because the Super Power rivalry in the Ocean had enhanced tensions in the region.

Mr Al-Daly was optimistic about the reunification of the two Yemens. Both countries, he said, have lifted visa restrictions on each other and are working for a joint constitution.

During his meeting with Mr Gandhi on Thursday evening, Mr Al-Daly delivered a special message to him from Yemen Socialist Party Secretary General Sakil Al Beidh.

Paper Gives Details of Indo-Romanian Trade Protocol

46001227 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 9 Dec 88 p 9

[Text] The Indo-Romania trade protocol for next year envisages a trade turnover of Rs 60 crore, reports UNI.

This will consist of Rs 380 crore by way of imports from Romania and an equal amount of exports from India.

The trade protocol between the two countries was concluded at the end of three-day trade talks between the visiting Romanian delegation led by Gheerge Badita, deputy minister of foreign trade and the Indian delegation headed by P. G. Muralidharan, additional secretary in the Commerce Ministry on Wednesday.

The trade plan envisages an offtake of five million tonnes of iron ore from India. Since there has been an improvement in the rupee resource position of Romania and imports picking up from that country, it is expected that Indian exports to Romania including iron ore would be stepped up in 1989, leading to a substantial increase in trade turnover.

The new items of import include streptomycin sulphate, vitamin A, speciality papers and glass shells for TV picture tubes.

New items of export are pesticides and herbicides, electronic components and computer peripherals.

Indo-Romanian trade reached a high volume of over Rs 200 crore in 1986 but started declining later following difficulties faced by the Romanian organisations in supplying substantial commodities due to power shortage, decline in supply of machinery and equipment and the tight rupee resource position of Romania.

This, among other things, had led to reduced offtake of iron ore by Romania from western India.

Discussions in Delhi during the past few days covered stabilising and promoting the trade through long term contracts, diversifying the structure and promoting new forms of cooperation, besides the usual review of bilateral trade.

It may be mentioned here that an expert team from the Directorate General of Trade and Development visited Romania to identify areas where technology transfer from that country might be possible.

The visiting Romanian deputy minister had discussions with ministers of Finance and Steel, the Petroleum Secretary and chairmen of the Railway Board, STC, MMTC and ONGC, covering a wide range of subjects.

Director in the ministry of foreign trade and international economic cooperation of Romania Ion Talpes and director in the commerce Ministry V. Viswanathan signed the trade protocol.

Hydrogen Cyanide in Union Carbide Gas Leak Confirmed

46001228 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
20 Dec 88 p 10

[Article by Anil Sharma]

[Text] Bhopal, 9 December—It has now been established that hydrogen cyanide was indeed a component of the gas that leaked from the methyl isocyanate (MIC) storage tank of the Union Carbide plant on the night of 2-3 December 1984.

This was the conclusion reached by research conducted by the Institute of Pathology, New Delhi, and the Defence Research and Development Establishment [DRDE], Gwalior. The studies by the Institute of Pathology were conducted in hospitals and community centres while the DRDE studies were conducted in laboratory conditions.

The suspicion that the deaths were due to hydrogen cyanide arose because of the cherry red colour of the blood and viscera of the victims. This impression was confirmed when the patients who were administered sodium thiosulphate showed an increased level of urinary thiocyanate. The patients who were administered sodium thiosulphate treatment also got relief from the usual complaints being made by other victims. In fact, the first responses from the Union Carbide Corporation about the treatment to the gas victims also showed a preference for this drug, but later on this was withdrawn.

Research undertaken at various laboratories within the country and abroad as well has substantiated that MIC, when exposed to thermal stress, releases hydrogen cyanide, among other chemicals.

Research by the DRDE has also established that MIC, when heated above 200 degrees celsius, forms hydrogen cyanide. It is clear that when the gas leaked out on the night of 2-3 December, the temperature was much above 200 degrees C. Or else, the steel tank would not have undergone the type of structural damage it suffered.

The anxiety of Union Carbide and its supporters to play down the role of cyanide poisoning and thereby campaign strongly against the use of sodium thiosulphate has also now become clear. At any cost, Union Carbide wants to eliminate the suggestion that the gas that leaked from the Bhopal plant contained any element of cyanide.

Five definite conclusions have been arrived at by the DRDE about methyl isocyanate. These are

(a) MIC on getting heated over 200 degrees C can form hydrogen cyanide;

(b) MIC can traverse the lung/blood barrier, can carbamylate proteins including haemoglobin, and can get distributed to different tissues/organs of the system;

(c) Pure MIC does not metabolise into hydrogen cyanide and toxicity is not reduced by sodium thiosulphate

(d) The organic lung lesions produced by MIC are of irreversible nature and aggravate further on physical stress and

(e) MIC is mutagenic but does not produce any noticeable change in two generations of mice.

It is gathered that soon after the gas tragedy in December 1984, DRDE, Gwalior, stepped in and although the experiments did not fall with the purview of its charter, it took up the challenge. This proved to be very useful. In the first place, it has demolished several myths circulated at that time, and secondly, it provided the base for further work on the role of MIC.

The research, related basically to MIC, revealed that the temperature and pressure conditions in the tank at the time of the leak were such that it could not have emitted pure MIC. The presence of cyanide in the degraded MIC was estimated by chemical methods by DRDE scientists.

These findings of Indian research scientists assume more significance in the background of the ridicule heaped on them. Their claims were dubbed as anecdotal Indian reports by writers in Western technical magazines.

On the health front, the DRDE conclusions bring little cheer to the victims. In fact, they confirm the worse fears about the probable effects of inhaling the gas. Armed with this knowledge the doctors could follow a much more scientific line of treatment after having a close look at the damage that has been suffered by the human system. The survivors were advised to avoid the type of physical stress that may aggravate the damage to the affected organs.

Interestingly, there is a very significant offshoot of the MIC disaster. For years, the world has been looking for a war gas, which could kill without leaving any visible scars. The ugliness that is created by conventional war gases attracts criticism as the wounds present a very

repulsive sight. On the other hand, those victims of the gas disaster in Bhopal who have survived, have been crippled in such a way that their physical infirmities are not visible. Thus, they do not create the repulsion which is associated with chemical warfare.

From the Indian defence point of view, the degraded MIC released on Indian soldiers in the cold atmosphere of the Himalayas will be a deadly and crippling weapon. After all, 2-3 December 1984, was one of the coldest nights. The MIC, twice heavier than air, and hydrogen cyanide lighter than air, form a very lethal combination. Perhaps this very idea also prompted the extensive research work undertaken by the DRDE, Gwalior.

The role of Union Carbide all these years has been very shady. The product that was being manufactured at the Bhopal plant was sevin. The MIC that was stored in the tank was just an intermediate product. It was not expected that MIC will be used anywhere. Moreover, sevin is a pesticide.

In fact, the Union Carbide carried out a survey of experiences concerning human sensitisation with methyl isocyanate on 86 persons.

The results were totally different from the ones experienced in the Bhopal gas tragedy. This report by Mr N. H. Katcham, submitted in December 1973, said: Appreciable exposure to MIC by both skin contact and by inhalation results in temporary incapacitation followed by recovery and no permanent injury or sensitisation.

The obvious question is if 86 persons did not suffer any permanent injury after exposure to MIC in these studies, why are the people in Bhopal still suffering, Union Carbide which conducted these studies in the United States has to answer this question.

The silence on this appears to be that of a conspirator, and not of an industrial company trapped in an unfortunate accident. The sabotage theory, on which the corporation has been harping for quite some time, also does not have much credence.

The corporation itself committed a large number of errors, the first one being storing all the MIC in one tank, when in fact there were three tanks for it. The primary mistake was storing such a large quantity of MIC when there was hardly any need to do so.

The subsequent behaviour of the corporation shows that while it accepts the moral responsibility for the tragedy, it does not come clean on all fronts related to the world's worst industrial disaster.

The worst part of this tragedy is that even after four years—and this situation may continue for several more years—the plant still stands where it did. It looks like a

nuclear waste that can be disposed of only at a great cost. The killer tank still has about 20 tonnes of MIC and an assorted range of chemicals are also stored in the plant.

Computer Development Center Works on Supercomputer
46001208 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
30 Dec 88 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Dec 29—The Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) is designing and developing a supercomputer based on parallel processing architecture, with a peak computing power of 1,000 megaflops in three years.

The centre will demonstrate applications of national priority on the target machine based on an appropriate parallel processing architecture. A fifth generation computer system will be developed in five years. Six nodal centres have been set up.

Specifications of the target machine have been formulated and design and development of hardware and software and interaction with user agencies is under way. The centre is headed by Mr Vijay Bhatkar.

Work on the centres first mission has started since August 1. Procurement of development facilities and setting up of modern office and laboratory infrastructure is nearing completion. A task force of 40 scientists and engineers has been organized.

This technology mission was launched by the Government as India's national initiative on high performance or supercomputing under the administrative coordination of the Department of Electronics, with a three-year approval budget of Rs 37.5 crores. C-DAC has been registered as a scientific society at the Poona university campus.

C-DAC will also make a range of commercial products, such as VLSI chip set for personal computers, accelerator boards, graphics-based information technology products, and cross-bar switch.

The Centre is attracting the best brains in India by offering good salaries and perks to young engineers and scientists.

It is one of the institutions which is believed to have reduced the brain drain from IITs [Indian Institute of Technology]. Only 70 percent of the best graduates are leaving India now compared to 90 percent till two years ago.

India is also planning to make a million personal computers a year at Rs 5,000 each, but some computers for the schools may be worth Rs 10,000.

Informatics

Meanwhile, the plan to build five Informatics Institutes of Technology has been dropped and, instead, 12 centres of informatics technology will be set up at the five IITs, the Indian Institute of Science and six selected regional engineering universities or colleges.

A provision of Rs 15 crores is likely to be made in the coming financial year to build up the 12 informatics centres at the post-graduate level with an intake of 40 engineering graduates in electronics and computer science.

If five informatics institutes had been approved, the expenditure could have been around Rs 100 crores. Land would have had to be acquired for new buildings. The existing institutions have some covered space available and land for new centres to be built gradually.

The importance of informatics centres is realized because of India's strong position in the world software market and growing shortage of men in the area.

India would like to build up a software and electronics export potential of Rs 1,000 to 2,000 crores within a few years. Human resources are the key to this.

Antarctic Expedition To Set Up New Station 46001224 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 22 Nov 89 p 16

[Text] New Delhi, 21 November (UNI)—The second Indian Antarctica station to be set up by the eighth expedition at Maitri will be totally indigenous in design and construction.

All the equipment and structures of the station to be constructed in 70 days are Indian-made.

The design of the station has been prepared by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and scientists say it is "indigenous" to the last detail, including power generators that will work in sub-zero temperatures.

The construction of the station, located 70 km from the first Indian station at Dakshin Gangotri, is the main task of the 100-member expedition leaving for the icy continent from Goa on 27 November.

Setting up of the station will enable Indian scientists to carry out more detailed experiments in the interiors of the continent.

The station will be constructed on a hard rock ice-free area known as "the Schirmacher oasis," whereas the first station at Dakshin Gangotri is on an ice shelf.

Scientists say the location of the station is on the Schirmacher hill range, adjacent to a beautiful lake.

The site was selected during the first expedition but a camp was established only during the fourth expedition in 1985.

Three cottages were built for camping purposes and for setting up field laboratories and communication centres.

During the seventh expedition, the site was levelled and the foundation for the station was laid.

Scientists regard the construction task as challenging as men and materials will have to be transported to the site.

Five helicopters from the air force and the navy will be engaged in the ferry work.

Arrangements will be made to transport huge quantities of fuel over the ice as well as by air for a winter team which will stay behind to complete the internal works.

The members staying at Maitri will also have adequate stocks of food, clothing and other necessities.

The bulk of the construction work will be undertaken by 42 personnel from the army's corps of engineers and the electrical and mechanical engineers (EME).

The eighth expedition will also carry out repairs and modification to the first station at Dakshin Gangotri.

This will include carrying out repairs of the station's services like the snow melting plant, the ventilation and heating systems, generators and the communication equipment.

The team members will lay new roads to transport food and fuel from the ship to the station. The station's vehicles such as the cranes and snow removers will also be repaired.

The first station at Dakshin Gangotri was set up by the first expedition which landed on the icy continent on 9 January 1982.

It was a summer station during the first two years but became a permanent station in 1984 when the entire building was completed.

The totally self-contained station is a double storeyed wooden structure and is equipped with all essential life support systems.

Correspondent Visits Zomi Training Camp on Border

46001223 *Madras THE HINDU in English*
8 Dec 89 p 10

[Text] At least two, and possibly three, camps where members of the Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV) of the Zomi Reunification Organisation (ZORO) are receiving training have come up in the southern parts of Manipur South district bordering Burma.

Two of these camps are at Haipi Lui near Behiang on the India-Burma border at the Indian end of Tiddim Road and at Sachik Tampak in Sugnu area in the same district.

The training imparted at these camps is claimed to be confined to unarmed combat. The volunteers wear grey uniforms with insignia and stars denoting rank. The camp at Haipi Lui near Behiang is about a kilometre off Tiddim Road at a point where an old bridge has collapsed.

A freshly constructed hut at the beginning of the track that veers to the right of Tiddim Road is guarded by two or three volunteers who regulate access to areas further in the interior Tiddim Road, appearing as a neatly drawn line on the map is in horrible condition from Singhat onwards, all the 30 km of its stretch up to the border where Behiang is situated. The road has never been tended properly and is officially classified as a village link road though it is a vital link of communication to the platoon of the Border Security force (BSF) stationed at Behiang village.

No landmark: The international border is undistinguished by any prominent landmark except two squat border pillars. A narrow stream in between forms the no-man's land. The Burmese village of Khenman with about 25 houses inhabited by people belonging to the same stock as those at Behiang is just a hundred yards or so up a climb beyond the shallow stream that divides the two countries.

There is free movement of men and virtually free movement of headloads of goods of ordinary consumption across the border. Indeed since there are no schools in Khenman (the nearest school on the Burmese side is at Chika about 11 km away) the children of Khenman cross the international border every day to attend one or the other of the four schools at Behiang.

This correspondent visited Behiang and the surrounding areas on Sunday, 4 December and also crossed the border and spent about an hour at Khenman. At both places there appeared to be widespread support for the movement for reunification of the Zomi-inhabited areas.

People on both sides of the border were familiar with the so-called declaration of 19 November by some leaders claiming to speak on behalf of the people of Chin State in

Burma announcing the secession of Chin State and its resolve to join India. But those on the other side were more reticent than those at Behiang who were its most enthusiastic exponents.

The camp at Haipi Lui in Behiang is commanded by Mr Lal Neih Thang who described himself as the chief of the ZRV of the area. The camp had about 60 volunteers, including several girls undergoing training. About 20 of these volunteers were Zomis from across the border, Mr Lal Neih Thang claimed.

Speaking to *THE HINDU* the Joint Secretary of the Zomi National Congress in Behiang, Mr Alosus Nehk-hojang Tungdim claimed that hundreds of such volunteers were receiving training. This appears to be exaggerated but Mr Tungdim is certainly coordinating the activities.

Nothing illegal: Both on the way to and back from Behiang, one could see small groups of young persons with knapsacks on their back moving all wearing the distinctive headgear of the ZRV. Indeed, the authorities at Churachandpur, the district headquarters, said they were aware of the existence of the camps and had allowed the inmates to have their exercises as there was nothing illegal in such activities. But they had stopped them from exercising with lathis. The BSF too is aware of the existence of the camps and Mr Lal Neih Thang said officials of the BSF and state Police had visited the camps.

In sum, uniformed volunteers of a movement sponsored by some political parties of Mizoram and Manipur have established training camps on the vicinity of the India-Burma border. The aim of the political parties and the movement they have created is to ensure the reunification of areas claimed to be inhabited by Zomis, a collective name now being popularised to denote all the Zizkuki Chin tribes inhabiting Mizoram and Manipur, including areas in Burma and Bangladesh, as a part of the Indian Union. The leaders of these movements have also claimed that some student and political leaders of the Chin State have announced the decision of the Chin State to secede from Burma and join India with effect from 19 November this year, the birth anniversary of Indira Gandhi. Those who made such an announcement and those claiming to be behind it have been hosted by political parties in India.

Editorial Sees Continued Threat to Democracy in Pakistan

46070007a *Calcutta DESH in Bengali* 10 Dec 88 p 15

[Editorial: "Continued Threat to Democracy in Pakistan"]

[Text] Pakistan's internal turmoil dates back to its very inception. From a geographic standpoint, the creation of Pakistan with two sections of land, thousands of miles apart was itself an unprecedented event. Between the

two sections lie another country whose air space cannot be used without its permission. More over, these two areas have different languages, and different cultures. From the beginning, though the national infrastructure was democratic, after the death of Quaid-E-Azam Jinnah, no such personality evolved who could steer the country properly. The situation became so unsettled that even after repeated changes of prime ministers, the situation could not be controlled. The military always took advantage of internal uncertainty. The military became the determiner of the nation's destiny—such examples are becoming quite plentiful these days. Naturally, Pakistan's destiny always brought it back to that very spot. Perhaps at that time there was no alternative.

But the problem comes from the realization of the military rulers that they are kings for a short time. They dig their own graves. Their own followers always learn the lesson of treachery they themselves had used to gain power. They also continue to look for opportunities. For that reason, military rulers secretly accumulate mountains of wealth in foreign banks, and build luxurious palaces overseas. When they see indications of political upheaval they run away to their safe haven. They are not supposed to have any patriotism or any sense of responsibility towards their own countrymen. They are a variation of foreign invaders. From time to time, in order to make their position permanent, they take off their military uniform, and play the game of holding democratic elections. Their own followers stuff ballot boxes and common people never find any trace of this. Overnight, military rule becomes democratic government. Of course, that change does not make any difference in the manner of their governing the country. We have seen such farce taking place repeatedly in Pakistan's political arena.

When the eastern section of Pakistan became free, and gained independence, it was hoped that at least this nation would follow the path of democracy. Unfortunately that did not happen. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh continued to maintain their military governments.

General Zia used to promise that soon elections would be held, and he would step aside by handing over the power to the democratically elected party. That promise, of course, was systematically shelved. After hanging Bhutto, the military administration of Pakistan was a bit more relieved.

Of course, that did not mean that Bhutto was an ardent worshipper of democracy, and his heart used to cry out for the common people of Pakistan. In fact, Bhutto was very ambitious and very clever. No one can remain off guard with someone like him as their opponent. Bhutto had to die due to an ordinary charge of murder, which quite commonly takes place in military administration. That was not the main reason, the main reason was that there was a need to find an alibi to remove Bhutto out of the way.

Exit Bhutto, enter Benazir. This fly had been buzzing under Zia's hat for a long time. She would not allow him

to be in peace. This woman continued her single handed and deadly struggle against the mighty iron-man Zia.

After Zia's exit due to the plane crash, an orderly and fair election in Pakistan was like the rolling away of a large rock from Pakistan's chest. Though no single party has the majority to form its own government, at least for the time being, it is a good omen that the wishes of the masses has found their place. However, there is reason to be concerned as well. If Bhutto's daughter fails to form a coalition, or a coalition does not last long, the democratic election will become useless. Pakistan's military has long been used to ruling the country, and they would not let any opportunity go by unused. The burning question is what would be the final outcome of this election.

Columnist Sees Factionalism in Opposition Parties

46070007b Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 10 Dec 88 p 4

[Sunit Ghosh column Capital Politics: "New Janata Dal Leaders Still Are Prisoners of Factionalism"]

[Text] In the anti-Congress camp confusion is paramount. These days in the political circles, the question remains: how far has the effort to unify the non-left front parties during the past 10 months become successful? Or has their effort to unify further expanded the sphere of disunity. The members of the Janata Party who had visualized an alternative to the Congress Party are disgusted at the activities of the leaders of these various parties. Once, Rajiv Gandhi had ridiculed them by saying, "It is difficult to remember which leaders currently belong to which party of the opposition camp." Though this statement made the opposition leaders unhappy, the truthfulness of this statement cannot be denied. As a matter of fact, after the fall of the Janata government at the Center in 1979, the picture of the completely disintegrated opposition parties was not much different than today's, even if the thought process at that time was entirely different from today's. In those days, there was the disappointment of being thrown out of power, and today the ambition of capturing power. The common result of these two attitudes are differences of opinions and resultant confusion.

This confusion started last March when the Lok Dal of Ajit Singh took the decision to merge with the Janata Party. They ignored other high ranking leaders, and almost by force decided to elect Ajit Singh as their president. The trouble started in the ranks of non-left parties from that day. Janata Party almost faced disintegration on the issue of Ajit Singh. Finally, Ramkrishna Hegde, Biju Patnaik, Madhu Dandavate, George Fernandez, and other leaders showed exceptional patience and saved the Janata Party from the calamity. Though the followers of Ajit Singh merged with the Janata Party, followers of Devilal-Bahuguna maintained their separate existence and started negotiating with the Janata Party over again. They decided to form "Socialist People's

Party" with the help of Congress (s) and Vishwapratap Singh's Jan Morcha. When Devilal took an active part in this process, Hembatinandan Bahuguna stood aside. Though he was named the president of the party, he did not have the reign of leadership in his hands. Because of this single handed efforts by Devilal, Chandrasekhar of Janata Party and followers of Ajit Singh were not very happy. In this effort at unification, the Jat leader was proceeding like a bulldozer without caring for anyone else. He had only one agenda in front of him: defeat Rajiv Gandhi in the election, and make Vishwapratap Singh the prime minister. Bahuguna or Chandrasekhar could not agree to that agenda. Though the birth of Socialist People's Party was announced last August, in October at the "inauguration" convention of the new party in Bangalore, the absence of the Socialist Congress created new dissension in the opposition camp. In the mean time, clever Chandrasekhar got wind of the direction of the events, came to an understanding with Devilal and agreed to the proposal of forming a new party with Vishwanathpratap Singh as its president. His objection was to the use of the word "socialist." Due to the absence of Socialist Congress leader Unnikrishnan, the elimination of that word posed no problem at all. Chandrasekhar was very happy, because his favorite Janata Party practically remained in tact.

However, this did not mean that all the differences of opinions in the opposition camp came to an end. Because, when the quarrel is about occupying the position of leadership in the party, it is difficult to please everybody. Though Janata Dal was already established, Lok Dal maintained its identification with Bahuguna, and Jana Morcha remained under the leadership of Ramdhan. Then again, trouble started in the newly formed Janata Party over the nomination of the office bearers. On November 18, in the Capital, when at the meeting of the national committee of the old Janata Party, the birth of the new Janata Dal was approved, representation of various factions in this new party came to the surface. It was informally decided that Vishwanathpratap Singh would become the president of the party; Ramkrishna Hegde would be the vice president; the only one position of secretary general would be held by Ajit Singh; and Madhu Dandavate would be the chairman of the Legislative Board. The election symbol would be a plough in the middle of a circle, and the flag would be the election symbol over a green background. Though the birth of the Janata Dal was quite legal, at first, hoisting of the party's flag at the head office of the party at 7 Jantar Mantar Road created problems between the two groups. For a few days, the flags of both the parties adorned the head office. Later, however, at the intervention of the senior members, this problem was resolved.

However, new troubles started with the announcement of the national Working Committee of the party by Vishwapratap Singh and the formation of the Steering Committee. Last December when Vishwapratap Singh formed the national Executive Committee with 140 members, and the Steering Committee with 22 members, members of different factions expressed their displeasure openly. Sahabuddin was angry because he had been excluded from both the

committees. Ajit Singh complained that in providing proportional representation in the Steering Committee, his party was not provided justice. In fact, in the new party he could not tolerate the prominence of Devilal. "The chip off the old block," Ajit Singh, now considered creating pressure on Vishwanath Pratap over the use of the election symbol. That is his "trump card." Only Ajit Singh has the authority of writing to the Election Commission requesting the use of the election symbol of the old party by the new one. If he refuses to write this letter, Ajit Singh can most certainly bring a new crisis to the party. Roughly 11 years ago, Charan Singh wrote to the Election Commission to deny the use of the election symbol of his Kranti Party and created a serious crisis. It is not yet clear whether in the interest of this small group, Ajit Singh will follow the path demonstrated by his father in the past. In short, the new leaders of the Janata Dal are not able to rise above the realm of the hierarchy of the Hindi belt. To them, representation by their party in the new party and their own positions are most important, not formation of an alternative to the Congress.

From that standpoint, the National Front formed under the auspices of the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh is free from any controversy. With Ram Rao as its chairman and Vishwapratap Singh as its convener, with the exception of BJP and leftist parties, all non-Congress parties participated. Based on the experience of the presence of infighting among the various factions, it appears, most likely the National Front would be the appropriate political organization to represent the unified feeling of India. Even 1 year ago, if all the non-Congress centrist parties had joined the National Front, already one strong alternative party to the Congress would have been in a strong position. If they can maintain the two vital principles of distribution of seats for election based on their proportionate strength, and election of the prime minister from among the majority party, it may not be impossible for the Janata Dal to form a coalition government at the center. In West Bengal, the left front has retained their power during the past 12 years following the same principles. If they are sincere in their desire, it is quite possible to form such a government at the center. From the very beginning, if they had considered the interest of the National Front, most likely, confusions over Janata Dal would not have occurred.

Editorial Claims West Bengal's Left Front Facing Crisis

Left Front's Harmony Broken

46070004 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 27 Oct 88 p 4

[Editorial: "Left Front Crisis"]

[Text] For the Left Front, the final bell is tolling. Regardless of what the leaders might say in public, in spite of their singing of the praise of their "unity," the

fact is very apparent. The Left Front's harmony is broken. A Vina [Indian lute] with broken strings cannot be tuned. Once mutual trust is broken, it is difficult to mend.

At this time, it is difficult to predict when and in what manner the front will crumble. However, there is no doubt that very soon events detrimental to the interests of the unity of the front and the resultant deterioration of relationship among the partners will develop very soon. As a matter of fact, chief minister, Mr Jyoti Basu has already initiated one such move last Tuesday. At the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] meeting held in Dhalkhola, North Bengal, Mr Basu's remarks directed at the Revolutionary Socialist Party [RSP] did not leave anything to the imagination concerning the fate of the unity of the front. Since the chief minister himself has declared that one of the partners of the Left Front has joined hands with the Congress, the crisis for the existence of the Left Front cannot be avoided by any means. People will understand this reality.

It is a well-known fact that the unity of the Left Front terminated quite some time ago. Since the election of the village council (panchayet), the front has been operating in a patchwork manner. It was like trying to keep a dying old patient alive by artificial means. Now the controversy over Bengal Lamps, the resignation of Jatin Chakraborty, etc., even the attempts at patchworking are coming to an end. I heard from a number of veteran Left Front leaders, that even after going through lengthy arguments during the past two sessions of the Left Front on 24 September and on 26 October, no unanimous firm decision could be taken—which is very "worrisome." These front leaders feel that this failure to be able to come to any unanimous decision will remain as a bad precedent, and this very fact might bring disaster to the Left Front.

But why did this happen? The simple answer is it is because CPI(M) has caused it to happen. Today, Jatin Chakraborty resigned from the ministry, and his written controversial notes remain as recorded documents. CPI(M) called Jatinbabu a "liar," and the RSP declared that under no conditions would they withdraw those notes or criticize Jatinbabu. It is very apparent that if CPI(M) had wanted otherwise, the matter would not have reached this far. This matter could have been resolved a long time ago without belittling the prestige of the Left Front before the public scrutiny. It did not happen because CPI(M) did not want it. They could not "deal" with the matter properly. Just as Jyotibabu failed to perform his proper role as the chief minister, Saroj Mukherjee also failed in his role on Alimuddin Street. The poison tree which Jatinbabu had planted has now flourished as a big tree with its branches widespread.

What are the mistakes of Jyotibabu and Sarojbabu? Initially, Chief Minister Jyoti Basu did not see the official note of his Public Works Minister Jatinbabu in time. Or, if he had seen it, he did not take any timely action on it. If the chief minister had seen the note and

discussed it with the public works minister, and instructed him to "rectify" the matter, would the public works minister have the authority to defy it? All the leaders of the Left Front agree that if Jyotibabu wanted to resolve the matter in his executive offices, it could not have gone this far. Even those who are familiar with the personal relationships between Jyotibabu and Jatinbabu, do not deny this assumption. But, Jyotibabu did not do it when the timing was right. He came to his senses when these notes were published in ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA. From that time on, the matter was sent over to Alimuddin Street from the Writers Building [executive offices of the Government]. Sarojbabu continued to make mistakes. On the first day, in an effort to save Jyotibabu, he stated that, Jatinbabu has made false accusations in his statements. The factuality of one official note is being established by the leader of one party, and that even after the note had become public! After considerable muddying of the water when CPI(M) pressured Jatinbabu to withdraw his notes, and when RSP had almost agreed to that, what did Sarojbabu do? He imposed another humiliating condition which was not possible for RSP to accept. As a matter of fact, when the matter became a struggle for honor, instead of pouring water on fire, Sarojbabu poured butter in it. The fire flared up menacingly.

This development took place just before the Pujas [religious festivals]. RSP leader, Makhan Pal, who very much wanted a compromise, went to Sarojbabu and proposed that they should make Jatinbabu withdraw his notes. It is reported that Sarojbabu screamed back at him, "No, withdrawal would not be enough; he will have to apologize. We want apologies." On the ninth day of the Puja, Sarojbabu went one step further. He told Makhanbabu to remove Jatinbabu; there was no other way out. At the Left Front meeting held on 24 October, Sarojbabu once again demanded an apology. But Jyotibabu said that there was no need for apologies; an expression of "regret" would be enough. Even on that day, RSP was agreeable to the proposition of expression of "regret." But Abnegates did not want to settle the matter. He dragged the entire "issue" before the State Committee. At that same time, Jyotibabu became a victim of an influential group inside his own party. That group compelled him to agree to two items: Jatinbabu must be compelled to admit that he issued "false notes," and RSP must be pressured to remove Jatinbabu from the ministry.

It has been reported from an inside CPI(M) source that Jyotibabu personally did not want to go this far. As a matter of fact, he tried in various ways to save the situation by coming to a compromise. According to a leader of one of factions of the Left Front, Jyotibabu had told him that: "I have become very weary of all this. I do not like it at all. Please do something to resolve the matter." But his most sincere wishes could not succeed due to the stubbornness of the leaders of CPI(M).

A small example might make it clearer. On 25 October, the night before the meeting of the Left Front, Mr Tara Dutta, a Marxist Forward Bloc leader came to see the Forward

Bloc leader, Ashok Ghosh in search of a possible solution. Ashokbabu told him that since Jatinbabu had already resigned, RSP should not withdraw the note under any conditions. However, a unanimous proposal could be adopted by the Left Front to regret these developments, and renew their confidence in the leadership of Jyotibabu. Tarababu was so excited at this proposition that he rushed to Jyotibabu on the morning of the day of the meeting of the Left Front. The chief minister also agreed with this idea. Tarababu again rushed to the residence of Ashok Ghosh to convey Jyotibabu's agreement. At the proper time Ashok Ghosh presented the proposal. Jyotibabu did not raise any opposition or objection. He remained quiet. RSP even agreed to describe the entire proceedings as "regrettable." But once again, Sarojbabu became the spoiler. As a result of his strong objections, in spite of Jyotibabu's agreement, a unanimous resolution could not be adopted.

Some say, most likely a segment of Jyotibabu's own party tried to put him in a difficult position. They continued to oppose any move to solve the Bengal Lamps controversy, and thus protect the prestige of all parties concerned. It might be difficult to prove this theory in black and white. However, those leaders of the Left Front who were present at the two meetings to discuss Bengal Lamps noticed that Jyotibabu himself had to prove his own innocence. Not a single CPI(M) leader present at the meeting opened his mouth to declare that Jyotibabu was not a "thief" or "a liar." His own prestige had been damaged. Jyotibabu had to defend himself. From a political perspective, this is not an easy development, specially, in the case of a strictly regimented party such as CPI(M).

Anyway, whatever might have happened, from the Bengal Lamps controversy and the resignation of Jatinbabu, two things became established:

(1) CPI(M)'s highhandedness has created a crack in the Left Front and

(2), peace does not come by surrendering to the powerful party. As a matter of fact, the crack in the Left Front and the simultaneous resignation of Jatinbabu have made one thing very clear that Mr Makhan Pal, Nani Bhattacharyya and other leaders of the RSP who are ready to compromise, may not have the final word. This psychosis and hardening of attitude among the participating parties are making the existence of the Left Front more and more threatened. Now, only to wait for the proper time.

Left Front Crisis Said Deepening

46070004 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 3 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by Debashis Bhattacharya: "Regardless of What Leaders Say, Front's Existing Crisis Is Deepening"]

[Text] Finally, at a meeting of the Left Front held last Tuesday, a decision has been made concerning the

compounding crisis over the matters of Bengal Lamps, Chandan Basu, Jyoti Basu and Jatin Chakraborty. Under tremendous pressure from the CPI(M) it has been decided that the Public Works Minister Jatin Chakraborty has to step down from the ministry. Seven out of nine partners of the Left Front favored this proposal. However, without removing Jatinbabu by a majority vote of the Front, RSP [Revolutionary Socialist Party] has been offered a different way out—let them select someone else as a minister instead of Jatinbabu. If RSP agrees to this proposal, then somehow the prestige of the Left Front would be maintained, the so-called unity would be preserved. However, earlier RSP had adopted a resolution in which it was decided that if at the meeting of the Left Front a decision to remove Jatinbabu was adopted, then RSP would pull out of the ministry. However, they would continue to remain as an ordinary member of the Front. Now by imposing the responsibility of removing Jatinbabu on the shoulders of RSP, the Left Front aggravated the pressures on the nerves of the RSP. Now RSP is facing a crisis. Now it is to be seen whether RSP will assume the responsibility of removing Jatinbabu or not. Prior to the meeting of the Left Front, RSP at its meeting of the State Committee had resolved that they would not agree to the removal of Jatinbabu. They would much rather pull out of the ministry altogether. Now if the RSP does a somersault even before the day was over, the RSP leadership would appear before their membership as spineless creatures. And, their future as a political party in West Bengal would forever become obliterated. Those who do not have self respect have nothing. A place in the ministry handed down to them by someone else cannot be the alternative to self respect. Now everyone is anxiously waiting to find out whether the RSP would follow that road.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether even after the expulsion of Jatinbabu from the ministry, the appearance of Jyotibabu as chief minister would become as bright as before. When Jyotibabu complained to Jatinbabu that he was favoring Bengal Lamps more than others, Jatinbabu politely reminded the chief minister that when Chandan Basu used to work for Bengal Lamps, he came to lobby for his company along with another high ranking person of the company. At that time Jyotibabu himself requested him to "look after" the matter. The PWD minister, in his note, also indicated that the chief minister had instructed him to follow the age old advice, "never resort to writing." The trouble between the chief minister and the PWD minister started right here. If the matter could have been locked up at that spot, the matter could have been easily resolved with cool minds. However it became apparent that the chief minister was not capable of demonstrating that much statesmanship and political expertise. Jyotibabu in his political career has hurt many political rivals by slinging mud. Atulya Ghosh and Prafulla Sen are his trophies. But, no sooner had a little bit mud fallen on him than he lost his ability to consider the consequences. The entire matter could have been solved by considering how much harm has been done by favoring Bengal Lamps, and whether some one has profited from this act.

Without following this track the matter took a different path. Now the entire Left Front is in a crisis. As the chief minister, Jyotibabu has the right to dismiss Jatinbabu. However, Jyotibabu does not have the power to stop the commotion that would arise on the issue of the dismissed

PWD Minister Jatinbabu. Would Jyotibabu be able to stop the allegations of corruption. Jyotibabu has plenty of experience in using false allegations as a political weapon. He also knows very well how one false allegation can bring about some more false allegations.

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